Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court held that mere proximity and power to exercise control over contraband are insufficient to sustain a conviction for possession absent evidence of intent. Petitioner-Defendant-Appellee Raymond L. Foster was found guilty by a jury of, inter alia, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Following the jury verdict, the circuit court granted Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on those two counts, concluding that the evidence adduced at trial did not establish he had the requisite intent to exercise dominion and control over the firearm and ammunition. The State appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") concluded that there was sufficient evidence of intent, vacated the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, and remanded for resentencing based on the jury's guilty verdicts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the ICA erred in vacating the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for acquittal of both the firearm and ammunition charges. The Court reinstated the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal of the firearm and ammunition charges.

Defendant Steve Cabagbag allegedly stole a truck from a storage facility as well as several tools from a construction site. A jury found Defendant guilty of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle and theft in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two concurrent five-year terms of probation. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court committed plain error for failing to provide a jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification because the jury's attention was not adequately drawn to the identification issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in criminal cases, the circuit courts must give the jury a specific eyewitness identification instruction whenever identification evidence is a central issue in the case, and it is requested by the defendant; (2) a circuit court may, in the exercise of its discretion, give the instruction if it believes the instruction is otherwise warranted in a particular case; (3) this new rule should be given prospective effect; and (4) Defendant's conviction is affirmed under the rule then in effect when he was tried.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Glenn Keohokapu was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to an extended term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the process by which the jury was selected for Petitioner's trial did not result in substantial prejudice to Petitioner notwithstanding the pretrial publicity to which some jurors were exposed. The Court, however, vacated Petitioner's extended term sentence, holding that, as to the extended sentencing proceedings, (1) where the jury must determined whether an extended term of imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public, it is error to instruct the jury that the extended term sentence includes the possibility of parole; (2) in this case it was error to admit the statement of one of the witnesses during the sentencing phase as past recollection recorded; and (3) these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Petitioner Less Schnabel allegedly caused the death of decedent by one punch. After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA, holding (1) the ICA gravely erred in affirming the ruling of the circuit court that the State would be allowed to introduce evidence from the prior juvenile proceedings of Petitioner if Petitioner testified on cross-examination in the instant case that he did not know a single punch could cause the death of a person; and (2) the statement of the deputy prosecuting attorney to the jury during closing arguments not to "get too caught up in the mumbo jumbo of all the words [of the jury instructions,]" among other statements, infringed on Petitioner's right to have the case against him proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded.

Defendant Lloyd Pratt received three citations when he was found residing in a closed area of a state park. Pratt filed a motion to dismiss the charges, asserting as a defense that his activities were constitutionally-protected native Hawaiian practices, and citing State v. Hanapi, which defined the scope in the criminal context of the legal privilege for native Hawaiians to engage in customary or traditional native Hawaiian practices when such practices conflict with State statute or regulations. The district court denied the motion, held trial, and found Pratt guilty on all three charges. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the law surrounding the assertion of native Hawaiian rights as a defense in criminal cases. The Court affirmed, holding (1) the courts below did not err in utilizing a balancing test in this case; (2) in balancing interests, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances; and (3) under the totality of the circumstances test, Pratt's convictions must be affirmed.

Petitioner Patrick Ho was convicted of first degree sexual assault and third degree sexual assault. Petitioner appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court's refusal to disqualify two jurors who were sexually assaulted as teenagers compelled him to use two of his three peremptories to remove the jurors from the jury panel, and (2) the court erroneously removed two other jurors for cause at Respondent's request after Petitioner exercised all of his peremptories, based on identical grounds urged by the State before the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that under the circumstances here, the circuit court plainly erred when during jury selection it removed two jurors for cause on the motion of the State after the jury panel already had been passed for cause and Petitioner and the State had already exhausted their peremptory challenges. Remanded for a new trial.

Petitioner Michael Tierney was charged with promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree. The trial court determined that Petitioner's fitness to proceed to trial was at issue and ordered a one person panel to examine Petitioner. Petitioner refused to cooperate with the examination. The trial court proceeded to trial without the examiner's opinion and found Petitioner guilty of the charge. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a court orders an examination to determine whether a defendant is fit to proceed to trial pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 704-404(1) and the defendant refuses to cooperate with the examiner, the examiner must produce a report of the examination that expressly states whether such unwillingness of defendant was the result of physical or mental disease, if possible; (2) if it is not possible for the examiner to make that determination, the examiner must expressly state as much; and (3) because the examiner in this case did not state in his report whether Petitioner was fit to proceed or state that it was impossible to make that determination, the district court abused its opinion in proceeding to trial without the examiner's opinion.

Petitioner Kevin Yamahata was adjudged guilty by the district court of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1) and (a)(3). The intermediate court of appeal (ICA) affirmed. Yamahata appealed, contending that the ICA gravely erred in holding that mens rea need not be alleged in either a section 291E-61(a)(1) or (a)(3) charge pursuant to State v. Nesmith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ICA gravely erred in holding that mens rea need not be alleged in a section 291E-61(a)(1) charge, and therefore, Yamahata's section 291E-61(a)(1) charge was deficient for failing to allege mens rea; but (2) insofar as the section 291E-61(a)(3) charge was sufficient, and insofar as Yamahata did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to that basis, his conviction still stood.

Petitioner James Flynn was found guilty of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1) and (a)(3). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Nesmith, the ICA erred by concluding that mens rea need not be alleged in a section 291E-61(a)(1) charge, and without such allegation, Flynn's section 291E-61(a)(1) charge was fatally deficient; but (2) insofar as Flynn's conviction under the alternative charge based upon subsection 291E-61(a)(3) was sufficient, and insofar as Flynn did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to that basis, his conviction under subsection (a)(3) stood.

Petitioner Tommy Bullard was convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court accepted Bullard's application for writ of certiorari and vacated the judgment of the ICA, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Nesmith, which holds that an OVUII charge under section 291E-61(a)(1) must allege mens rea, the ICA erred by concluding that mens rea need not be alleged in a section 291E-61(a)(1) charge; and (2) without such allegation, Bullard's charge was fatally deficient. Remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.