Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty, among other things, of malice murder and attempting to elude a police officer in connection with a shooting death during a failed drug deal and a subsequent high-speed chase involving five police officers. The court held that, based on the evidence supporting defendant's participation in a felony drug transaction at the time of the fatal shooting, the trial court was authorized to instruct the jury pursuant to OCGA 16-3-21(b)(2). The court also held that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that defendant willfully led police on a dangerous high speed chase after being given clear signals by five separate police vehicles to stop and therefore, the trial court properly sentenced defendant on five separate counts of attempting to elude a police officer. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to strike Juror No. 7 for cause and the trial court did not err in its jury instructions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, a 73-year-old, appealed his conviction of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in connection with the death of his elderly and wheelchair-bound ex-girlfriend. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of malice murder; because the similar transaction evidence from his ex-wife and his ex-girlfriends was sufficient to establish the required similarity between the charged crime and the assaults defendant inflicted on his ex-wife and his ex-girlfriends, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse two jurors; the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence a letter written by the victim; defendant has failed to provide a basis for providing him with a new trial or having his conviction overturned; and the court rejected defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This is an interim appellate review of a case in which the State sought the death penalty. Defendant had been indicted for malice murder and false imprisonment. The court granted defendant's application for interim review and directed the parties to address whether the trial court erred in its order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to exclude his statements to law enforcement officers, in granting his motion to suppress his clothing, in ruling that the evidence of his prior convictions would be admissible under OCGA 24-9-84.1(b) in the event he testified at trial, in ruling admissible as similar transaction evidence certain prior acts of defendant, and in denying defendant's motion regarding the State's destruction of blood evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with direction.

Defendant was found guilty of malice murder for killing his roommate and theft by taking his car. Defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of all the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt; the trial court did not err in allowing alleged hearsay testimony; because the evidence supported the inference that others could have been involved in the murder, and even defendant himself tried to implicate another, evidence supported the trial court's decision to include a charge on parties to a crime; and defendant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of the investigator's testimony on hearsay grounds could not amount to ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted for the malice murder of the victim and other related crimes and was sentenced to life in prison. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial and he appealed. The court held that defense counsel affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the admission of defendant's statements at trial and he has waived review of this issue on appeal; there was no likelihood the omission of a specific charge on transferred justification affected the outcome of the trial and the trial court did not plainly err; because the evidence in this case did not show the sudden, violent, and irresistible passion required to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge; there was no merit in defendant's assertion that the trial court committed error by refusing to charge the jury on the defense of mistake of fact; and defendant could not demonstrate prejudice in regards to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The court granted defendant a certificate of probable cause to appeal an order of the Superior Court denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus in order to consider whether the habeas court erred in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to further investigate the actual validity of defendant's prior convictions in the face of the State's notice of intent to rely on those convictions for sentencing enhancement purposes. Finding that it was not error to reject the claims of the ineffectiveness of counsel on the basis urged, the court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief.

This appeal returned to the court following its grant in 2010 of defendant's pro se application for a certificate of probable cause and its remand of the case to the habeas court with direction "to analyze and make appropriate findings and legal conclusions regarding the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel." On remand, the habeas court concluded that defendant did not satisfy the prejudice prong and denied relief. The court held that there was evidence to support the factual findings made by the habeas court and the legal conclusions drawn by the habeas court were sound. Therefore, the court affirmed that court's determination that defendant failed to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and its judgment that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for the 1993 felony murder of the victim. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court improperly curtailed the jury's consideration of a voluntary manslaughter conviction as a possible alternative to convicting him of felony murder. The court held that nothing in the recharge suggested that the jury was required to acquit defendant of malice murder and felony murder before considering whether he committed voluntary manslaughter. Moreover, when the jury initially returned the handwritten verdict sheet not showing a verdict on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court instructed the jury on how to return such a verdict if it so desired. Therefore, there was no Edge v. State violation and the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his 1996 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the bludgeoning death of the victim. The court held that the trial court did not plainly err in considering the jury's request for recharge to have been tacitly withdrawn; the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to rehear portions of the trial testimony during deliberations where the trial court's instruction adequately addressed defendant's concerns; the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based on improper juror contact and in denying his new trial motion raising the same claim where that court found that the exchange was momentary and had no effect on the verdict; and defendant's ineffective of assistance of counsel claimed failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, kidnapping, and other charges arising out of the shooting death of the victim. After the trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial, he filed a plea in bar contending that double jeopardy prohibited a second trial on the same charges. The trial court granted the plea in bar and the State appealed. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal of the new trial order, the court dismissed that portion of the appeal. In regards to the plea in bar, the court concluded that double jeopardy did not bar a second trial since the grant of the new trial was based on the improper admission of evidence. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's grant of the plea in bar.