Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and other offenses in connection with the death of the victim. On appeal, defended asserted, inter alia, that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The court held that because a report detailing the findings of a private consulting company hired by the mayor to investigate the operations of the police department was hearsay and inadmissible, defendant had not shown how its disclosure would have led to admissible evidence. Therefore, the report did not constitute Brady material. The court also held that defendant's assertion that Brady was violated because the State refused to identify a witness was without merit where defendant was aware pretrial that the State had taken statements from the witness. The court further held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a 2004 convenience store homicide as a similar transaction. The court finally rejected defendant's contention that the trial court should have permitted him to cross-examine an officer about any possible bias and rejected defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a jury view. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant entered negotiated pleas of guilty to charges of murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his out-of-time appeal. The court held that defendant was not entitled to an out-of-time appeal for his contention that the indictment was void for failing to allege what instrument was used to shoot the victim where the indictment was not lacking an essential element of the crime of malice murder; for defendant's challenge that the indictment was void because the name of the grand jury foreman and the date of offense as to Count II were altered where the claims were not supported by the record; for defendant's claim that the trial court failed to swear him in prior to his guilty plea where the issue could be decided against him on the existing record; and for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because such claims could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record. Accordingly, his remedy was to file a petition for habeas corpus; the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised; and defendant was not entitled to the appointment of counsel on his motion for out-of-time appeal.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and other related offenses in connection with the stabbing death of one victim and the aggravated stalking of another. Defendant appealed. The court held that defendant failed to preserve his contention that the trial court violated OCGA 24-3-38 by refusing to allow the witness to testify to the "complete statement" defendant made to her in the hours following the stabbing; the court agreed with the trial court's credibility determination as well as its conclusion that an acquittal would not likely have resulted had the jury heard the witness' testimony in its entirety and therefore, defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the counts; even assuming arguendo, the court found no error in the admission at trial of defendant's first offender plea; and the trial court did not plainly err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on mutual combat.

Defendant appealed the habeas court's denial of his motion to transfer his habeas action. Defendant sought transfer of his habeas petition to the superior court of the county to which he had been transferred after properly filing his petition in his original county of detention. The court held that there was no error in the denial of the motion to transfer and affirmed the judgment where Wilkes v. Terry held that a habeas court had the discretion, but generally was not required, to transfer a habeas petition in the event the petitioner's county of detention changes.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for malice murder and armed robbery, assault of the victim with intent to rob, the aggravated assault of the victim by shooting him with a deadly weapon, and for being in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant appealed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of malice murder and armed robbery. However, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault with intent to rob must be vacated because it merged into the armed robbery conviction, and the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon to shoot the victim must be vacated because it merged as a matter of fact into the malice murder conviction. The court also held that the trial court's findings of facts were not clearly erroneous and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress defendant's custodial statements. The court further held that defendant did not overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and therefore, the trial court did not err when it concluded that defendant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant appealed an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 1988 guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At issue was whether the habeas court erred in holding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the guilty plea hearing. The court concluded that it was error for the habeas court to find a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel where defendant was never informed that he had a right to counsel during the plea hearing. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions, as well as the denials of his "plea in bar and motion to dismiss" and "general demurrer," which both asserted that the indictment returned against him was defective because the non-murder crimes charged therein were time-barred. The court held that there was no abuse of the superior court's discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial; the superior court did not err in failing to dismiss the indictment where neither prejudice nor deliberate adverse action on the part of the State had been shown; and the superior court did not err in failing to grant his "plea in bar and motion to dismiss" and his "general demurrer," where the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under OCGA 17-3-2(2). Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a deadly weapon at a public gathering, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault. The court held that defendant did not cite to any evidence indicating, or evidence that otherwise showed a Brady violation, and thus he failed to meet his burden; to the extent that defendant's enumeration of error embraced the motion for mistrial, without a contemporaneous objection, no error was shown in the denial of the motion; and trial counsel was not deficient. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his convictions for the malice murder of Rocky Heard, the aggravated assault of Ray Dean Heard, possession of a firearm during the commission of the crime of aggravated assault, affray, and simple battery. The court held that review of the record revealed that the conviction for the aggravated assault of Rocky merged into the malice murder conviction as a matter of law. Accordingly, the separate judgment of conviction and sentence for the aggravated assault of Rocky must be vacated. The court held, however, that the trial court did not clearly err by denying introduction of prior acts of violence by Rocky and Ray Dean against third parties; the trial court did not err in giving the jury instructions; and the trial court did not err in determining that defendant was advised of his right not to testify. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Defendant was found guilty of malice and felony murder of her husband, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, concealing the death of another, and two counts of cruelty to children in the second degree. The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law and the district court entered judgments of conviction on the remaining guilty verdicts. The court held that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to reject the defense's theory that the victim's death was a suicide and to find defendant guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that because the trial court correctly entered judgment of conviction on the malice murder verdict and not the felony murder count, the court need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence as to that alternative charge. The court further held that the jury was authorized to conclude that the presence of an unembalmed corpse in the minor children's home for nearly three days was a criminally negligent act constituting an unsanitary condition and to infer from the reaction of the police officers that the resulting stench caused the children excessive mental pains. The court finally held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.