Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Leonard Maurice Drane of committing murder and aggravated battery against Renee Blackmon and sentenced him to death. Initially on direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on a number of issues and held that the evidence for the convictions and for the statutory aggravating circumstances supporting the death sentence was sufficient. However, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court to conduct a hearing regarding the State's use of peremptory strikes during jury selection and regarding the court's exclusion of testimony of a jail inmate to whom Defendant's co-defendant had allegedly confessed during the guilt/innocence phase of testimony. After the hearing, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and death sentence. Defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in 2000 which was denied in 2009. In 2010, in response to his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of habeas relief, the Supreme Court remanded Defendant's habeas application for further consideration of two issues (not relevant to this appeal). That same year which the habeas application was still pending, Defendant filed an extraordinary motion for new trial in the original trial court claiming that Defendant's co-defendant had confessed to a parole officer as the sole perpetrator of the murder. This motion was denied, and Defendant appealed that denial to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the "newly discovered" evidence of the parole-officer-confession would not have produced a different result at trial had it been admitted. As such, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the extraordinary motion for a new trial, and affirmed the court's judgment.

After a jury trial, Appellant Sam Green was found guilty of the malice and felony murder of Candy Wright, a separate charge of aggravated assault against Ms. Wright, and the rape and aggravated assault of Leanna Ziel. The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law, and the charge of aggravated assault against Ms. Wright was merged into the malice murder count. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on the remaining guilty verdicts and imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for murder and for rape and 20 years for aggravated assault. A motion for new trial was denied, and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant contended that the evidence would have been insufficient if, as argued in other enumerations, certain evidence had been excluded and trial counsel had not been ineffective. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crimes of which he was convicted. Furthermore, the Court found Appellant's allegation that his trial counsel was ineffective to be unsupported by the record. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decisions in Defendant's case, and affirmed the final judgment.

Defendant Willie Henry Lewis appealed his convictions for the malice murders of Xavier Dinkins and Kejaun Webb, as well as a variety of other crimes that occurred over a four-day crime spree. On appeal, Defendant argued that a family tie between a prospective juror and the prosecuting attorney was grounds to strike that juror from voir dire for cause. Further, Defendant argued that the admission of certain facts into evidence were improper, and grounds for reversal of his conviction. He also contended that much of the evidence entered against him was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions with respect to voir dire and the admission of evidence, however, the Court could not determine from the record whether Defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective had merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for a hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue.

Appellant Paul Mathis was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the 2006 shooting death of Jurell Williams. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting evidentiary errors and ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. Furthermore, the Court found Appellant's remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Following a May 1995 jury trial, Defendant Eric Kelley was convicted of two counts of felony murder (with the underlying felony of aggravated assault) in connection with the shooting deaths of two people at a pawn shop. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on appeal. In 2006, Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, amended in 2008 and 2009. Following an October 2009 hearing, in 2011 the habeas court granted Defendant relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Specifically, the habeas court found that appellate counsel was ineffective for having failed to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in charging the jury on both subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) of OCGA section 16-5-21 when the indictment stated only that Defendant had committed aggravated assault in connection with felony murder by shooting the victims with a pistol. The Warden of Scott State Prison appealed that ruling. The habeas court relied on "Chapman v. Georgia" (548 SE2d 278 (2001)) in arriving at its conclusion. However, as the Supreme Court "made clear" in "Sharpe v. Georgia" (S12A0677 (2012)), "[w]here the indictment charges a defendant committed an offense by one method, it is reversible error for the court to instruct the jury that the offense could be committed by other statutory methods with no limiting instruction. The defect is cured, however, where … the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court found that the trial court specifically provided jurors with the indictment and instructed it that the burden of proof was with the State to prove every material allegation. As such, any error in overcharging the jury was cured. Accordingly, the Court reversed the habeas court's decision to grant Defendant the relief he requested.

Following the grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief brought by defendant, the warden appealed, contending that the trial court erred in its finding that cause and prejudice had been shown to raise the procedural bar on defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that the habeas court erred by reaching defendant's claims of ineffective assistance at all because they had previously been waived. The habeas court then compounded this error by inserting its own additional grounds, namely lack of preparation of trial counsel. Moreover, even if defendant had properly presented a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, his habeas petition would still have to be denied under Strickland v. Washington. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

The court granted certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court erred in holding that defendant should have been allowed to present evidence in support of his justification defense about a previous incident of violence allegedly committed by the victim against third parties, where defendant claimed that he had heard of the previous incident but did not witness it or have any other evidence in support of the claim. The court held that the trial court correctly refused to allow defendant to testify about the unsupported alleged violent incident involving the victim and third parties. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, burglary, and other related offenses in 1998 and was sentenced to death. The habeas court subsequently granted defendant habeas relief, vacating all of his convictions on several grounds. The court held that the habeas court erred in granting defendant relief on his Brady claim; on the ground that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter; on his claim of several instances of prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error in connection with that alleged misconduct; on his claim that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte stop the alleged prosecutorial misconduct; and in vacating defendant's convictions based upon a finding of cumulative error. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

After being indicted for certain theft crimes, defendant filed a pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue on appeal was whether the holding in Hicks v. Scott, preventing a pro se prisoner in a post-conviction habeas case from being dismissed for failure to comply with certain appellate procedural requirements unless he was correctly informed of those requirements, should be extended to pre-trial habeas cases and whether the holding in Hicks should be overruled. The court concluded that compliance with OCGA 5-6-35 could not be excused for failure to inform defendant of its requirements and the holding in Hicks could not be applied in this pre-trial habeas case. Accordingly, the application for discretionary review filed by defendant was subject to dismissal as untimely, and the current appeal, not being authorized, must be dismissed.

Defendant and his co-indictee were separately tried for the malice and felony murder of the victim and for other offenses. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his amended motion for a new trial after he was convicted of felony murder during the commission of criminal attempt to possess cocaine. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the crimes for which he was convicted. However, defendant was erroneously sentenced on both felony murder and the underlying felony. The court also concluded that defendant waived his argument that the trial court should have given his requested instructions regarding inherent dangerousness; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing a juror; the trial court did not err in granting a motion in limine made by the State to exclude certain demonstrative evidence; the trial court did not abuse its discretion under OCGA 17-16-6 in fashioning an appropriate remedy and in refusing the harsh remedy of evidence exclusion for the untimeliness of discovery; and the court rejected defendant's claims that a new trial was required and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.