Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Two cases were consolidated on appeal. In the first case, Defendant was convicted of felony attempting to elude a peace officer, and misdemeanors malicious injury to property and assault. In the second case, Defendant was convicted of felony grand theft. For each felony, he was sentenced to eighteen years in prison, with eight years fixed and ten years indeterminate, and the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Defendant raised five alleged errors in connection with his eluding case, and two alleged errors in the grand theft case. Taking each in turn, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "Idaho v. Skunkcap" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant-appellant Russell Parker with one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen. Defendant went to trial and the jury found him guilty. On appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting statements made by law enforcement during an interview with him. Further, he argued that the State engaged in five instances of prosecutorial misconduct, each satisfying the fundamental error standard, and these in the aggregate resulted in cumulative error. Due to these errors, defendant asked that the Court vacate his conviction and remand his case for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Idaho v. Parker" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Krystal Easley appealed the revocation of her probation and the Supreme Court's partial denial of her request to augment the record with various transcripts to be created at the public's expense. This case also presented the issue of the prosecutor's refusal to consent to the district judge's desire to sentence Easley to mental health court and the district court's acquiescence in that refusal. Defendant has been charged by information with possession of a controlled substance. She admitted to violating the terms of her probation for failing to stay in contact with her probation officer, moving without permission and failing to pay for the costs of her supervision. Defendant had been in contact with a mental health court coordinator. Defendant asserted that she was a good candidate for mental health court. The prosecutor did not agree with the recommendation. The district court ruled it did not have the authority to place defendant into the mental health program because the prosecutor had an "absolute veto" over post-judgment eligibility for mental health court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it did not violate defendant's right to due process and equal protection when it denied in part her motion to augment; (2) the district court erred in sentencing when it determined that the prosecutor had an absolute right to veto the district court's desired decision to sentence defendant to the mental health court; and (3) the district court erred when it failed to consider the mental health court as an alternative in sentencing when it revoked defendant's probation. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Easley" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Carey Baker married Robyn Shea in 2005; divorced in 2009. Shortly thereafter, Shea sought and obtained a civil protection order against Baker. Shea received a series of phone messages from Baker in violation of the protection order. Eleven of those phone messages were received by Shea while she was located in Kootenai County, and one of the messages was received by Shea while she was located in Ada County. The Boise City Attorney, acting on behalf of the City of Meridian, filed a misdemeanor complaint against Baker for one count of violating the protection order for the phone message Shea received while in Ada County. The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney in Kootenai County filed charges against Baker for twelve counts of violating the protection order for all of the phone messages that Shea received from Baker. Kootenai County also issued an arrest warrant on the same day. On February 27, 2010, Baker entered into a plea agreement with the Boise City prosecutor, agreeing to plead guilty to the single count filed in Ada County in exchange for the promise that "the State" would pursue no other charges against him for violation of the protection order for calls Baker placed to Shea prior to February 17, 2010. At sentencing, the magistrate judge considered all twelve phone messages that Shea received from Baker. This included the messages that were the basis of the charges in Kootenai County. The Boise City Attorney was aware of the phone calls to Kootenai County but unaware charges had been filed. Likewise, the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney was not aware of the proceeding in Ada County. On April 2, 2010, Baker was arrested on the warrant issued in Kootenai County. On October 8, 2010, Baker filed a motion to dismiss the charges in Kootenai County claiming double jeopardy and violation of the plea agreement. On November 5, 2010, the magistrate judge dismissed one count of the charges in Kootenai County because that charge was for the August 24, 2009, phone message to which Baker pled guilty in Ada County. The magistrate judge denied Baker's motion to dismiss the remaining eleven counts. A jury ultimately found Baker guilty on all eleven counts of violating the protection order. Baker appealed to the district court in its capacity as an intermediate appellate court, asserting that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney was bound by the plea agreement between him and the Boise City prosecutor. The district court vacated the convictions in Kootenai County on the basis that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney was bound by the terms of Baker's plea agreement. The district court ruled that the plea agreement must be construed in favor of Baker and that specific performance of the plea agreement was the appropriate remedy. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision vacating the eleven Kootenai County charges. View "Idaho v. Baker" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Murray appealed the district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief after he pled guilty to felony domestic violence and was sentenced to three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate. Murray's petition for post-conviction relief argued, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Murray's petition for post-conviction relief: "although Murray has provided argument that his counsel was deficient in failing to inform him of his ability to obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to pleading guilty, he has not provided a single authority or legal proposition to support his argument. Murray merely states, without support, that his counsel’s failure to advise him of his ability to undergo a confidential evaluation 'represented deficient performance.'" View "Murray v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Robert Hansen pled guilty to the charges of aggravated driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an injury accident. At the sentencing hearing the district court allowed the victim's father to give an informal statement over Hansen's objection that the father was not a victim entitled to make a victim impact statement. The district court sentenced Hansen to a total of 15 years imprisonment for the two convictions. Hansen appealed. The Court of Appeals determined that it was error for the district court to allow the father’s statement, because the father was not a victim. However, the Court of Appeals held that any error was harmless. Hansen also appealed his sentences on both the aggravated driving under the influence charge and the leaving the scene of an injury accident charge, maintaining that the district court's departure from the plea agreement on one charge opened up both for review. The State petitioned this Court for review of whether the district court erroneously admitted the father’s statement. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did nor err by admitting the victim's father's statement at the sentencing hearing, and it affirmed with regard to Hansen's sentence. View "Idaho v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Defendant Alisha Murphy was convicted in 2001 of first degree murder of her husband, James. She appealed the conviction and sentence, which were affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Defendant filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief asserting numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, police misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial misconduct, together with a motion for the appointment of counsel. The Court of Appeals concluded defendant had made a successive petition for post-conviction relief and denied it. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in denying her request for counsel, summarily dismissing her successive petition, and denying her I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. She argued that her ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were properly before the district court on successive petition because, under the Supreme Court’s decision in "Palmer v. Dermitt," (635 P.2d 955 (1981)), ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel constituted sufficient reason to bring a successive petition under I.C. 19-4908. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, concluding that the district court properly dismissed three out of the four ineffective assistance of counsel claims without appointing counsel. As to the remaining claim, the Court of Appeals held that defendant alleged sufficient facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim and remanded that claim to the district court for appointment of counsel. Defendant argued to the Supreme Court that she was entitled to relief from the district court’s orders denying counsel and summarily dismissing each of the claims in her successive petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel was not a sufficient reason under I.C. 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition, and thus, overruled Palmer v. Dermitt. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and the district court’s order of summary dismissal of defendant's successive petition for post-conviction relief was reinstated. View "Murphy v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Samuel Glenn appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss a 2010 driving under the influence (DUI) charge. The State sought an enhanced sentence based upon a 2001 DUI conviction. The district court had previously dismissed that 2001 DUI conviction. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred because Idaho Supreme Court precedent holds that cases dismissed pursuant to I.C. 19-2604 are a nullity and cannot later be used as sentencing enhancements. The State contended that the district court erred in considering the merits of Defendant's untimely motion to dismiss and that precedent allowed an enhanced sentence based on a previously dismissed DUI conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Alan and Diane Johnson were shot and killed in their home. The Johnsons' sixteen-year-old daughter Sarah was home at the time of the shooting. She consistently denied any involvement, but gave several different accounts of what she was doing, what she saw, and what she heard prior to and after the murders. After a lengthy trial, a jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree murder of her parents. The district court sentenced Johnson to concurrent life sentences, plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction and sentence. View "Johnson v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant David Lee appealed the district court's order that denied his motion to strike certain language from his acquittal. In that judgment, the court declared that because defendant was "a serious pedophile, it is hoped that the authorities will be able to keep a closer watch on him in the future." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the "surplus" language should not have been included in the judgment of acquittal in the first place when defendant raised the issue in his motion. That motion should have been granted. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to strike, and the case remanded for entry of an amended judgment eliminating the sentence in question. View "Idaho v. Lee" on Justia Law