Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-appellant Hasan Icanovic appealed a district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief brought on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Icanovic argued that his attorney’s advice offered in connection with his consideration and acceptance of a plea bargain was deficient and that but for this advice he would not have pled guilty to felony domestic battery. At issue was his attorney’s advice regarding the immigration-related consequences of his guilty plea. Finding that Icanovic did not meet his burden of proof for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Icanovic’s petition for post-conviction relief. View "Icanovic v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On October 23, 2012, the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. On September 3, 2013, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the Criminal Case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel in the Criminal Case advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court in this case dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the Criminal Case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, the only issue he raised relating to the denial of post-conviction relief was whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and so it affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Ryan Rawlings went into a Wal-Mart store to steal various items. He selected a large tote, placed it in a shopping cart, filled the tote with small items of merchandise, and covered them with the tote’s lid. He also selected a combination floor lamp and table and placed it in a cart. He then pushed the cart through the self-checkout line without paying for the merchandise, hoping that a cart containing two items that were too large to bag would not attract attention. However, a loss prevention officer had observed Rawlings’s actions. The loss prevention officer called law enforcement. When a sheriff’s deputy arrived, he talked with Rawlings after giving him Miranda rights. The Deputy asked Rawlings whether he had previously committed thefts like this, and Rawlings answered that he had back in Ohio. He stated that he had always been able to take items from Wal-Mart stores in the past without getting caught. Rawlings was charged with petit theft, a misdemeanor, and burglary, a felony. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony, and he was bound over to answer in the district court. Prior to trial, his counsel moved to dismiss the burglary charge on the grounds that the statute, as applied to Rawlings, violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The motion was denied. Prior to trial, the Prosecutor served and filed a notice of the State’s intent to present evidence of Rawlings’s statement regarding his prior thefts, and Rawlings filed and served a motion in limine seeking to exclude that evidence. The evidence was ruled admissible. During a conference in chambers on the morning of the trial, Mr. Logsdon unsuccessfully re-argued the motion in limine. Then the Prosecutor orally moved to dismiss the petit theft charge, and the district court granted the motion. The burglary charge was tried to the jury, which found Rawlings guilty of burglary. He then appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

In January of 2008, a jury convicted Faron Hawkins of two counts of robbery. At trial, Hawkins admitted that he robbed banks but claimed that he did so under duress that stemmed from his previous involvement with various government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred when it did not “sua sponte order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing . . . .” The Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins’ judgment of conviction and remanded the case so that Hawkins could undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code sections 18-211 and 18-212. On remand, the district court conducted a competency hearing in late 2010. Two experts had evaluated Hawkins and determined that Hawkins was competent during the entire course of his legal proceedings. In its order of December 6, 2010, the district court found that Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January of 2008. Hawkins appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the district court’s 2010 retroactive determination that he was competent to stand trial in 2008 violated his due process rights. He also argued that he was not competent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself pro se. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jorge Lopez-Orozco was convicted by jury on three counts of first degree murder. The district imposed three concurrent determinate life sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in finding that his brother was unavailable as a witness at trial and allowing the brother’s preliminary hearing testimony to be read into evidence; and (2) the court erred in allowing the brother’s unsworn written statement to law enforcement to also be read into evidence. Finding neither of these contentions to warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Lopez-Orozco" on Justia Law

Shortly before midnight on November 14, 2012, Boise Police Officer Ryan Thueson began following Nathan David Neal in a patrol car. Thueson observed Neal drive his pickup onto, but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway (the “fog line”). Thueson continued to follow Neal until, about one mile further west, he saw Neal again drive onto, but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway. According to Officer Thueson’s original report, at the time he observed Neal drive onto the fog line twice. Thueson learned later that there was no fog line and the line actually marked a bicycle lane. Thueson stopped Neal after he turned right. This traffic stop led to Neal’s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. He was not ticketed for any traffic violations. Neal moved to suppress, claiming the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a traffic stop. The State argued the officer observed both a misdemeanor (Boise City Code section 10-10-17, which prohibited driving on a bicycle lane) and an infraction (Idaho Code section 49-637, which required drivers to maintain a single lane of travel), and that these observations justified the stop. The State also argued that observing these two instances of driving onto the line on the right, close to midnight, gave the officer reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, which also justified the stop. After a hearing and reviewing briefs, the magistrate granted Neal’s motion to suppress. The magistrate held there was no traffic violation justifying the stop because Neal did not cross the line and enter another lane. The magistrate also held that driving onto an alleged fog line two times did not create a driving pattern outside the broad range of normal driving behavior, so the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of DUI. Finally, the magistrate found there was no evidence the officer’s observations occurred in Boise, so there was no violation of Boise City Code. The State appealed, and the district court reversed, ultimately concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion that both “the statute and ordinance were violated by Mr. Neal’s driving upon the fog line and upon the bike lane marker.” Neal appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that driving on, but not across, an alleged fog line on the roadway violated the state statute requirement that a vehicle remain within its lane. The Supreme Court granted Neal’s petition for review, and held that driving onto but not across the line marking the right edge of the road did not violate Idaho Code section 49-637. Therefore the officer’s stop of Neal was not justified. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court reversing the magistrate’s granting of Neal’s motion to suppress. View "Idaho v. Neal" on Justia Law

This case was the sixth appeal considered by the Idaho Supreme Court following petitioner-appellant Timothy Dunlap’s guilty plea to first-degree murder. The district court summarily dismissed Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. Dunlap raised several substantive claims for post-conviction relief. For each claim, he advanced a corresponding claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After review and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary dismissal of Dunlap’s successive petition for post-conviction relief. View "Dunlap v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The State charged Kyle Richardson with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. After a preliminary hearing in which a confidential informant testified for the State, the State filed a motion requesting that the district court allow the State to admit into evidence at trial a transcript of the confidential informant’s preliminary hearing testimony. The State sought admission of the confidential informant’s testimony because the confidential informant had died and thus was unavailable as a witness for trial. The district court issued an opinion and order denying the State’s motion. The State filed a motion for a permissive appeal of the district court’s order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Richardson's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the admission of the informant's preliminary hearing testimony. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Idaho law governing the admission of preliminary hearing transcripts permitted the admission of the testimony at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Joshua Jones appealed his conviction for grand theft by extortion. Defendant argued the district court erred when it denied his mid-trial request to question a juror after the juror informed the court that he was suffering from anxiety and was unsure if he could continue participating on the jury. Defendant also argued that the district court made errors in evidentiary rulings and that the prosecutor engaged in various forms of misconduct during closing argument. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed the appellate court's judgment. It is reasonable to assume that after the trial resumed, the court, defense counsel, and bailiff may have continued to observe Juror 69 for any outward signs of anxiety. Because no further concerns were raised by anyone, including Juror 69, this Court is not in a position to second guess the district court’s handling of the matter. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dealing with the matter. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Idaho v. Moses" on Justia Law

Bob Boren appealed his conviction entered upon his conditional guilty plea to unlawful possession of a firearm. Boren claimed that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Boren" on Justia Law