Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State filed an in personam action pursuant to OCGA 16-14-6 (b) of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against Hargurtag Singh and his company Rajan Singh, LLC (collectively, "Singh"), seeking equitable relief including injunctive relief to stop the alienation of Singh's property and the appointment of a receiver over Singh's business and property. The complaint also sought the forfeiture of certain property as defendants in rem pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7. The complaint alleged that Singh was engaging in illegal gambling activity at its Clayton County business, Pure Gas Station, by paying out cash winnings to persons who played electronic gaming devices located in the store. On the same day the action was brought, the trial court granted the State's request that cash and equipment be seized and that certain assets be frozen; granted the State's request for a temporary restraining order; and granted the State's request that a receiver be placed in control of the business. The State and Singh subsequently entered into a consent agreement whereby Singh was allowed to resume operating the business under certain conditions and under the receiver's supervision. Hargurtag Singh later moved to dismiss the action on two grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, and (2) that the State's in personam forfeiture claims were unconstitutional. The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the State had sufficiently alleged violations of OCGA 16-12-22 and 16-12-28. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in, inter alia, "Cisco v. Georgia," (680 SE2d 831) (2009)) the trial court dismissed the State’s in personam claims because it determined that all civil in personam claims under the RICO statute were unconstitutional. The State appealed and Singh filed a cross appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Singh moved to dismiss contending that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction based on its view that the State failed to file an application for interlocutory review; the State contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the in personam defendant on grounds that claims under Georgia's RICO act were unconstitutional; and in the cross appeal, Singh contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Court reversed the decision pertaining to the in personam defendants, finding none of the subsections of OCGA 16-14-6 require proof of criminal conduct on the part of the in personam defendants, but allowed the superior court to enjoin any violations of OCGA 16-14-4 until the case was resolved; and, (3) Singh failed to show that there was no set of provable facts that would entitle the State to relief. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6) was sustained.

Appellant Horatio Zamora was convicted of malice murder and first-degree cruelty to children in connection with the death of 19-month-old Jonathan Castillo. Appellant contended that the evidence at his trial was insufficient to prove him guilty, that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that his right to be present during trial was violated by the dismissal of a juror as a result of bench conferences in which Appellant did not participate. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant acquiesced in the limited trial proceedings that occurred in his absence, and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict him. Accordingly, the Court affirmed his conviction.

Appellant Jamaal Williams was indicted along with Alex Marshall, Melvin Daniels, Bennie Durham, and Kyle Oree for numerous crimes related to the shooting death of Robert Daughtry, Jr. Marshall and Daniels pled guilty to murder and other charges, and they testified for the State at the joint trial of Appellant, Durham, and Oree. The jury found Appellant guilty of felony murder, kidnapping, and other crimes. Durham and Oree were also found guilty of felony murder and other charges. The Supreme Court already affirmed their convictions. In this appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the kidnapping felony that served as the predicate offense for his felony murder conviction, as well as the trial court's admission of alleged hearsay statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence ultimately admitted at trial established that Appellant, the other three attackers, and Oree were part of a conspiracy to assault and kill the victim. Furthermore, there was no error in the district court's admission of the alleged hearsay statements at issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction.

Appellant Mathew Wilkins was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery in connection with the death of Marlisa Wells. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and the admission of certain items. Furthermore, Appellant contended that the State engaged in unconstitutional race-based discrimination by using three of its peremptory strikes during voir dire, and that the State's display of several nondescript boxes, paper evidence bags and a foam exhibit board tainted the venire and denied him a fair trial. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The record in this case supported the trial court's finding that the reasons offered for the State's strikes were race-neutral and not pre-textual. The Court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion when it determined the view of the State's boxes did not prejudice the venire. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence.

Appellant Fredrick Terry was found guilty of and sentenced for the felony murder of James Hansell and for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial. Furthermore, he challenged the jury instructions ultimately given by the trial court. Finding the evidence sufficient for the jury to convict him, and that the trial court made no error in its admission of certain evidence and in its instructions to the jury, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence.

Following a jury trial, appellant Steven Wayne Abston was convicted of malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of certain crimes in connection with the stabbing death of his father, Jeffrey Abston. Abston appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Appellant Brandon Green was convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of Teressa Owens. On appeal, he contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to certain hearsay testimony. More specifically, he argued trial counsel should have objected when the prosecution introduced out-of-court statements: made to a police officer by an eyewitness who lived in the same room as Appellant and who said she saw Appellant put a gun to the victim's head and pull the trigger; made to the victim's brother by several bystanders shortly after the shooting informing him that appellant and the victim had an argument; and, that they had been dating. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Pro se Appellant Dexter Wendell Green appealed a trial court's order which granted the State's motion to dismiss appellant's motion for an out-of-time appeal. In 1990, appellant entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder. In May 2011, appellant moved for an out-of-time appeal, claiming he was not indicted, or that he involuntarily waived the indictment, and that the trial court failed to question him about the voluntariness of his plea. Appellant also alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could withdraw his guilty plea. Finding that Appellant's claims lacked merit, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Derrick Cartwright was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The trial court denied Cartwright's motion for a new trial and he appealed, challenging only the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Petitioner Jose Alonso Martinez was not a citizen of the United States, but he became a permanent legal resident in 2008. In 2010, he entered a guilty plea to aggravated battery and received a probated sentence of seven years. As a result, Petitioner has since been taken into custody by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and faced deportation and banishment from the United States. In 2011, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel. After a hearing, the habeas court granted relief, finding that plea counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner that he "need not be concerned about immigration consequences" of entering the guilty plea. The habeas court further found that, although the trial court warned Petitioner that he would almost certainly face deportation should he proceed with the plea, he was also receiving advice from his attorney calling into question the information from the trial court, and he likely relied more heavily on counsel's advice. The State appealed the habeas court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the habeas court's decision on the prejudice prong was based primarily on its finding that Petitioner "was also receiving advice from his attorney and that advice called into question the information he was receiving from the court. . . . Such a finding of a contemporaneous contradiction of the trial court, if authorized by the evidence, may undermine the curative effect of an otherwise clear warning of adverse immigration consequences. So too may prior advice by counsel to disregard any such warning. However, neither circumstance is demonstrated by the evidence in this case." Regardless of the prior erroneous advice from plea counsel, the trial court correctly informed Petitioner of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and he therefore failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.