Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested on September 11, 2007 for murder and his motion to dismiss was filed on August 27, 2010, almost three years later. At issue was whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him for a constitutional speedy trial violation. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his constitutional speedy trial rights where, under the circumstances, defendant had not shown that he was prejudiced.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act ("VGCSA"), Title 16, Chapter 13, in connection with the death of a young man. Defendant asserted that the evidence was insufficient to authorize the jury to find him guilty of violating the VGCSA by distributing controlled substances; felony murder; and VGSA by keeping a dwelling for the purposes of using controlled substances. The court held that the evidence authorized the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of multiple counts of distributing controlled substances by prescribing them in a manner that was not in the usual course of his professional practice and was not for a legitimate medical purpose in violation of OCGA 16-13-41(f). The court also held that defendant's felonies of illegally providing controlled substances through prescriptions were dangerous felonies and the young man's death was a foreseeable result within the meaning of the felony murder statute. The court further held that, while the jury could infer that controlled substances had been kept and used at defendant's home on more than one occasion by the young man, without a showing that a purpose of defendant's maintaining a house was for such use by the young man, a guilty verdict was not authorized. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence on this count was vacated. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of two other young men who had formed relationships with defendant and that the trial court did not err in failing to give the exact "good faith" jury instructions defendant requested.

Appellant, a 15-year-old, was convicted of murdering her mother and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive five-year term for firearm possession. At issue was whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce, over defense counsel's objections, various items of evidence seized from appellant's bedroom during the police investigation, including photographs of her with dyed black hair and dark make-up; a document bearing the words of a "curse;" and seven different inscriptions of song lyrics and quotations attributed to various singers and other artists bearing themes of anguish, enslavement, atheism, and violence. The court held that the evidence was improper prejudicial character evidence where the nature of the evidence was highly inflammatory and evidence of appellant's guilt was entirely circumstantial and not overwhelming. Accordingly, the court could not say that it was highly probable that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict and therefore, reversed appellant's conviction.

While on probation in Douglas County, defendant was charged with drug-related offenses in Paulding County. The Douglas County Court issued a probation warrant for his arrest based on the Paulding County charges and defendant was arrested on the probation warrant in October 2007. While executing the warrant, officers saw methamphetamine on a table and then obtained and executed a search warrant and found more methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized both in March and October in the Paulding County criminal case. At issue was whether the exclusionary rule applied in probation revocation proceedings. The court held that because application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings would achieve only marginal deterrent effects and would significantly alter and affect the proper administration of the probation system in the state, the court found the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule did not outweigh the costs of the system. Therefore, under the proper balancing test, neither the federal nor state constitutions required application of the exclusionary rule in state probation revocation proceedings.

Appellant appealed pro se the denial of his pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus where he was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, criminal damage to property, and simple battery against a pregnant person. At issue was whether the denial of bail constituted excessive bail and was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII of the Georgia Constitution. The court held that nothing in the record suggested that the trial court abused its discretion in denying bail and thus it was not error for the habeas court to deny appellant's petition where the trial court specifically concluded that he was a flight risk and the habeas court noted that under recidivist treatment, he faced incarceration for a significant period of time.

Appellant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and whether he was entitled to a new trial. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and held that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to admissible evidence; failing to object to testimony that appellant was part of a gang; failing to contemporaneously object to testimony of a witness who said she visited him in jail; failing to object to in-court identification testimony and had it stricken from the record; and strategically refusing the trial court's offer to give a curative instruction regarding certain testimony. The court also held that, based on the facts and absence of any evidence of specific harm or prejudice to appellant, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Likewise, appellant's claim that the prosecution violated OCGA 17-16-4(a)(1) by failing to turn over the records of his conversations was unavailing. The court also held that where counsel strategically refused the trial court's proffer of a curative instruction regarding testimony about a juvenile court disposition, the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial generally was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for a new trial.

Appellant was convicted of murder and appealed the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of his appeal from the trial court's order for failure to pay appeal costs. At issue was whether the trial court erred in dismissing appellant's appeal for failure to pay costs because he asked the trial court to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis. The court held that the record conclusively revealed that appellant could not have suffered any harm from such error where, even if the trial court had not dismissed his appeal, appellant's appeal would have failed as a matter of law. In any event, appellant provided no basis for a finding of any inadequacy in his indictment or his conviction, which further revealed that the arguments that he raised with respect to his motion in arrest of judgment were without merit.

Appellant was convicted of felony murder and two counts of aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of a three-year-old. Appellant appealed from the denial of his motion for new trial arguing that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter where appellant's testimony showed that he did not shoot the child in the heat of passion because he was not upset and fired out of fear to defend his and his mother's life and where the testimony of the child's parents demonstrated, at most, that appellant could have opened fired in response to their heated or angry statements, which as a matter of law, could not constitute "serious provocation" within the meaning of OCGA 16-5-2(a).

Appellant was convicted of two counts of malice murder and various related offenses in connection with the asphyxiation death of an individual and the bludgeoning death of her daughter. Appellant appealed certain jury instructions and asserted that he was improperly denied a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the convictions and held that it found highly probable that the erroneous failure to charge on impeachment by proof of a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude did not contribute to the verdict; that the trial court's jury instruction on theft presented no ground for reversal; and that the trial court did not err in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing where appellant waived his claim when he did not argue it, or offer any evidence in support of it, despite being afforded the opportunity to do so. The court remanded for resentencing and held that, under the circumstances, the three additional life sentences for felony murder were illegal and could not stand.

Defendant was charged with malice murder and concealing the death of another in connection with the killing of his girlfriend. The court granted defendant an interlocutory appeal from an order of the superior court which denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made to law enforcement officers in order to consider whether the superior court erred in concluding that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary in light of the evidence of his mental disabilities. The court held that the superior court did not err where there was evidence to support the determination that, despite some mild mental impairment, defendant was capable of understanding his Miranda rights, including his right to counsel, and that he never invoked this right.