Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State of Idaho charged Lea Anne Eaton with felony burglary and petit theft after she used discarded Walmart receipts to return stolen items for a refund. Shortly after her arrest, a new statute creating the misdemeanor offense of commercial burglary became effective. Eaton sought to reduce her felony charge to a misdemeanor under the new statute, but the district court denied her motion. Eaton entered a conditional guilty plea to felony burglary, reserving her right to appeal the denied motion. The district court sentenced her to a unified ten-year sentence with four years fixed. Eaton's subsequent motions to reconsider the denial and to correct an illegal sentence were also denied.The Idaho Court of Appeals upheld Eaton’s conviction and sentence. Eaton then petitioned for review by the Idaho Supreme Court, which granted the petition.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court erred in denying Eaton’s motion to reduce her charge and her motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Court held that the commercial burglary statute was not retroactive and did not apply to Eaton’s conduct, as there was no clear legislative intent for retroactivity. The Court also determined that the commercial burglary statute created a new offense with distinct elements from the general burglary statute, and thus, Eaton was properly charged under the existing felony burglary statute. Consequently, Eaton was not entitled to the lesser penalty of the commercial burglary statute, and her sentence under the felony burglary statute was not illegal.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction and the denial of Eaton’s Rule 35(a) motion. View "State v. Eaton" on Justia Law

Gerardo Raul Chavez was convicted of second-degree murder for the 2016 killing of Vason Widaman. While in custody for a probation violation, Chavez made incriminating statements to a cellmate, Manuel Acevedo, who was acting as a confidential informant. The State sought to introduce these recordings at trial. Chavez moved to suppress the statements, but the district court only partially granted the motion, suppressing a few statements. The jury acquitted Chavez of first-degree murder but convicted him of second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. Chavez was sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence with a 42-year fixed term. Post-trial, Chavez's motions for a new trial and permission to contact jurors were denied.Chavez appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, abused its discretion in sentencing, violated his constitutional rights by considering acquitted conduct at sentencing, and erred in denying his motion to contact jurors. The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the district court did not err in admitting Chavez's statements, as they were not deliberately elicited by Acevedo. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the 42-year fixed sentence, noting that it fell within statutory limits and was justified by the aggravating factors. The court further held that considering acquitted conduct at sentencing did not violate Chavez's constitutional rights. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to contact jurors, as Chavez failed to show good cause for suspecting juror misconduct. View "State v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Michael Anthony Pulizzi was convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine and destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. Pulizzi argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from warrantless searches and seizures of his trash, which he claimed violated his rights under the Idaho Constitution. He contended that the Twin Falls City waste collection ordinances created an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho denied Pulizzi’s motion to suppress, finding that the waste collection ordinance did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court concluded that the ordinance did not mandate participation in the city’s waste collection program and that the prohibition against collecting garbage for monetary gain did not apply to law enforcement officers. Pulizzi then pled guilty to the charges under a conditional plea agreement, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the waste collection ordinance did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in Pulizzi’s trash. The court declined to reconsider its previous holdings in State v. Donato and State v. McCall, which aligned with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Greenwood, stating that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection in a public area. The court found that the ordinance’s purpose was to promote public health and safety, not to protect privacy interests in curbside garbage. Consequently, the court affirmed Pulizzi’s conviction. View "State v. Pulizzi" on Justia Law

Thomas Eugene Creech, sentenced to death in 1995, faced a failed execution attempt earlier this year due to the inability to establish reliable peripheral intravenous access. The execution team spent nearly an hour attempting to establish venous access in various parts of Creech’s body, but each attempt resulted in vein collapse, leading to the procedure being halted. Following this, Creech sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the district court and affirmed on appeal.While his post-conviction appeal was pending, Creech applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that any further attempt to carry out his death sentence would violate his constitutional rights. The district court summarily dismissed Creech’s application with prejudice. Creech appealed, contending that the State’s revised standard operating procedure and execution protocols constitute cruel and unusual punishment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court noted that the Idaho Department of Correction had modified its standard operating procedure for executions to allow a qualified physician to establish a central line if peripheral vein access is not attainable. Creech’s application for a writ of habeas corpus included three claims, but only Claim Two, which challenged the use of a central venous line as cruel and unusual punishment, was before the court on appeal.The court held that Creech failed to establish a prima facie challenge to the State’s method of execution. The court found that the use of a central line catheter is a common medical procedure and does not rise to the level of indecency or cruelty prohibited by the United States Constitution. Additionally, Creech failed to propose an alternative method of execution, as required to assert a “method of execution” challenge. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s order of dismissal. View "Creech v. Randy Valley" on Justia Law

Dustin Mansfield was convicted of introducing contraband into a correctional facility. In January 2021, Mansfield was charged after suboxone strips were found in his mail at the Bannock County jail. The State filed an Information against him, and he was arraigned in March 2021. Mansfield filed a motion to suppress evidence, which delayed the trial initially set for August 2021. The trial was rescheduled multiple times due to Mansfield's motions and the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to emergency orders prohibiting jury trials.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of Idaho denied Mansfield's motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation, citing the pandemic and emergency orders as good cause for the delay. Mansfield entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the related emergency orders constituted good cause under Idaho Code section 19-3501(2). The court also applied the Barker v. Wingo factors to assess the constitutional speedy trial claim. It found that while the fourteen-month delay was significant, the reasons for the delay, including the pandemic and Mansfield's own motions, were justified. Mansfield's late assertion of his right to a speedy trial and the lack of specific prejudice to his defense further supported the court's decision. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Mansfield's statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated, and his conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

Fernando Rodriguez, an inmate at an Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) facility, was involved in a disturbance in April 2021. During the incident, inmates threw objects, barricaded doors, and started fires. Rodriguez was identified as one of the inmates who dumped soap on the floor near a door. The State charged Rodriguez with riot and arson, alleging he created a disturbance of the peace and caused property damage.The magistrate court found probable cause for the riot charge but not for the arson charge, binding Rodriguez over to the district court. Rodriguez moved to dismiss the riot charge, arguing that his actions did not meet the statutory requirements for a riot under Idaho Code section 18-6401. The district court agreed, concluding that dumping soap did not cause property damage and that the disturbance of the public peace provision did not apply to a prison setting. The district court dismissed the riot charge.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court held that the term "public peace" in Idaho Code section 18-6401 unambiguously refers to the exterior or sensory peace of the public writ large, which can be disturbed by conduct occurring inside a prison. The court also found that there was probable cause to believe Rodriguez committed the crime of riot by acting together with other inmates to disturb the public peace and cause property damage. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the riot charge against Rodriguez. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Robert Kenneth Wilde was charged with two felonies, including trafficking in heroin, and one misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. One felony charge was dismissed, and Wilde pleaded guilty to trafficking in heroin, with the misdemeanor charge dismissed as part of a plea agreement. The plea agreement included a provision for Wilde to pay drug restitution for investigation costs. Wilde was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, followed by twenty years indeterminate, and ordered to pay a $15,000 fine and $291 in restitution to the Idaho State Police. The State sought additional restitution for investigative costs, which Wilde contested, citing his lengthy sentence and diminished earning potential.The district court ordered Wilde to pay an additional $2,806.40 in restitution, considering his foreseeable ability to repay. Wilde appealed, and the Court of Appeals held that he waived his right to appeal the restitution order based on his plea agreement. The Court of Appeals also addressed the merits, concluding that Wilde failed to show error in the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision to raise the issue of appellate waiver sua sponte, as the State had not raised it. The Supreme Court found that Wilde's plea agreement did not contain an appellate waiver regarding restitution under Idaho Code section 37-2732(k). On the merits, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding additional restitution, as it adequately considered Wilde's foreseeable ability to repay, supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's restitution order. View "State v. Wilde" on Justia Law

Adrian Renee Soliz was found unconscious behind the wheel of his vehicle, which was impeding traffic. Concerned, a passerby called 9-1-1, and emergency responders arrived at the scene. They discovered drug paraphernalia on Soliz's lap while providing medical assistance for what was later confirmed to be a drug overdose. Soliz was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and other related offenses.Soliz filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that under Idaho’s overdose immunity statute (Idaho Code section 37-2739C(2)), he should be immune from prosecution because the evidence was obtained as a result of his medical emergency. The State opposed the motion, contending that the evidence was discovered during a traffic investigation, not solely due to the medical emergency. The district court denied Soliz’s motion, concluding that the evidence was not obtained solely as a result of the medical emergency.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that the phrase “as a result of” in the overdose immunity statute means that the drug-related medical emergency must be the sole cause of the discovery of evidence. Since the evidence was discovered during both a traffic investigation and a medical emergency response, the statute did not apply. Therefore, Soliz was not entitled to immunity, and the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was upheld. View "State v. Soliz" on Justia Law

Jakobe G. Martin was charged with three counts of statutory rape involving a 17-year-old female, K.F., who reported that Martin had raped her on three occasions. Martin allowed K.F., a runaway, to stay at his apartment, where she later accused him of both forced and consensual sexual intercourse. During the investigation, DNA evidence was collected, and K.F. made statements during a forensic interview that conflicted with the DNA results.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho heard the case. The State filed a motion in limine under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412 to exclude evidence of the victim’s sexual history. Martin argued that he should be allowed to use certain evidence for impeachment purposes, specifically to challenge a statement K.F. made during her forensic interview. The district court allowed Martin to inquire about the DNA results but barred the use of the victim’s statements about her sexual history for impeachment, citing Rule 412(b). Martin was convicted of one count of rape and sentenced to a twenty-year term, with seven years fixed and thirteen years indeterminate.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence Martin sought to introduce was properly excluded under Rule 412(b), which prohibits evidence of an alleged victim’s past sexual behavior unless it falls within specific exceptions. The court also noted that Martin failed to provide the required notice under Rule 412(c). Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Martin’s judgment of conviction. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

Desiree Elaine Karst was a passenger in a car stopped by police in Kootenai County, Idaho. During the stop, a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and Karst admitted to having drugs in the car. Additional drugs and paraphernalia were found on her at the jail. She was charged with multiple drug offenses and introducing contraband into a correctional facility. Karst moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was impermissibly extended. The district court partially denied her motion, and Karst entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving her right to appeal. She was ordered to pay $569.50 in various court fees.Karst appealed the partial denial of her motion to suppress. The Idaho Supreme Court found the traffic stop was impermissibly extended, reversed the district court’s decision, and remanded the case. Subsequently, the prosecutor dismissed all charges against Karst. Karst then filed a motion to reimburse the fees she had paid, arguing that retaining her funds violated her due process rights. The district court denied her motion, citing a lack of jurisdiction and suggesting she sue each governmental entity that received the fees.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to consider Karst’s motion for reimbursement. The court found that the State, by initiating the criminal case, had submitted to the district court’s jurisdiction. The court also determined that requiring Karst to file multiple civil suits to recover the fees would impose more than minimal procedures, violating her due process rights. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing that Karst should be reimbursed if she proves she paid the fees and her conviction was invalidated. View "State v. Karst" on Justia Law