Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, fleeing and eluding, and resisting arrest with violence. At the penalty phase of trial, the jury recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The trial court followed the recommendation and sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s guilt phase claims but reversed and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding that because the non unanimous jury did not make the findings required under Hurst v. State, the error was not harmless, and Defendant was entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hurst v. State. View "Bradley v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated or felony murder, robbery, and sexual battery. The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five. The trial judge followed the recommendation and sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant appealed his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed the instant motion for postconviction relief, presenting, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied all claims. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion, raising claims of ineffective assistance of resentencing phase counsel and ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Defendant also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, as interpreted by the Court’s decision in Hurst v. State. View "Orme v. State" on Justia Law

In 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison for attempted first-degree murder and attempted robbery with a gun or deadly weapon. The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentences. Thereafter, Petitioner initiated a series of postconviction challenges to his convictions and sentences. The instant mandamus petition concerned the twelfth extraordinary writ petition Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court since 2010. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any future pro se requests for relief. The Supreme Court then directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner that pertained to the criminal case at issue unless such filings were signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. In addition, the Court found that the petition was a frivolous proceeding brought before the Supreme Court by a state prisoner. View "Pray v. Forman" on Justia Law

In 1987, Petitioner was convicted of several counts of uttering forgery. In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and robbery without a weapon. After his convictions and sentences became final, Petitioner repeatedly sought postconviction relief. Since 2000, Petitioner has filed, without success, twenty-six petitions or notices, the vast majority of which have concerned his 1987 forgery convictions and his 1992 robbery convictions and sentences. The instant habeas petition challenged, inter alia, Petitioner’s 1987 forgery convictions and his 1992 robbery convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s habeas petition in part and dismissed it as unauthorized in part. The Court then directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any further pro se requests for relief concerning his 1987 and 1992 convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner’s response failed to show cause why he should not be sanctioned and concluded that the instant petition was a frivolous proceeding brought before the Court by a state prisoner. The Court then directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner that pertained to the convictions at issue unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. View "Desue v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1982, Petitioner pled guilty to several counts of attempted first-degree murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and other offenses. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for those offenses. Thereafter, Petitioner repeatedly sought postconviction relief from his convictions and sentences. The instant habeas petition, in which Petitioner challenged his convictions and sentences along with the circuit court’s application of its barring order to a pro se postconviction motion that Petitioner attempted to file, was the twenty-fifth pro se petition or notice that Petitioner had filed with the Supreme Court since 2000. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in part as meritless and dismissed it in part as unauthorized. In so doing, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction and directed Petitioner to show cause why he should not be barred from filing any future pro se requests for relief. The Court then concluded (1) Petitioner failed to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and (2) Petitioner’s petition in this case is a frivolous proceeding brought before the Supreme Court by a state prisoner. The Court then directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Defendant unless such filings were signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. View "Roberts v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury returned a recommendation in favor of death by a vote of eight to four. The trial court accepted the recommendation and sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and vacated the death sentence, holding (1) it cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that a Hurst v. Florida error did not contribute to Defendant’s sentence; and (2) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and there was no error in the guilt phase of trial. Remanded for a new penalty phase. View "Deviney v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and home invasion robbery. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. Defendant then filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The trial court denied all relief after an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion and also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s claim related to the constitutionality of Florida’s death penalty scheme, vacated Defendant’s death sentence as unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida, and denied habeas relief, holding (1) the Hurst error in Defendant’s penalty phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Defendant was entitled to a new penalty phase; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims were unavailing. View "Baker v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and other offenses. The trial court sentenced Appellant to death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions but reversed his sentences, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase of Appellant’s trial; but (2) Appellant’s death sentence was not based upon factual findings by a jury of his peers, as required by the Sixth Amendment, but upon a nonunanimous jury recommendation, and the Hurst v. Florida errors that occurred during sentencing were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new penalty phase. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury recommended the death sentence by a vote of ten to two. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, raising twelve claims. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s oder as to Appellant’s conviction but vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase, holding (1) Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington; but (2) in light of the nonunanimous jury recommendation to impose a death sentence, it cannot be said that the failure to require a unanimous verdict in this case was harmless. View "Hodges v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Fla. Stat. 384.24(2), which was enacted to prevent the spread of sexually transmissible diseases. The charge arose from a homosexual relationship between Defendant and the victim. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4), arguing that the term “sexual intercourse” applies only to penile-vaginal intercourse. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in L.A.P. v. State, which held that the term “sexual intercourse” as used in the statute applies only to “the penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.” The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the term “sexual intercourse” as used in section 384.24(2) encompasses conduct beyond penile-vaginal intercourse and includes oral and anal intercourse between two men. The Supreme Court approved of the Third District’s decision and disapproved the decision of the Second District in L.A.P., holding that the term “sexual intercourse” in section 384.24(2) encompasses conduct beyond penile-vaginal intercourse. View "Debaun v. State" on Justia Law