Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Schulz appealed his conviction of felony domestic battery and the attempted strangulation of his fifteen-year-old daughter. Both charges required the state to prove that the daughter was Defendant's "household member" as defined by the applicable statute. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the fact that she did not fall within that definition. Because the Supreme Court found that the definition of "household member" plainly limited the application to "intimate partners" and thus, did not extend to a child living with her father, the Court affirmed.

Defendant Torey Adamcik appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. In 2007, a jury convicted him for the stabbing death of Cassie Jo Stoddart. Defendant raised multiple issues on appeal, among them, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, Defendant alleged multiple errors at trial prejudiced him from receiving a fair trial. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the jury was provided with sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, and that the trial court did not err in its rulings at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences.

Cassie Jo Stoddart was murdered in 2006. Defendant Brian Draper, who was sixteen years-old at the time of Stoddartâs murder, and Torey Adamcik, also a juvenile, were arrested and charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Both were tried as adults, and convicted during separate trials. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fixed life imprisonment for the murder charge and a life sentence with thirty years fixed for the conspiracy charge. Defendant raised seven issues on appeal: 1) the jury instructions for both murder and conspiracy relieved the State of proving all elements of the crimes and violated his right to due process of law; 2) his fourth police interview should have been suppressed as his parents were not present at the interview; 3) the jury instructions and the district courtâs failure to suppress the interview, even if individually harmless, cumulatively constitute reversible error; 4) the sentences should be vacated because the investigatorâs presentence report was biased; 5) Defendant's fixed life sentence for murder violated the Idaho and U.S. Constitutionsâ prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment; 6) the district courtâs sentences constituted an abuse of discretion; and 7) the district courtâs denial of Defendant's motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to modify his sentences constituted an abuse of discretion. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court only found error in the jury instruction pertaining to Defendant's conspiracy charge, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Court vacated Defendant's conviction on conspiracy to commit first degree murder and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge.

This case arose from Defendant Diego Morales Peregrinaâs conviction on two counts of aggravated battery and two firearm enhancements; one for each battery. Peregrina argued on appeal of his sentence that there was insufficient evidence to support the district courtâs "implicit" finding that the crimes arose out of divisible courses of conduct, and that even if there was, the State had the burden to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that no instruction was requested by either Peregrina or the State regarding I.C. 19-2520E, which states that when two crimes "arise out of the same indivisible course of conduct," the defendant "may only be subject to one (1) enhanced penalty." The district court sentenced Peregrina as follows: ten years fixed for the first count of aggravated battery; ten years fixed for the second count of aggravated battery consecutive to the first count; ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the first count; and ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the second count, both consecutive to the previous counts. Peregrina was also sentenced to five years fixed for his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, to run concurrent with the other sentences, with credit for two hundred days served. The Supreme Court found that the State's failure to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.

Defendant Christopher Flegel was indicted by a grand jury for lewd conduct with a child under sixteen in violation of Idaho Code section 18-1508. Defendant pled not guilty and was tried by a jury. The district court instructed the jury regarding the crime of Lewd Conduct and, as an included offense, the crime of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age. The jury found Defendant not guilty of Lewd Conduct, but could not reach a verdict on the Sexual Abuse charge. Without resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, the State filed an amended indictment charging Defendant with Sexual Abuse. Defendant was tried by a jury on that charge and found guilty, to which he appealed. The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals. It held that the indictment was properly amended because evidence admitted during Defendant's first trial supported the included offense of Sexual Abuse; and that the district court erred in failing to tailor the jury instruction on Sexual Abuse to eliminate the risk that the jury in the second trial would find Defendant guilty of conduct for which he was acquitted in the first trial. Because it concluded that such error was not harmless, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the Sexual Abuse crime had not been submitted to the grand jury and was not an included offense of the crime of lewd conduct charged in the original indictment, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.

In 2007, a mother walked in on her child and Defendant Jonathan Folk "just playing." She would later learn that Defendant had placed his mouth on the child's penis. The State charged Defendant with lewd conduct. Defendant would be later tried by a jury, found guilty and sentenced to life in prison without parole. Defendant appealed. Principal among his arguments was that the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial. At issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether the postponement of trial at the defendant's request waived the protection of the speedy trial statute, even if the trial was rescheduled within the proscribed period. The Court found that Defendant's request indeed waives protection of the statute. However, the Court vacated Defendant's conviction on errors by the trial court. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial.

The State appealed a district court's judgment granting Defendant Trevor Booth's petition for post conviction relief on the grounds that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2005, Defendant was accused of the shooting death of Leonard Kellum. Defendant was subsequently charged for first-degree murder. The State declined to seek the death penalty in this case. Defendant's attorney prepared a memorandum outlining his understanding of the potential penalties he would face. The attorney discussed the nuances of the statutory aggravating circumstances and the risks associated with taking the case to trial. Defendant then entered into a plea agreement with the State, agreeing to plead guilty first-degree murder. After a failed appeal challenging his sentence, Defendant filed for post-conviction relief. The court concluded that Defendant's attorney erroneously advised Defendant of the consequences of his plea agreement. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant's attorney was deficient, and that Defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant Defendant post-conviction relief.

In 2004, a jury found Petitioner Erick Hall guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping and rape. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Petitioner appealed his conviction, and was appointed a public defender. In 2005, Petitioner petitioned the district court for post conviction relief. In that proceeding, the district court limited contact between Petitioner's counsel and the jurors that convicted him. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. In 2006, Petitioner moved to depose his trial attorneys and their investigator. The court allowed the deposition of trial counsel, but denied leave to depose the investigator. Petitioner's petition for post conviction relief was ultimately denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner challenged all of the district court's denials pertaining to the interview and deposition of jurors and key witnesses so that he could mount a successful appellate petition for relief. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's requests. The Court affirmed the district court's decision on all issues.

Defendant Jonathan Ellington appealed his conviction for murder and aggravated battery. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that prosecutorial misconduct, evidentiary errors, a biased jury and the "cumulative error doctrine" entitled him to a new trial. The Supreme Court found merit to several of Defendant's claims. The Court found that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant a new trial after evidence came to light that the State's sole rebuttal witness provided false testimony at trial. The Court vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Petitioner Zack Fields appealed the dismissal of his application for post conviction relief. In 1988, Petitioner was sentenced to death for the stabbing death of Mary Vanderford. Petitioner argued that he was wrongly accused and that DNA test results and affidavits of trial witnesses supported his argument. The district court ordered nineteen latent fingerprints from the murder scene to be run through the national fingerprint database and to have DNA testing of substances found on Petitioner and the victimâs clothing and underneath her fingernails. Testing determined that the fingerprints did not belong to Petitioner, nor did any of the substances contain his DNA. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that he was entitled to an inference that the victim scratched her attacker because the attacker was close enough to stab her. With no DNA evidence of Petitioner recovered from the murder scene, Petitioner contended the district court erred by not viewing the DNA and fingerprint evidence âin a light most favorable toâ Petitioner. The Supreme Court found that there was ânothing but speculation supporting the claim that the scrapings from the victimâs fingernails came from her attacker. We therefore uphold the dismissal of [Petitionerâs] claim . . . because the DNA test results, in light of all admissible evidence, do not demonstrate that [Petitioner] is not the person who committed the murder.â