Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1995, a jury found defendant guilty of rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, and six counts of child molestation. The court subsequently granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a trial court had the authority to grant an out-of-time discretionary appeal in a criminal case as a remedy for counsel's failure to timely file a discretionary application. The court held that Georgia courts did not have such authority where, as here, that remedy was not required by a violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

The court granted the interlocutory application of defendant to review the trial court's denial of a motion for bond defendant filed pursuant to OCGA 17-7-50. The appeal required the court to construe the statute to determine what constituted "confinement" that triggered the 90-day period within which the case of an unindicted and confined arrestee must be considered by the grand jury. The court held that, since it was undisputed that defendant was under arrest, was taken to the hospital pursuant to governmental authority, and was physically restrained during his two-day hospital stay as he was handcuffed to the hospital bed under the watchful eye of a deputy sheriff in an area of the hospital that contained jail cells, defendant was "in confinement" during his hospital stay and the 90-day period in which his case was required to be presented to the grand jury commenced on the day he was arrested. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion for bail on the charges for which defendant was arrested and held for 90 days without grand jury action. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony when he punctured Jeffrey Waldon's femoral artery by a knife he held during a physical struggle between the two men. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he was immune from criminal prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2. The trial court granted defendant's motion finding that Waldon had assaulted defendant by head-butting him in the mouth; at the time of the confrontation, defendant was in fear of death, or in fear of having a forcible felony committed against him by Waldon; and Waldon had placed defendant in reasonable fear for his life, which indicated that defendant had acted in his own self-defense pursuant to OCGA 16-3-24.2. The state appealed and the court affirmed the trial court's findings, holding that defendant would have been justified in using deadly force against Waldon to protect himself, although he was no required to do so in order to be immune from prosecution. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that defendant met his burden of proving that he was entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to OCGA 16-3-24.2. Consequently, the state's argument that defendant somehow was not entitled to immunity because he was engaged in the crime of aggravated assault during the confrontation with Waldon was without merit.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another. The felony murder was subsequently vacated by operation of law, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault count into malice murder and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for malice murder and to a consecutive ten-year term for concealing the death of another. After a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the state clearly met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly in DeKalb County not only for the murder, but also for the crime of concealing the death of another. The court further held that trial counsel did not err by failing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause and that defendant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire by failing to examine the two prospective jurors. The court finally held that the medical examiner's testimony was admissible and that an audio recording of a prior inconsistent statement made by defendant was admissible. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, reckless conduct, aggravated battery, tampering with evidence, and possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held, however, that the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant for felony tampering with evidence. Inasmuch as the evidence showed defendant threw the murder weapon away, thereby tampering with evidence in his own case and not that of another, he could not be convicted of a felony, but only convicted of a misdemeanor. Accordingly, it was erroneous for the trial court to impose a five-year probated sentence for the tampering with evidence conviction. The court also held that defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it allowed two witnesses to testify on cross-examination that they did not take seriously the threats made by the victim was without merit; and the charges given on justification, provocation, and voluntary manslaughter did not preclude the jury from considering defendant's claim of self-defense. The court further held that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it did not charge the jury on the issue of lack of a duty to retreat when a person acted in self-defense; when it recharged the jury on malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter; and when it refused to give defendant's requested charge on transferred justification. The court finally held that the judgment of conviction and the sentence for reckless conduct must be vacated where the reckless conduct charge should have merged into the aggravated battery charge as a matter of fact. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims of error.

Defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes after a pool hall fight. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, the admission of his post-arrest statement, and the trial court's sustaining an objection to his cross examination of a state witness. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held that neither fear that someone was going to pull a gun nor fighting prior to a homicide were types of provocation demanding a voluntary manslaughter charge and, moreover, defendant testified that he fired because he was "just scared," and acting out of fear was not the same as acting in the heat of a sudden irresistible passion. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; defendant's post-arrest statement was admissible where he was advised of his Miranda rights both verbally and in writing, and he signed a waiver; and the trial court did not err when it limited defendant's cross examination of the detective who interrogated him where the trial court merely imposed reasonable limits on cross examination. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and other crimes arising out of the shooting death of his wife. Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court did not err by concluding that the search of defendant's residence was authorized due to exigent circumstances and the challenged evidence was admissible at trial. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that a witness's testimony about the victim's statements bore sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule; that contrary to defendant's assertion, it followed that courts were under no obligation to place a defendant's decision whether to testify on the record and it was not error for the trial court to fail to do so here; that there was no error in the trial court's removal of a juror after concluding the juror slept through the presentation of portions of the evidence; and that defendant received effective representation of trial counsel.

A jury found defendant guilty of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, as well as to a consecutive five-year term for the weapons offense. After a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of three counts of burglary, two counts of false imprisonment, two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery, one count of kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, and malice murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 30 years and, after a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find appellant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that trial counsel was not ineffective and rejected appellant's contention that counsel insufficiently disputed that the attack proximately caused the victim's death; counsel gave appellant bad advice about the risks of testifying at trial; counsel should have called a certain witness; counsel did not prepare adequately to impeach certain testimony; and counsel failed to request a jury charge on the defense of abandonment. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.