Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Todd Sunrier is the father of twin girls who, in December 2008, were about three and one-half years old. One of the daughters mentioned to her aunt that Defendant had "hurt her 'business,'" a term she had been taught to use when referring to her vagina. Law enforcement was contacted; Defendant ultimately admitted that for a year he had been abusing both daughters. Defendant was then charged with two counts of lewd conduct. He pled not guilty and was tried before a jury. The jury found Defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with five years determinate and the remaining twenty indeterminate, concurrent sentences. Defendant appealed when the trial court declined to place him on probation. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that there was no evidence corroborating Defendant's confessions as required by the corpus delicti rule. The State filed a petition for review which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the corroboration was sufficient and affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Court also overruled its prior decisions adopting the corpus delicti rule. View "Idaho v. Suriner" on Justia Law

In 2009, the State filed a petition against John Doe, charging that he was within the purview of Idaho's Juvenile Corrections Act (JCA) for delivery of a schedule III controlled substance, hydrocodone. The State and Doe's counsel reached an agreement whereby Doe admitted to the charge and, in exchange, the State waived proceedings to bring Doe into adult court. At the conclusion of Doe's sentencing hearing, the magistrate judge memorialized his ruling in a "decree" that was issued that same day. The decree stated, "It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that [Doe] is within the purview of the [JCA] and shall be placed on Formal Probation supervision not to exceed 2 years." In the first year of Doe's probation, he had two probation review hearings, both of which demonstrated good behavior. At Doe's one-year probation review hearing, Doe's counsel argued that the magistrate should convert his formal probation to an informal adjustment. Doe's counsel could not cite any authority for converting the sentence, but believed that the court had broad authority to do so based on the interests of justice. The State objected and argued that the court did not have authority to convert the formal probation to an informal adjustment. Ultimately, the magistrate court stated that it had the authority to convert the sentence and entered a "supplemental decree nunc pro tunc to date of original order," granting Doe an informal adjustment and dismissing the case. The magistrate then issued an Order Supplementing Decree that provided "Formal Probation converted to Informal Adjustment, nunc pro tunc 05/05/09." The State filed an appeal to the district court. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's order. The State timely appealed to the Supreme Court. Because it was improper for the magistrate to convert Doe's sentence, any subsequent dismissal or termination of the improperly substituted informal adjustment could not be upheld. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of the 2009 decree. View "Idaho v. Doe (2012-09)" on Justia Law

This case arose out of an appeal of the district court's refusal to grant a dismissal following an evidentiary hearing in 2011. In 1988, Defendant Philip Dieter entered a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to lewd conduct in exchange for the State's dismissal of two related charges. Subsequently, the court entered an Order of Withheld Judgment and Order of Probation. Following an amended order that enlarged the terms of probation, the district court dissolved and terminated probation in 1992. However, it did not dismiss the case. Defendant argued that the district court should have been required to dismiss the case because the initial order contained a clause that stated the case would be dismissed if Defendant fully complied with his probation terms. He also argued that the district court had no authority to deny the dismissal. Upon review of the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.

During a traffic stop, police officers searched Defendant-Appellant Steven Clay Anderson's vehicle based on a drug dog's alert on the exterior of the vehicle, as well as other suspicious circumstances. The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the search, holding that probable cause did not dissipate when the same dog failed to alert a second time when placed inside the vehicle. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "in the absence of something more to neutralize probable cause, the initial alert, coupled with the surrounding suspicious circumstances, entitled the officers in this case to perform a thorough search of Anderson's vehicle, including the manual search performed following the failed alert. Thus, the district court correctly denied Anderson's motion to suppress the evidence found in that search."

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court pertained to an order suppressing evidence. A law enforcement officer following two vehicles turned on the overhead lights of his patrol car in order to pull over the lead vehicle. Both vehicles pulled over, and the officer parked his car behind the lead vehicle and several car lengths in front of the rear vehicle. When the officer got out of his car, he walked back to the rear vehicle to tell the driver he was only stopping the lead vehicle. The district court held that by walking towards the rear vehicle, the officer seized its occupants without a reasonable, articulable suspicion that they had violated any law. The Supreme Court reversed: when approaching the rear vehicle, the trooper did not draw his gun or make any hand gestures indicating that the vehicle should not leave, nor did he even shine his flashlight at it. Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, the trooper did not seize the rear vehicle by walking up to the driver's door. His actions certainly indicated that he wanted to talk to the driver, but the Supreme Court concluded that did not constitute a seizure.

Appellant Richard Leavitt appealed his death warrant. He also appealed the district court's denial of his motion to quash the death warrant. In 1984, Appellant brutally attacked, sexually mutilated and murdered a 31-year-old woman in Blackfoot, in which a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder. In 1989, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, but reversed the death sentence because the trial court failed to weigh all the mitigating factors against the statutory aggravating factor that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manifesting in exceptional depravity. On remand, the district court held another sentencing hearing and again sentenced Appellant to death. The warrant was issued in 1992, with a scheduled date of execution 23 days later. The United States Supreme Court granted Appellant's stay of execution. In 2000, Appellant was granted the writ of habeas corpus because of an improper jury instruction and ordered the State to retry Appellant. The State appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the habeas order. The case was remanded to determine whether Appellant's resentencing hearing in 1989 violated his constitutional rights. In 2007 on remand, the district court again granted habeas relief. The State appealed in 2011, and the Ninth Circuit again reversed the habeas order. In 2012, Appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment; the Ninth Circuit issued a mandate automatically lifting any stay previously imposed by the habeas court. The habeas court denied Appellant's motion, and denied his request for a stay of execution. Appellant's appeal of that order was pending before the Ninth Circuit, but anticipating the issuance of a new death warrant, he filed notice of Demand for Opportunity to be Heard regarding the Issuance of the Death Warrant in Idaho district court. The court denied the motion because at that time, no stay of execution or death warrant was then pending before any court. Subsequently, the court signed Appellant's death warrant and scheduled his execution. Appellant raised multiple challenges to each procedural stage of his case, from sentencing, habeas relief, constitutional rights violations and the eventual signing of his death warrant. Taking all in turn, the Supreme Court found no errors arising from this case's journey to the Idaho Supreme Court. Accordingly the Court affirmed the district court and declined to stay Appellant's execution.

Petitioner Richard Leavitt petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Commission of Pardons and Parole (Commission) to schedule a full hearing on his petition for commutation and comply with its rules for such a hearing by publishing notice of the time and place of the hearing in a newspaper of general circulation at least once per week for four weeks prior to the hearing. After the Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of Petitioner's death warrant, the Commission denied Petitioner's request for a hearing. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to set a date for a hearing wherein the Commission must show cause why a full hearing should not be conducted; if granted, the hearing would effectively stay his execution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission was not required to grant Petitioner a full, open hearing regarding his commutation petition. Furthermore, Petitioner did not demonstrate that his request for the writ of mandamus or alternative writ should have issued. Accordingly, the Court denied Petitioner's requests.

After moving from the address that he reported to the Idaho State Police Sex Offender Registry pursuant to the sex offender registration requirements of I.C. 18-8309 (2001) and having been extradited from Belize, Defendant David Leroy Lee was convicted of Failure to Register as a Sex Offender in 2009. Defendant asserted on appeal that the plain language of I.C. 18-8309 did not require sex offenders to register or update their address information with either the Registry or the sheriff of the county where the offender was required to register after moving to another country. In the alternative, he contended that the State failed to provide evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he moved from his last known address to a definite new address or actual residence thereby triggering his duty to notify the Registry or the sheriff. Furthermore, Defendant claimed that I.C. 18-8309 was unconstitutionally vague and that his due process rights were violated. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant changed his address or actual residence. The Court therefore vacated the district court's Amended Judgment of Conviction, and remanded this case with instructions for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.

Defendant Hector Almaraz appealed his conviction for first-degree murder based on several evidentiary grounds, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting impermissible character evidence that gang members commit crimes and other violent acts and by admitting improper testimony from a police officer and an expert witness interpreting the security video from the scene of the crime. Defendant also argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress an eyewitness identification due to suggestive procedures, and by precluding an expert from opining to the suggestiveness of a specific eyewitness’ identification. Furthermore, Defendant asserted that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a fair trial, warranting the Supreme Court to remand his case to district court for a new trial. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in failing to suppress the identification of Defendant as the shooter, and abused its discretion by limiting a defense expert from testifying about the suggestiveness of the specific procedures employed by the police during the eyewitness' interview with police. Nevertheless, the Court found those two errors to be harmless. There was no other abuse of discretion committed by the district court on the remaining evidentiary issues raised by Defendant on appeal and that Court held that his Motion for a New Trial was properly denied. Thus, the Court upheld Defendant's conviction.

This case concerned Appellant James Fredrick Pepcorn, Sr.'s petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision which found error in two cases against him that were consolidated at trial. After a harmless error analysis, the Court of Appeals decided that the error in one of the cases was harmless error, but was not in the other case. In resolving the appeal, the Supreme Court directly addressed the issues from the trial court level regarding the introduction of Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b) evidence. The Court concluded that the admission of 404(b) testimonial evidence was not in error.