Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993, a jury found Appellant Joseph Barnes guilty of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and armed robbery and recommended a death sentence. The trial court sentenced Barnes to death for the murder and also imposed a consecutive life sentence for the armed robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions but vacated the death sentence and remanded the case back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing based on its conclusion that the trial court had improperly restricted the scope of mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing phase of Appellant's trial. On remand, Appellant and the State entered into a sentencing agreement under which Appellant accepted a sentence of life without parole and the State agreed to withdraw its notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The trial court accepted the agreement at a hearing and sentenced Barnes to life without parole on his malice murder conviction. In 2011, proceeding pro se, Appellant filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal. He appealed following the denial of his motion. Because Appellant challenged the validity of the sentencing agreement which could have been resolved against him on the record, the trial court did not err in denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal. View "Barnes v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Robert Clark filed a petition against Chief Justice Carol W. Hunstein, seeking a writ of mandamus to order Chief Justice Hunstein to rule on his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal his habeas corpus case, which was pending with the Supreme Court. The Attorney General moved to dismiss the mandamus petition on the ground that it should have been filed in superior court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that as the highest court in the state, the writ of mandamus may not be issued against the Court or its Justices, and it dismissed Clark's original mandamus petition on that ground. View "Clark v. Hunstein" on Justia Law

Appellant Devin Anthony Grell was convicted of the felony murder of Donny Edouard, with the aggravated assault of Edouard as the underlying felony. He was also convicted of burglary of the Edouard home, two counts of aggravated assault of Brianna Morgan, and five counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, with each of the possession counts using as its predicate felony a different one of the five felonies with which Appellant was charged. He appealed the judgment of conviction, contending that he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel and that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of a defense witness and improperly instructed the deliberating jury in response to a question the jury raised. After reviewing the appellate record, the Supreme Court affirmed six of the nine convictions and vacated two of the convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and one of the aggravated assault convictions in which Morgan was the victim. View "Grell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In December 2005, Appellant Jamerson Mangrum was found guilty of numerous crimes related to the death of 15-year-old Katie Hamlin in July 2002, including three counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated child molestation, and one count each of rape, abandoning a dead body, concealing a death, and tampering with evidence. After his motion for new trial was denied, Appellant obtained new counsel and appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging numerous grounds for reversal. In its first review of this case, the Court rejected all of his arguments except for his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which was remanded to the trial court for a hearing. In 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the ineffective assistance claim. The only witness at the hearing was Appellant's trial counsel, Jimmy Berry. At the hearing, Appellant's new counsel attempted to show that Berry unreasonably failed to support his theory that the victim's medications caused her to have a seizure and asphyxiate and to investigate the possibility that her failure to take her medications caused her death. However, new counsel did not offer any of the victim's medical records or present any expert medical testimony at the hearing. The the trial court denied Appellant's ineffective assistance claim. He appealed that ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was required to offer more than "mere speculation" that the victim's medical records and expert testimony would have bolstered his defense at trial for his ineffectiveness claim. He failed to do so, offering no evidence at the hearing as to the victim's medical records or how their introduction or the introduction of testimony about them would have changed the outcome of his trial. Appellant therefore failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court correctly denied his claim.

Following a jury trial, Reginald L. Lynch appealed his conviction for malice murder, felony murder, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no merit to Appellant's claims, the Supreme Court affirmed.

A jury convicted William David Riley of murdering his three children and of first degree arson, and the jury imposed death sentences for the murders. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Riley's convictions and sentences in 2004. Riley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2005, and he amended his petition in 2007. The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing in 2008. The habeas court granted Riley's petition in an order filed in 2012, vacating both Riley's convictions and his sentences. The Warden appealed in case number S12A0910, and Riley cross-appealed in case number S12X0945. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the habeas court’s decision to vacate Riley's convictions and sentences in the Warden's appeal, the Court affirmed the habeas court's denial of relief on the grounds addressed in Riley's cross-appeal, and remanded for the consideration of Riley's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

Antonio Faniel appealed his convictions for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the fatal shooting of Doreen Young. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt, the admission into evidence of other transactions, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding the challenges to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Appellant Torrance Dunn was convicted of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and five counts of felony obstruction in connection with the shooting death of Ramon Smith. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, in addition, he raised an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Furthermore, his motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed that too. Finding that Appellant's claims lacked merit based on its review of the trial court evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.

In February 2003, appellant Leviticus Burns entered a negotiated guilty plea to a murder charge stemming from his indictment for the October 2001 shooting death of Reginald Berry. Appellant's other charges were placed on a dead docket and he was sentenced to life in prison for murder. In May 2011, appellant moved for an out-of-time appeal which motion the trial court denied. Appellant timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion, and affirmed its denial of appellant's out-of-time appeal.

A jury convicted Donald Hugh Gamble, Jr., of the murder of Quamaine Rickman in Richmond County. Gamble contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient and the trial court erred in its jury instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed because the evidence was sufficient and there was no error in the jury charge, but vacated the conviction and sentence for felony murder due to a sentencing error.