Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife divorced in 2020, with Husband required to pay child support and attorney fees. Two years later, Wife initiated a contempt proceeding against Husband for failing to comply with the divorce decree. On the day of the contempt trial, Husband informed the court he was unable to attend due to vehicle issues. The magistrate court proceeded with the trial in his absence, found him in criminal contempt, and sentenced him to 70 days in jail, with 50 days suspended, and ordered him to pay additional attorney fees.The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision to hold the trial in Husband's absence but reversed the incarceration sanction, finding insufficient evidence that Husband waived his right to counsel. The district court concluded that the magistrate court violated Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(l)(1) by imposing incarceration without an attorney present to represent Husband.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the magistrate court erred in holding the contempt trial in Husband's absence. The court held that a contemnor's right to be present at a criminal contempt trial is protected under the Sixth Amendment, similar to a criminal defendant's right. The court concluded that Husband's willful absence did not constitute a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to be present. The proper procedure would have been to issue a writ of attachment to ensure Husband's attendance.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order of contempt and remand to the magistrate court for further proceedings. The court also found the district court's failure to address Wife's request for attorney fees harmless, as Husband's appeal was not frivolous. No attorney fees were awarded on appeal, and costs were awarded to Husband. View "Salazar v. Salazar" on Justia Law

John David Wurdemann was charged and convicted of seven felonies related to a 2000 attack on a woman in Canyon County, Idaho. Sixteen years later, a district court granted his petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his convictions due to ineffective assistance of counsel. This decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2017. Wurdemann has not been retried since.Wurdemann filed a petition under the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act, seeking compensation and a certificate of innocence. The State opposed the petition and moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded that Wurdemann had not established that the basis for vacating his conviction was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence, as required by the Act.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and interpreted the statutory language of the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act. The Court held that the phrase “not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence” means “legal error related to his factual innocence.” The Court concluded that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which led to the reversal of Wurdemann’s convictions, did not establish his factual innocence. The reversal was based on the improper admission of lineup evidence, not on evidence showing Wurdemann was actually innocent. Therefore, Wurdemann could not satisfy the statutory requirement, and the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State was affirmed. View "Wurdemann v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Chitta Roy, challenged the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's (the "Department") denial of her criminal history background clearance during her certified family home (CFH) recertification. Roy had a 2008 conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which was dismissed in 2011 under Idaho Code section 19-2604 after she successfully completed probation. Despite this, the Department denied her 2021 application for background clearance, citing the conviction as a disqualifying crime under its updated rules.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho upheld the Department's decision, rejecting Roy's arguments that the dismissal of her conviction should preclude the Department from denying her clearance and that the Department should be bound by its 2009 decision to grant her an exemption. The district court also determined that Roy failed to show substantial prejudice from the denial, as the Department could still approve her CFH recertification through a separate process.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its conclusions. The Supreme Court held that the Department improperly based its denial on the dismissed conviction, which, under Idaho Code section 19-2604, should be treated as if it never existed. The Court also determined that the case was ripe for adjudication and that Roy's substantial rights were prejudiced by the Department's denial. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Roy was awarded costs on appeal. View "Roy v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare" on Justia Law

John David Wurdemann was convicted of seven felonies related to a 2000 attack on a woman in Canyon County, Idaho. Sixteen years later, a district court granted his petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his convictions due to ineffective assistance of counsel. This decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2017. Wurdemann was not retried. In 2021, Idaho enacted the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act, which allows for compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals who meet specific criteria. Wurdemann filed a petition under this Act seeking compensation and a certificate of innocence.The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Wurdemann had not established that the basis for vacating his conviction was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence, as required by the Act. Wurdemann appealed this decision.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and interpreted the statutory language of the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act. The Court held that the phrase “not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence” means “legal error related to his factual innocence.” The Court concluded that the legal error in Wurdemann’s case—ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to challenge a suggestive police lineup—did not establish his factual innocence. The reversal of his convictions was based on the deficient performance of his trial attorneys, not on evidence proving his innocence. Therefore, Wurdemann did not meet the statutory requirement for compensation under the Act.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that Wurdemann could not satisfy the necessary element of showing that the basis for reversing his conviction was related to his factual innocence. View "Wurdemann v. State" on Justia Law

While employed as a bookkeeper for Castlerock Homes, Sarah Brizzee embezzled over $230,000 by writing fraudulent checks and using the company credit card for personal purchases. She also created fraudulent lien waivers and invoices to cover her tracks. The crimes were discovered in October 2018, and Brizzee was charged with grand theft and forgery in April 2019. She pleaded guilty to one count of each and was sentenced in March 2020 to a unified sentence of seven years, with two years determinate and five years indeterminate, but the court retained jurisdiction, placing her on a rider program. She was released from incarceration in October 2020 and placed on probation until October 2026.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho found that Idaho Code section 5-248 created a one-year statute of limitations for crime victims to file civil claims, starting from the offender's release from incarceration. Since Brizzee was released from her rider in October 2020, the court ruled that Castlerock's complaint, filed in September 2022, was untimely and dismissed the case with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Idaho Code section 5-248 does not create a one-year limitations period but instead tolls the applicable limitations period until one year after the offender has been released from incarceration and has fully satisfied the sentence imposed. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing Castlerock’s complaint as untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, clarifying that the statute of limitations was tolled during Brizzee's incarceration and for one year after her release, making Castlerock's complaint timely. View "JK Homes, LLC v. Brizzee" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Idaho, Michael W. Skehan appealed a decision affirming the Idaho Central Sex Offender Registry's ruling that he must register as a sex offender in Idaho. Skehan had been convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree in Oregon in 2001 and later moved to Idaho. He argued that the procedures used by the Registry were improper and that he should not be required to register.The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Skehan failed to demonstrate that the Registry's ruling was deficient under Idaho Code section 67-5279(3). The court also found that Skehan failed to preserve several arguments for appeal, offered little rebuttal to the Registry's position, and did not provide a sufficient record to substantiate his claims on appeal.The court also held that Skehan failed to demonstrate that the Registry's consideration of other information in addition to the Oregon and Idaho statutes was arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, the court found that the Registry did not abuse its discretion by not considering whether his Oregon conviction was a misdemeanor or felony. Lastly, the court concluded that the Registry was not required to compare Skehan’s Oregon conviction to Idaho offenses that do not require registration.The Registry was awarded its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-117. View "Skehan v. ISP" on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding. View "SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Melvin Savage was convicted of first-degree arson. He filed a post-conviction petition alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his right against self-incrimination during a deposition that took place in a civil lawsuit involving the arson allegation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that counsel’s failure to advise Savage of his right to remain silent constituted deficient performance; however, Savage failed to prove he was prejudiced by that deficient performance because he was already intent on resolving his criminal case by entering a guilty plea at the time of the civil deposition. Savage unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Appealing to the Idaho Supreme Court Savage argued the district court erred by limiting its prejudice analysis to an evaluation of whether Savage would have gone to trial instead of considering whether Savage demonstrated that the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Savage v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Idaho Supreme Court. The federal court asked whether an Idaho state court order reducing a defendant’s judgment of conviction for felony burglary to a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor petit theft under Idaho Code 19-2604(2) changed the operative conviction for the purposes of Idaho Code 18-310, which prohibited the restoration of firearm rights to those citizens convicted of specific felony offenses. In 2019, defendant Antonio Gutierrez was indicted in the District of Montana on four charges: (1) conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce; (2) robbery affecting commerce; (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence; and (4) felon in possession of a firearm. These charges resulted from a robbery of Dotty’s Casino in Billings, Montana, that involved a firearm. The felon in possession of a firearm charge stemmed from Gutierrez’s previous convictions under Idaho state law for burglary. In 2000, Gutierrez pleaded guilty to two counts of felony burglary. He was sentenced to the Idaho State Correctional Institution for a fixed term of two years and a subsequent indeterminate term of three years. In 2003, acting pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2604(2), an Idaho district court ordered Gutierrez’s burglary convictions “REDUCED to Misdemeanor Petit Theft.” The order specified that Gutierrez was “not to be considered a convicted felon because he has successfully complied with the terms and conditions of probation and paid all restitution/reimbursement and fines in full.” Based on the plain language of Idaho Code section 19-2604 the Idaho Supreme Court's answer to the Ninth Circuit’s question was no. "A grant of leniency under Idaho Code section 19-2604(2) does not remove a defendant originally convicted of an enumerated felony from the reach of section 18-310(2) and (3)." View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

In 2004, a jury found Azad Haji Abdullah guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree arson, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and felony injury to a child. He was sentenced to death for the murder. Abdullah filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed by the district court in 2011. Abdullah then filed a consolidated appeal that included a direct appeal from his convictions and sentences and an appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Idaho Supreme Court, in Idaho v. Abdullah, 348 P.3d 1 (2015), affirmed the convictions, sentences, and denial of post-conviction relief. In 2013—after the district court issued its order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, but prior to the Supreme Court’s issuance of Abdullah in 2015—Abdullah filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief. The Successive Petition was amended in 2016 and 2017. Abdullah also filed a pro se supplement to the successive petition that was incorporated with the successive petition. The successive petition and supplement included substantive claims, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The district court determined that Abdullah was not entitled to post-conviction relief and summarily dismissed his successive petition and Supplement. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Abdullah v. Idaho" on Justia Law