Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Simona Manzanares appealed the judgment entered after she pled guilty under a conditional plea agreement. She pled guilty to recruiting a criminal gang member in exchange for the dismissal of a charge for providing a firearm to a criminal gang member. On appeal, Defendant argued that the "Recruiting Provision" (I.C. 18-8504(1)(a)) was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and as applied for encroaching on the First Amendment right to free association; that the "Firearm Provision" (I.C. 18-8505) was unconstitutionally overbroad as applied for punishing her "expressive conduct," and unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied for failing to adequately define "gang member," as well as being unconstitutional under the Second Amendment of the federal and under Article I, Section 11 of the state constitution. Defendant raised additional constitutional claims, and argued that the evidence presented against her at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to support the charges she faced. Upon careful consideration of Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that the "Recruiting" and "Firearm" provisions were not unconstitutionally overbroad nor were they unconstitutional as they applied to Defendant. As such, the Court upheld Defendant's conviction pursuant to her conditional plea agreement.

Defendant-Appellant Daniel Johnson petitioned the district court for an exemption from sex offender registration requirements. The district court determined that the 2009 amendments to the Idaho Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (SORA) precluded such exemption and therefore denied his petition. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court’s application of SORA was unconstitutional. Because Defendant filed his petition in his already-dismissed criminal case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. The Court therefore vacated the district court’s decision.

Defendant John Joseph Delling appealed his conviction based on his conditional pleas of guilty to two counts of second-degree murder. Defendant was initially charged with two counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of David Boss and Brad Morse. These counts were later amended to second-degree murder. Shortly after being charged, Defendant's counsel motioned for a mental health evaluation to determine whether Defendant was fit to proceed and able to aid in his own defense. Defendant requested that the Supreme Court reconsider and overrule its decision in "State v. Searcy" (798 P.2d 914 (1990)), to find that Idaho's abolition of the insanity defense was unconstitutional. Defendant also asserted that the district court abused its discretion and imposed excessive sentences. Upon careful review of the applicable legal authority and the arguments presented in Defendant's appellate brief, the Supreme Court concluded Defendant had not provided any argument that showed the precedential cases to be wrongly decided, unwise, or unjust. By looking at each argument individually, none of Defendant's constitutional rights were infringed by the abolition of the insanity defense. Furthermore, the Court also found that the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.

Defendant John Schulz appealed his conviction of felony domestic battery and the attempted strangulation of his fifteen-year-old daughter. Both charges required the state to prove that the daughter was Defendant's "household member" as defined by the applicable statute. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the fact that she did not fall within that definition. Because the Supreme Court found that the definition of "household member" plainly limited the application to "intimate partners" and thus, did not extend to a child living with her father, the Court affirmed.

Defendant Torey Adamcik appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. In 2007, a jury convicted him for the stabbing death of Cassie Jo Stoddart. Defendant raised multiple issues on appeal, among them, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, Defendant alleged multiple errors at trial prejudiced him from receiving a fair trial. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the jury was provided with sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, and that the trial court did not err in its rulings at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences.

Cassie Jo Stoddart was murdered in 2006. Defendant Brian Draper, who was sixteen years-old at the time of Stoddartâs murder, and Torey Adamcik, also a juvenile, were arrested and charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Both were tried as adults, and convicted during separate trials. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fixed life imprisonment for the murder charge and a life sentence with thirty years fixed for the conspiracy charge. Defendant raised seven issues on appeal: 1) the jury instructions for both murder and conspiracy relieved the State of proving all elements of the crimes and violated his right to due process of law; 2) his fourth police interview should have been suppressed as his parents were not present at the interview; 3) the jury instructions and the district courtâs failure to suppress the interview, even if individually harmless, cumulatively constitute reversible error; 4) the sentences should be vacated because the investigatorâs presentence report was biased; 5) Defendant's fixed life sentence for murder violated the Idaho and U.S. Constitutionsâ prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment; 6) the district courtâs sentences constituted an abuse of discretion; and 7) the district courtâs denial of Defendant's motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to modify his sentences constituted an abuse of discretion. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court only found error in the jury instruction pertaining to Defendant's conspiracy charge, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Court vacated Defendant's conviction on conspiracy to commit first degree murder and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge.

This case arose from Defendant Diego Morales Peregrinaâs conviction on two counts of aggravated battery and two firearm enhancements; one for each battery. Peregrina argued on appeal of his sentence that there was insufficient evidence to support the district courtâs "implicit" finding that the crimes arose out of divisible courses of conduct, and that even if there was, the State had the burden to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that no instruction was requested by either Peregrina or the State regarding I.C. 19-2520E, which states that when two crimes "arise out of the same indivisible course of conduct," the defendant "may only be subject to one (1) enhanced penalty." The district court sentenced Peregrina as follows: ten years fixed for the first count of aggravated battery; ten years fixed for the second count of aggravated battery consecutive to the first count; ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the first count; and ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the second count, both consecutive to the previous counts. Peregrina was also sentenced to five years fixed for his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, to run concurrent with the other sentences, with credit for two hundred days served. The Supreme Court found that the State's failure to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.

Defendant Christopher Flegel was indicted by a grand jury for lewd conduct with a child under sixteen in violation of Idaho Code section 18-1508. Defendant pled not guilty and was tried by a jury. The district court instructed the jury regarding the crime of Lewd Conduct and, as an included offense, the crime of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age. The jury found Defendant not guilty of Lewd Conduct, but could not reach a verdict on the Sexual Abuse charge. Without resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, the State filed an amended indictment charging Defendant with Sexual Abuse. Defendant was tried by a jury on that charge and found guilty, to which he appealed. The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals. It held that the indictment was properly amended because evidence admitted during Defendant's first trial supported the included offense of Sexual Abuse; and that the district court erred in failing to tailor the jury instruction on Sexual Abuse to eliminate the risk that the jury in the second trial would find Defendant guilty of conduct for which he was acquitted in the first trial. Because it concluded that such error was not harmless, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the Sexual Abuse crime had not been submitted to the grand jury and was not an included offense of the crime of lewd conduct charged in the original indictment, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.

In 2007, a mother walked in on her child and Defendant Jonathan Folk "just playing." She would later learn that Defendant had placed his mouth on the child's penis. The State charged Defendant with lewd conduct. Defendant would be later tried by a jury, found guilty and sentenced to life in prison without parole. Defendant appealed. Principal among his arguments was that the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial. At issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether the postponement of trial at the defendant's request waived the protection of the speedy trial statute, even if the trial was rescheduled within the proscribed period. The Court found that Defendant's request indeed waives protection of the statute. However, the Court vacated Defendant's conviction on errors by the trial court. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial.

The State appealed a district court's judgment granting Defendant Trevor Booth's petition for post conviction relief on the grounds that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2005, Defendant was accused of the shooting death of Leonard Kellum. Defendant was subsequently charged for first-degree murder. The State declined to seek the death penalty in this case. Defendant's attorney prepared a memorandum outlining his understanding of the potential penalties he would face. The attorney discussed the nuances of the statutory aggravating circumstances and the risks associated with taking the case to trial. Defendant then entered into a plea agreement with the State, agreeing to plead guilty first-degree murder. After a failed appeal challenging his sentence, Defendant filed for post-conviction relief. The court concluded that Defendant's attorney erroneously advised Defendant of the consequences of his plea agreement. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant's attorney was deficient, and that Defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant Defendant post-conviction relief.