Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of malice and felony murder, as well as possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A motion for new trial was denied and defendant appealed. The court held that the trial court did not err in rejecting the claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if his attorney had offered evidence of a prior violent act by a co-indictee. The court also held that the trial court did not err in giving the suggested pattern jury instruction on mere presence and mere association.

Defendant was convicted of the malice and felony murders of two victims. The felony murder verdicts were vacated by operation of law. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on the malice murder verdicts and imposed two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was denied and defendant timely appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder might have been committed in DeKalb County; the evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murders; defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct was without merit; similar transaction evidence at issue was admissible; the trial court's statements were not coercive; claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit or waived; and defendant's severance claim was waived. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants, Thomasina Beverly Mack and Demario Steven Smith, were convicted of the malice murder of Mack's 30 month old child, who died as a result of blunt-force head trauma and strangulation. The court held that the trial court did not err when it denied Mack's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal or in denying Mack's motion to sever her trial from that of Smith; allowed the testimony of the deputy examiner; overruled Mack's objections to the prosecutor's closing argument; denied the portion of Smith's motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and denied Smith's motion to continue the hearing on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, the judgments were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, malice murder of his pregnant girlfriend and her sister. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed. The court held that, viewed in context, defendant's statement "I can't go on answering these questions" was not an unambiguous and unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent. Accordingly, agents had no obligation to cease the interview and it was not error to admit defendant's incriminating statements into evidence. The court also held that, even assuming the trial court erred by admitting the challenged testimony based on hearsay, the error was harmless because other admissible evidence covered the same subject matter. The court further held that it was not error to admit bullets and bullet casings found at the scene of the crime into evidence at trial.

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction involving murder, burglary, and related offenses. The court held that the trial court did not err by excusing potential jurors; convictions for eight of the alleged offenses were proper; defendant's contention that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to state an incorrect interpretation of the law was without merit; the court rejected defendant's contention that a new trial was required because his conviction for malice murder as a party to the crime was mutually exclusive of his convictions of tampering with evidence; the trial court did not fail to instruct the jury on the manner by which he allegedly committed the aggravated assaults in Counts 11 and 12; any issues with regard to the felony murder counts was moot because defendant's felony conviction was vacated by operation of law; the trial court did not err in denying a motion for mistrial; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance; and the trial court had sufficient evidence to sentence defendant as a recidivist.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and other related offenses in connection with the stabbing of one victim and the aggravated assault of another. On appeal, defendant challenged certain evidentiary rulings of the trial court and asserted that he was denied effective assistance of trial. The court found no error and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder of one victim and aggravated assault of three other victims. Defendant was also convicted of armed robbery of each of the four victims and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the crimes against each of the four victims. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. Defendant's testimony presented an account of events that differed from that presented by the State through the testimony of the surviving victims. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the drive-by shooting of the victim. Defendant contended that he did not receive a fair trial because the trial court restricted his cross-examination of an eyewitness and the prosecutor improperly injected his character into evidence. The court held that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting impeachment related to a witness's first offender plea or denying the motion for a mistrial, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant challenged his guilty plea to two counts of malice murder. The court affirmed where the trial court found that defendant fully understood the terms of the negotiated agreement, including that he would be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The trial court also found that defendant's plea counsel appropriately recommended that defendant plead guilty, and accepted a life sentence without the possibility of parole, due to the grief that a trial would cause the victims' families and the emotion and strain it would cause defendant. Therefore, the trial court's factual findings were supported by the record.

Defendant was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault after the victim was fatally shot with a crossbow. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for discharge and acquittal and plea in bar, alleging that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the presumptive prejudice arising from delay in bringing defendant to trial was insufficient for him to prevail on his constitutional speedy trial claim, given that the State's pre-indictment delay was not intentional, that defendant was dilatory in asserting his rights, and that there was not any demonstrable prejudice to his defense.