Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime. The court rejected defendant's claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by introducing into evidence his videotaped statement to police without first redacting where he invoked his right to counsel and him asking God to have mercy on his soul; that the trial court erred by truncating his testimony that he was actually afraid of the victim and only acted in self-defense; that the trial court erred by not reading aloud to the jurors two stipulations agreed upon by the parties; that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to an arresting officer that he had consumed seven alcoholic beverages on the night of the murder; and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury regarding Miranda and the voluntariness of statements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and acquitted of malice murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim. On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant appealed his conviction for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, contending, among other things, that the trial court incorrectly charged the jury and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court rejected defendant's claim of error regarding the jury charge where trial courts did not have to follow an exact formula in instructing juries so long as the charge as a whole ensured that the jury would consider whether the evidence of provocation and passion might authorize a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. The court also rejected defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant himself placed the evidence at issue before the jury and where trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to a proper argument. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his conviction for malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, contending that a co-defendant's statement was introduced into evidence in violation of Crawford v. Washington. The State correctly conceded that the co-defendant's statement to police during the investigation of the victim's murder was testimonial in nature and that it was improperly admitted because defendant could not confront the co-defendant, who died before the trial commenced. Under the facts of the case, however, this Crawford violation was harmless where the co-defendant's statement was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and other related offenses in connection with the shooting death of the victim. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strikes during jury selection and violated his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights relating to jury selection. The court held that a trial court's finding as to whether the opponent of a strike has proven discriminatory intent was entitled to great deference and would not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Applying this standard, defendant's contention that the State failed to give an adequate nondiscriminatory reason for striking Juror 24 was unpersuasive. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was indicted for aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and felony sexual battery. At issue was whether a criminal suspect who was told by police officers that he would be able to return home after questioning regardless of what he said had received a "hope of benefit" that rendered his subsequent confession inadmissible at trial under OCGA 24-3-50. The court held that the answer was no, as long as the officers' statements did not amount to a promise that the suspect would never be charged or would face reduced charges or a reduced sentence based on what he told the officers during the interview. In this case, defendant could not reasonably have construed the officers' statements as such a promise and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Lewis Dempsey admitted to shooting Dillard Jewell Crane but claimed self-defense. In Case No. S11A1875, the State appealed the trial court's order granting Dempsey's motion to quash indictment number 10-CR-003-DB (second indictment). In Case No. S11X1876, Dempsey cross-appealed the trial court's earlier denial of his motion to quash indictment number 09-CR-325-MM (first indictment). The court agreed with Dempsey that the trial court should have granted his motion to quash the first indictment were the juror at issue was ineligible to serve on a grand jury under OCGA 15-12-60(b)(1) because he was an elected local government officeholder. The court held, however, that the effect of the juror's presence as to the first indictment was to nullify the proceedings at which he was purportedly grand juror. As there was never a proceeding at which a legally constituted grand jury received testimony, the trial court properly quashed the second indictment.

Defendant appealed his conviction of felony murder predicated on a drug transaction and attempted violation of the state's controlled substances act. The court held that the trial court was authorized to instruct the jury pursuant to OCGA 16-3-21(b)(2); given the latitude allowed during closing argument, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection to the prosecution's closing argument; even if it had been error to allow the prosecutor's comments during closing, the trial court's subsequent instructions and responses to the jury's inquiry would render the error harmless; there was sufficient nexus between the violation of the state's controlled substances act and the victim's death to show that defendant's participation in the drug transaction was the proximate cause of the victim's death; the trial court properly instructed the jury; and defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were rejected.

This case arose from the arrest of defendant for various crimes, including an attempted violation of the state's controlled substances act following an exchange of telephone messages between defendant and law enforcement officers who posed as another individual. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a police officer's search of a cell phone incident to arrest was lawful. The court found that the Court of Appeals gave appropriate guidance regarding the scope of a search of a cell phone incident to arrest and reviewing the reasonable scope of the search was largely a fact-specific inquiry. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his conviction for malice murder in connection with the death of a 63-year-old victim. Although the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce similar transaction evidence without conducting the hearing required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 13.3(b) and making the necessary findings on the record. Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a Rule 31.1 hearing and entry of proper findings or, if need be, a new trial.