Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After moving from the address that he reported to the Idaho State Police Sex Offender Registry pursuant to the sex offender registration requirements of I.C. 18-8309 (2001) and having been extradited from Belize, Defendant David Leroy Lee was convicted of Failure to Register as a Sex Offender in 2009. Defendant asserted on appeal that the plain language of I.C. 18-8309 did not require sex offenders to register or update their address information with either the Registry or the sheriff of the county where the offender was required to register after moving to another country. In the alternative, he contended that the State failed to provide evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he moved from his last known address to a definite new address or actual residence thereby triggering his duty to notify the Registry or the sheriff. Furthermore, Defendant claimed that I.C. 18-8309 was unconstitutionally vague and that his due process rights were violated. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant changed his address or actual residence. The Court therefore vacated the district court's Amended Judgment of Conviction, and remanded this case with instructions for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.

Defendant Hector Almaraz appealed his conviction for first-degree murder based on several evidentiary grounds, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting impermissible character evidence that gang members commit crimes and other violent acts and by admitting improper testimony from a police officer and an expert witness interpreting the security video from the scene of the crime. Defendant also argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress an eyewitness identification due to suggestive procedures, and by precluding an expert from opining to the suggestiveness of a specific eyewitness’ identification. Furthermore, Defendant asserted that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a fair trial, warranting the Supreme Court to remand his case to district court for a new trial. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in failing to suppress the identification of Defendant as the shooter, and abused its discretion by limiting a defense expert from testifying about the suggestiveness of the specific procedures employed by the police during the eyewitness' interview with police. Nevertheless, the Court found those two errors to be harmless. There was no other abuse of discretion committed by the district court on the remaining evidentiary issues raised by Defendant on appeal and that Court held that his Motion for a New Trial was properly denied. Thus, the Court upheld Defendant's conviction.

This case concerned Appellant James Fredrick Pepcorn, Sr.'s petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision which found error in two cases against him that were consolidated at trial. After a harmless error analysis, the Court of Appeals decided that the error in one of the cases was harmless error, but was not in the other case. In resolving the appeal, the Supreme Court directly addressed the issues from the trial court level regarding the introduction of Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b) evidence. The Court concluded that the admission of 404(b) testimonial evidence was not in error.

In 2008, Defendant Abelardo Gomez was arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and eleven counts of trafficking in cocaine. In a plea agreement reached with the State, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to three counts in exchange for an eight year fixed sentence. At sentencing, the district court also imposed a twenty-five year indeterminate sentence and a restitution order totaling $129,534.97. Defendant argued that the imposed sentence was excessive, and that the restitution order is a violation of the plea agreement since it was not contemplated in the agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant's sentence and ordering restitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order.

In 2004, Defendant Randy Koivu was charged with possessing methamphetamine. He was found guilty and the district court sentenced him to five years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with three years fixed and two years indeterminate. The court suspended that sentence and placed Defendant on probation for four years. The terms of probation included that Defendant pay a fine, court costs, public defender reimbursement, and restitution. Defendant later violated the terms of his probation, and the court revoked his probation and committed him to the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction. Defendant was released in 2009. A few months after his release, a deputy court clerk filed an affidavit stating Defendant failed to pay his fines and court costs. The court issued a warrant of attachment to have Defendant seized and brought before the court to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for failing to pay his fines. No copy of the order was attached to the warrant of attachment, but bail was set and would be released when Defendant posted bail. In 2010, Defendant was pulled over for speeding, and law enforcement arrested him on an outstanding warrant. While searching Defendant at the jail, a baggie of methamphetamine was discovered near his feet. Defendant was ultimately charged again for possession of methamphetamine, and found as a "persistent violator." The prosecuting attorney moved to dismiss the warrant of attachment pursuant to which Defendant had been arrested. The district court dismissed the prosecution's motion for lack of jurisdiction on the 2009 warrant. The lack of jurisdiction was apparently based upon the fact that the district court had not sentenced Defendant to a fine and court costs, but had only ordered him to pay such sums as a condition of probation. Upon the revocation of his probation, Defendant was no longer required to pay them. As a result, the district court issued an order suppressing the methamphetamine. The State then timely appealed. The State asked the Supreme Court to overrule "Idaho v. Guzman," (842 P.2d 660 (1992)) to hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to violations of Article I Section 17 of the state constitution. Because the State did not show any ground for doing so, the Court declined to overrule that case and affirmed the district court's order suppressing evidence obtained incident to the wrongly issued 2010 warrant.

Defendant Filip Danney appealed a district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of drugs obtained through the use of a drug dog during a traffic stop. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in determining that: (1) a proper foundation was laid for the admission of Global Positioning System (GPS) data used in his prosecution; (2) reasonable suspicion existed to justify the warrantless extension of his traffic stop; and (3) the government’s placement of a GPS device constituted an impermissible warrantless search. Because the Supreme Court agreed that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of possible criminal activity justifying the limited detention of Defendant for purposes of a drug dog search, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

Defendant-Appellant Robert Gurney pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. He then successfully completed drug court. Upon completion, he requested and received a dismissal of the charge. He also requested that the record of his criminal case be sealed, pursuant to I.C.A.R 32(i), on the basis of economic hardship. The district court denied this second request. It subsequently denied Defendant's request to change the caption of this case on appeal to an abbreviated version of his name which would conceal his identity. Defendant appealed both decisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to seal his records or amend the caption of his case: "[a]s the district court recognized that the decision was committed to its discretion, recognized and applied the applicable legal standard, and did so through the exercise of reason, [the Court was] unable to conclude that the decision was an abuse of discretion."

Defendant-Appellant Torey Adamcik appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant raised several issues on appeal pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and procedural errors that prejudicially lead to his conviction. Taking each of Defendant's issues raised on appeal, and after a review of the trial record and applicable law, the Supreme Court found that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably find that Defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, and that the trial court committed no fundamental errors that adversely impacted Defendant's trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences.

In 2003, Defendant Lonnie Forbes pled guilty to attempted lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen years of age. The district court withheld judgment three months later and placed Defendant on probation for seven years. As a result of his plea, Defendant was required to register as a sex offender. When Defendant committed the crime, Idaho law permitted him to request to withdraw his guilty plea and have the case dismissed. The district court was given discretion to grant Defendant's request so long as Defendant complied with the terms of his probation. Three years later, the law was amended. Three years after that, Defendant's probation was amended to unsupervised probation, with all other terms of probation still in effect. In 2010 when Defendant met the requirements of his withheld judgment, he moved to set aside his guilty plea and for a restoration of his civil rights. The State opposed Defendant's motion to dismiss, but the district court granted Defendant's request. The State appealed, arguing that the change in the law governing Defendant's sentence and probation barred Defendant's ability to have his case dismissed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred by retroactively applying the amended law to Defendant's case. The district court's decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant-Appellant Matthew Hanson was convicted of aggravated assault. At the sentencing phase, he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and declined to participate in the preparation of the presentence investigation (PSI) report. Defendant later moved the court to order a presentence psychological evaluation. The district court ruled that unless Defendant agreed to participate in the PSI, his motion would be denied on the ground that a defendant may not selectively invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to different aspects of a single subject. Defendant again declined to participate, and the court denied his motion. Defendant's attorney subsequently requested a competency evaluation, which was also denied. Defendant was sentenced to five years, with three years fixed. He then moved for reconsideration of his sentence, which motion the district court denied. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his requests for a psychological evaluation and for a competency evaluation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's request for a competency evaluation. However, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's request for a psychological evaluation because: (1) the record showed Defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing; and (2) it incorrectly held that Defendant could not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with regard to the PSI but waive the privilege in order to obtain a psychological evaluation. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.