Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Lewis Vanalen Borek was arrested for felony driving under the influence following a car accident in Star, Idaho. Officers at the scene administered a breathalyzer test, which returned a reading of .000, but Borek showed signs of impairment during field sobriety tests and admitted to taking anti-depressant medication. Subsequent blood tests revealed the presence of prescription drugs for mental health conditions. The State obtained records from the Idaho Prescription Monitoring Program (PMP), Ada County Jail, and Star Pharmacy, which included information about Borek’s prescriptions, medical history, and treatment.Borek initially moved to suppress all evidence from his arrest, arguing that officers lacked probable cause for a felony DUI, citing Idaho constitutional protections. The District Court denied his motion, but Borek appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing that there was no probable cause for a felony DUI, and suppressed both the blood test results and statements made by Borek to medical staff. On remand, after further motions, the District Court allowed the State to obtain medical and prescription records from various sources. Borek filed a motion in limine to exclude these records, arguing they were privileged under Idaho Rule of Evidence 503. The District Court granted Borek’s motion, finding the records to be confidential communications protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the District Court’s order on permissive appeal. It held that the PMP and Star Pharmacy records did not constitute confidential communications under Rule 503(b)(2) and that Borek failed to meet his burden to prove that the Ada County Jail medical questionnaire was privileged. However, the State waived its challenge to exclusion of other jail records. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order granting Borek’s motion in limine and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Borek" on Justia Law

A man was accused of surreptitiously recording his 13-year-old stepdaughter with his cellphone while she was undressing in the bathroom. His wife reported the incident to police, providing video evidence from a hidden camera that appeared to show him engaging in inappropriate conduct outside his stepdaughters’ bedrooms. Detectives confronted the man at his workplace, and after he indicated he wanted a lawyer, he handed over his cellphone when asked by police. The officers immediately informed him they were seizing the device but did not search it until obtaining a warrant the next day. Upon searching the phone, police found incriminating photos and videos, leading to a grand jury indictment on charges including video voyeurism and sexual exploitation of a child.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress the cellphone and its contents, arguing the seizure was a Fourth Amendment violation due to the lack of a warrant or valid exception. At a suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from the detective about his concern that evidence could be quickly deleted if the phone was not seized immediately. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure because of the imminent risk that evidence would be destroyed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the warrantless seizure of the cellphone was justified under the Fourth Amendment’s exigent circumstances exception due to the risk of imminent destruction of evidence. The court clarified that this exception applied based on the totality of the circumstances and did not create a per se rule for all cellphone cases. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. The court also found that any issues regarding parole conditions were moot due to their removal from the amended judgment. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped the defendant for traffic violations. During the stop, a certified drug detection dog conducted a sniff of the defendant’s vehicle and alerted near the driver’s door. Based on this alert, the officer searched the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently charged with drug possession offenses. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was unconstitutional because the drug dog’s field alerts over the previous two weeks had resulted in the recovery of drugs only 43% of the time, suggesting the alert was not a sufficiently reliable indicator of the presence of drugs.The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, reviewed the suppression motion. The court considered evidence of the dog’s training, certification, and performance in controlled environments, where the dog had demonstrated 100% accuracy. The district court found that the dog’s performance in controlled settings, along with the officer’s explanations for field alerts that did not yield drugs, established the dog’s reliability under the totality of the circumstances. The court denied the motion to suppress, concluding the dog’s alert provided probable cause for the search. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court properly denied the suppression motion. The Idaho Supreme Court held that under the United States Supreme Court decision in Florida v. Harris, proof of a drug dog’s reliability in controlled certification or training programs can provide sufficient reason to trust its alert. The Court concluded that the dog’s field performance alone does not undermine probable cause when the dog’s training and certification are uncontested and reliable, affirming the conviction. View "State v. Barritt" on Justia Law

Three brothers accused their stepfather of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse that occurred over several years when they were minors. The allegations included sadistic and lewd conduct, with all three boys describing similar patterns of abuse and threats. After Child 1 disclosed abuse to his mother, Child 3 and Child 2 also reported similar mistreatment. The stepfather was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with minors under sixteen, each count corresponding to one of the brothers.After a preliminary hearing in the Magistrate Court, the defendant was bound over to the District Court for trial on all three counts, despite one count being temporarily remanded for additional findings. At trial in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County, each of the boys testified. The State introduced text messages between Child 2 and his mother to rebut the defense’s theory of fabrication. The defense objected to these messages as hearsay, irrelevant, and as containing evidence of uncharged bad acts. The court admitted the messages with a limiting instruction and also permitted a forensic interviewer to provide testimony that touched on expert opinion, despite being disclosed only as a fact witness. During trial, a juror disclosed she had attended middle school with one of the victims, but the court, after inquiry, declined to remove her for cause. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts relating to the older children and acquitted him regarding Child 1. The defendant was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences with fixed terms, later reduced from 25 to 20 years on a Rule 35 motion.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed four alleged errors: denial of the juror’s removal, admission of the text messages, permitting the forensic interviewer’s testimony, and the sentence’s excessiveness. The Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion regarding juror removal, the text messages were properly admitted for a non-hearsay purpose (though references to physical abuse should have been redacted, the error was harmless), and any error in the forensic interviewer’s testimony was likewise harmless. The sentence imposed was affirmed as within the court’s discretion. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "State v. Frandsen" on Justia Law

The case involves Todd Marshall Frandsen, who was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with minors under sixteen, based on allegations from his three sons. The boys reported that Frandsen engaged in lewd and abusive conduct, including fondling and other forms of mistreatment, over many years. Each son described similar patterns of abuse, which included threats and psychological intimidation. Frandsen was tried before a jury in Bannock County, Idaho, in March 2023.After a four-day trial, the jury convicted Frandsen of two counts related to the older boys and acquitted him of the charge involving the youngest. Frandsen was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences with 25-year fixed terms, later reduced to 20 years fixed upon his motion for reconsideration. He filed timely appeals, arguing that the district court erred by not removing a juror who recalled knowing one of the victims, admitting certain text messages between a victim and their mother, permitting a forensic interviewer to offer expert-like testimony without proper disclosure, and imposing an excessive sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the juror, as she provided unequivocal assurances of impartiality and her past acquaintance with a victim did not establish actual or implied bias. The Court found the text messages were relevant and non-hearsay, though it did identify harmless error in admitting references to uncharged physical abuse without required Rule 404(b) notice. Similarly, it determined that the forensic interviewer’s limited expert testimony, though improper due to non-disclosure, was harmless given the acquittal on the related charge. The Court also found that the sentence imposed was not excessive. Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "State v. Frandsen" on Justia Law

A woman was convicted of possessing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia after police discovered these items during a search of a residence she shared with another individual who was on probation. The search was initiated when a probation officer visited to verify the housemate's residence. The woman answered the door, attempted to refuse entry by shutting the door, but the officer entered regardless and proceeded to search the shared bedroom after both occupants indicated there might be contraband present. The officer found drugs and paraphernalia in the room, and both individuals were charged.Previously, the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, denied the woman's motion to suppress the evidence, rejecting her argument that the search was unlawful under Georgia v. Randolph because she had expressly objected to the entry. The district court also admitted a police body camera video at trial, which included statements from her housemate that allegedly violated her Sixth Amendment confrontation rights under Bruton v. United States. The case proceeded to a joint jury trial, resulting in guilty verdicts for both defendants.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the search was lawful because the probationer's waiver of Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation allowed officers to enter and search shared areas, even over the objection of a co-occupant. The Court declined to extend the Randolph rule to probation searches, reasoning that co-tenants of probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Regarding the confrontation issue, the Court found that admitting the body camera footage was error under Bruton, but determined the error was harmless due to overwhelming independent evidence of guilt. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction. View "State v. Horn" on Justia Law

Police responded to a report of a disturbance at a man’s home, where they learned from his girlfriend that he was a convicted felon in possession of firearms. The man admitted that he knew about the firearms and had purchased two for his children. He led officers through his home, where they recovered three firearms and ammunition. The State charged him with three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.The case progressed through the Idaho courts, beginning with the magistrate court, where the man repeatedly stated he could not afford an attorney and wanted “effective assistance of counsel,” rather than representation. The magistrate court suggested he did not qualify for a public defender due to his employment, and the preliminary hearing proceeded with the defendant unrepresented, after which he was bound over to the district court. Throughout proceedings before the district court, the man continued to appear without counsel, filing many pro se motions. Eventually, after much confusion about his wishes, the district court appointed “shadow counsel” to assist him at trial, but continued to treat him as self-represented. The jury convicted him on all counts, and the district court denied his post-trial motions.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case after the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of “shadow counsel” did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the defendant, not an attorney, controlled and managed his defense. The Court further held that the record did not show the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, as required by law. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Knight" on Justia Law

Sheryl Robertson was arrested in Custer County, Idaho, for felony possession of methamphetamine and ultimately pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced her to a ten-year term, retained jurisdiction for one year, and later placed her on probation with additional requirements after she admitted to multiple probation violations. These requirements included completing 100 hours of community service and successfully participating in a treatment court program. Robertson entered the Bonneville County Wood Court but encountered issues with the program and requested transfer to a different treatment court. The State subsequently moved to terminate her participation in Wood Court and revoke her probation, alleging further rule violations.Robertson waived her right to a termination hearing in Wood Court using forms that referenced only the treatment court termination, not probation revocation. The district court proceeded directly to disposition on the alleged probation violation, reasoning that Robertson’s waiver in Wood Court extended to her right to a probation-revocation hearing. Robertson was sentenced to a modified term of incarceration, and she appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, finding that the procedures under the Idaho Rules for Treatment Courts (I.R.T.C.) were followed and provided the required due process, but declined to address whether Robertson had received the process required by the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated in Morrissey v. Brewer.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Robertson’s waiver of her right to a probation-revocation hearing was not knowing and intelligent, as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The forms she signed did not clearly communicate that waiving the Wood Court termination hearing also constituted a waiver of the right to a probation-revocation hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order revoking probation and imposing a modified sentence, and remanded the case for a probation-revocation hearing. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and two related misdemeanors. He and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement under which he would plead guilty to the felony, the misdemeanors would be dismissed, and he would receive a suspended sentence with probation, provided he complied with certain conditions. The agreement included a clause stating it would be “null and void” if the defendant failed to appear for his presentence appointment or sentencing without good cause. After entering his guilty plea, the defendant failed to appear for both the presentence appointment and sentencing, leading to his arrest on a bench warrant.Following these events, the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, determined that the “null and void” clause released the State and the court from their obligations under the plea agreement, but held that the defendant remained bound by his guilty plea. The court imposed a sentence inconsistent with the plea agreement and did not allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment.On review, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the “null and void” clause. The Supreme Court concluded that, under general contract principles, the clause rendered the entire plea agreement unenforceable by either party upon breach, not just by the State. The court further held that, under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(4), once the plea agreement was rendered unenforceable and the court declined to be bound by its terms, the defendant was entitled to an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the district court failed to provide this opportunity, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. McGarvey" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested for possession of controlled substances in late December 2021 and released on his own recognizance. The State filed an Information in January 2022, charging him with possession of heroin, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, jury trials in Bingham County were suspended until late February 2022, creating a backlog of cases. The defendant’s trial was rescheduled multiple times, primarily because of delays in forensic testing and the unavailability of a forensic analyst. The district court repeatedly warned that older cases and limited judicial resources might further delay the trial. Ultimately, the defendant’s trial did not occur within the six-month statutory period, and he moved to dismiss the case, arguing violations of his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District denied the motion to dismiss, finding good cause for the delay due to the backlog of cases resulting from the pandemic and the need to prioritize older cases. The court also noted that the defendant was not in custody, which lessened the prejudice from the delay. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss under Idaho Code section 19-3501 and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme Court held that court congestion resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for the trial delay under the statute. The Court also rejected the argument that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution regarding speedy trial rights, reaffirming the use of the Barker v. Wingo factors. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Fierro-Garcia" on Justia Law