Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this dispute over whether the trial court properly allowed a witness's identification testimony during a criminal trial, the Supreme Court held that a witness who identifies a defendant’s voice can establish a prior special familiarity with the defendant’s voice at any time prior to trial.On appeal from his conviction of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing a witness’s identification testimony because the witness lacked the prior special familiarity to identify Defendant’s voice on phone calls recorded during an ongoing investigation under Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2015). The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the identification testimony met the requirements under Evans because the witness both possessed a prior special familiarity with Defendant’s voice and was a witness who heard the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because allowing voice identification testimony that was acquired during an ongoing investigation is consistent with aiding the jury, this Court now recedes from Evans; and (2) the trial court properly allowed the witness to identify Defendant’s voice on the recorded calls. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court on Petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of mandamus, the Court found that Petitioner failed to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief in the Court related to certain cases and sanctioned him accordingly.Since May 2017, Petitioner filed forty-two petitions or notices with the Court. After the Court dismissed Petitioner’s instant petition, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction and ordered Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pro se requests for relief. The Court then found that Petitioner has demonstrated a pattern of vexatious filing of meritless pro se requests for relief and abused the Court’s limited judicial resources. Accordingly, the Court directed the clerk of court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner related to certain case numbers, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. View "Raghubir v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the Court’s prior denial of Appellant’s successive motion for postconviction relief raising similar claims was a procedural bar to the claims at issue in this appeal.All of the claims raised in Appellant’s Rule 3.851 motion depended upon the retroactive application of Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court previously held that Appellant was not entitled to such relief. Therefore, as to Appellant’s Rule 3.851 motion, in which he sought relief pursuant to Hurst and Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), the Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly denied the motion. View "Lightbourne v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death.After a jury unanimously recommended death, Appellant was sentenced to death. Appellant’s death sentence became final in 2001. In his Rule 3.851 motion, Appellant sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and the Supreme Court’s decision on remand in Hurst. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hurst did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death. View "Kearse v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief under Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).In his motion, Appellant sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and the Supreme Court’s decision on remand in Hurst. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court’s previous denial of Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising similar claims was a procedural bar to the claims Appellant raised in this appeal. View "Booker v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order granting Milo Rose’s pro se motion to dismiss postconviction proceedings and discharge collateral counsel, holding that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rose’s postconviction waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.Rose was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Bjorn Brunvand was later appointed to represent Rose. In 2005, Rose successfully moved to discharge Brunvand and represent himself in state court proceedings. Although counsel was not reappointed to represent Appellant in state court, in 2017, Brunvand, who represented Rose in federal court, filed a second successive postconviction motion on Rose’s behalf, and against Rose’s wishes, seeking relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Rose sought to dismiss the postconviction proceedings and discharge Brunvand. After conducting the inquiry required by Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1993), the postconviction court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the postconviction court followed the procedures set forth in Durocher and Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(i) and did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rose’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. View "Rose v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s orders summarily denying Appellant’s fifth motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and 3.203.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and armed burglary in 1982. In 1994, following a new penalty phase on resentencing, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of ten to two. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s death sentence. In 2015, Appellant filed this postconviction motion seeking relief based on Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Thereafter, Appellant filed an amended postconviction motion seeking additional relief based on Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s intellectual disability claim was foreclosed by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. State, an unpublished order; and (2) Appellant’s Hurst claim was foreclosed by the Court’s decision in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017). View "Blanco v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 seeking relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and the Supreme Court’s decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016).Appellant was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a vote of eleven to one. Appellant’s sentence of death became final in 1986. Appellant later sought relief pursuant to Hurst, without success. The Supreme Court held that Hurst did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death, and therefore, the postconviction court properly denied Appellant’s motion. View "Peede v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the Third District Court of Appeal’s decision in this case and remanded for reconsideration under the correct harmless error standard set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), holding that the Third District improperly departed from the DiGuilio standard.In DiGuilio, the Supreme Court set forth the test to be applied in determining whether an error is harmless. The Court thereafter reaffirmed the harmless error standard numerous times. In the instant case, the Third District departed from the DiGuilio standard. Consistent with precedent, the Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision and remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault, attempted sexual battery, and burglary with an assault or battery, which arose during a single criminal episode, did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.The Fourth District Court of appeal held that because burglary with an assault or battery does not necessarily include an aggravated assault or attempted sexual battery, Defendant’s convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court approved the decision below and disapproved conflicting decisions to the extent that they conflicted with this opinion, holding that Defendant’s convictions were different offenses, prohibited by different statutes, and criminalized different conduct, and therefore, the convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. View "Tambriz-Ramirez v. State" on Justia Law