Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a no contest plea to a charge of sexual assault in the third degree. Defendant later tested positive for methamphetamine use in violation of his probation. Defendant’s probation officer subsequently filed a motion requesting a revocation of Defendant’s probation. During trial, the family court denied Defendant’s request for a continuance to obtain the testimony of a physician, who could have informed the court of whether Defendant was decompensating at the time of the violations. The court then revoked Defendant’s probation and sentenced him to five years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the family court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance and in revoking his probation where the evidence did not indicate that he willfully and inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his probation. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) inasmuch as Defendant satisfied the “good cause” standard in his request for a continuance, the family court abused its discretion in denying his request; and (2) in determining whether Defendant inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed by the probation order, the court must apply a test articulated within this opinion. View "State v. Villiarimo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the circuit court abused its discretion when it ruled that evidence of Petitioner’s prior assault conviction would be admissible to rebut the affirmative, mitigating defense of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED), which caused him to forego an instruction on the EMED defense. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding (1) the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the EMED defense when it is raised by the evidence even where neither party requests the instruction; (2) thus, a defendant may not waive an instruction on the EMED defense; and (3) therefore, the circuit court in this case was obligated to instruct the jury on the EMED defense upon determining that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the instruction, even where Petitioner waived the defense. Remanded. View "State v. Adviento" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant, a native Hawaiian, of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was denied due process because the complaint did not allege the state of mind that the State was required to prove for the charge of OVUII. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and vacated the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that, inasmuch as the charge against Defendant did not allege the requisite state of mind that also was an essential fact of the offense of OVUII, the complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "State v. Rivera " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants, father and son, were found guilty of assault in the first degree and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. The father (Defendant) appealed, arguing in relevant part that the prosecutor misstated the law on accomplice liability under Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-222 by separately defining certain terms used in the statute during closing argument and that the court should have given a cautionary instruction that the jury adhere to the court’s instructions on the law of accomplice liability. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the prosecutor orally modified the court’s accomplice instruction, and because the court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the modification, the prosecutor’s definitions of the accomplice instruction became the court’s instructions upon the law; (2) the instruction was a misstatement of the law on accomplice liability; and (3) the misstatement of law for which no curative instruction was given was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Basham" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with committing the offense of assault in the third degree and was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was not adequately informed of his right to testify. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court’s right-to-testify colloquy was defective, and as a result, Defendant did not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive his right to testify; (2) the constitutional violation of Defendant’s right to testify was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction, and the prohibition against double jeopardy did not preclude a retrial in this case. View "State v. Pomroy" on Justia Law

Petitioner was adjudged guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1). Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the complaint against her for the first time on appeal, alleging that section 291E-61(a)(1) was deficient for failing to allege mens rea. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against Petitioner without prejudice, holding that because the complaint failed to charge a requisite state of mind, the ICA’s judgment must be vacated and the charge dismissed without prejudice because it violated due process. View "State v. Avilla " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree and unauthorized entry into motor vehicle in the first degree. According to the State, Defendant’s co-defendant entered Jennifer Kincaid’s garage and Jeffrey Sampson’s van, while Defendant was the getaway driver. Kincaid, the only witness who identified Defendant as the driver in the incidents, identified Defendant in a field show-up procedure conducted shortly after she reported the burglary. Defendant and his co-defendant were the only two suspects present at the field show-up, prior to which the police informed Kincaid that they had stopped a vehicle that matched her description. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to give a specific instruction on field show-up identifications. Remanded. View "State v. Cabinatan" on Justia Law

The family court convicted Defendant of harassment in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 711-1106(1)(a). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the family court’s judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the complaint did not sufficiently apprise Defendant of what he must be prepared to meet because the language was worded in the disjunctive. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the family court’s judgment, holding that, pursuant to State v. Codiamat, which held that a charge worded disjunctively in the language of the statute provides sufficient notice so long as the acts charged are reasonably related and are contained in a single subsection of a statute, the State’s charge provided Defendant with sufficient notice of what he must be prepared to meet. View "State v. Lockey " on Justia Law

The State charged three defendants (collectively, Petitioners) of entering or remaining within the Kaho’olawe Island Reserve without being specifically authorized to do so, thereby committing the offense of entrance into the reserve. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Petitioners were found guilty of the charges. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and the district court, holding that although the sufficiency of the complaints was not raised by either party, the complaints must be dismissed without prejudice because the charges failed to charge that Petitioners acted with the requisite state of mind by violating the law intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. View "State v. Armitage" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of excessive speeding and no motor vehicle insurance. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the State did not lay sufficient foundation for the admission of the laser gun reading. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the ICA gravely erred in holding that the State laid sufficient foundation for the admission of the laser gun reading and challenging, for the first time, the sufficiency of the charge in the amended complaint because the amended complaint did not allege the requisite state of mind. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that inasmuch as the amended complaint against Petitioner failed to allege the requisite state of mind, the amended complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. View "State v. Pai " on Justia Law