Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm under an accountability theory and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 14 years and five years,respectively. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Reversible error occurred when the state was allowed to impeach defendant, who testified at trial, with his prior juvenile adjudication for burglary. A juvenile adjudication is typically not admissible against a testifying defendant, and defendant did not "open the door" to admission of his juvenile adjudication.

After thefts from a school office, a motion activated, wireless, digital camera concealed within a clock radio and a digital video recorder were installed. Over the weekend, the motion sensor triggered the DVR and a recording was made, which was later copied by the police. School officials identified a night watchman on the recording; he admitted to stealing cash from the office, but disagreed about the amount. When the state sought to admit the VHS tape at trial, defendant objected on foundational grounds, arguing that the video skips forward 30 seconds and the state failed to explain why the gap existed. Defense counsel also argued that it had not been shown that the camera was working properly. The trial court overruled the objection and found defendant guilty. The appellate court held that the state failed to establish even the probability that the VHS tape had not been tampered with. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the conviction. The totality of the evidence demonstrated that the state laid a proper foundation for admission of the VHS tape.

Following separate convictions, the circuit court of Cook County charged the two defendants $10 each for the Arresteeâs Medical Costs Fund (medical cost assessment), 730 ILCS 125/17. Neither actually received medical services. The appellate court upheld the assessment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed with respect to one defendant and dismissed the other appeal. The plain language of the statute does not indicate the collection of the fee depends upon actual use for defendant's medical care. The statutory scheme requires convicted defendants to contribute to the fund because an arrestee who does use medical services while in custody is required to reimburse the county only to the extent that he or she is reasonably able to pay, leaving the fund to reimburse the county for the balance.

An inmate, committed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01), claimed deprivation of his right to equal protection because he was not provided with the option to retain an independent psychiatrist to defend against the proceedings, an option afforded similarly situated individuals subject to commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). The trial court rejected the claim and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that an individual subject to commitment under the SDPA, is not similarly situated to individuals subject to commitment under the SVPA. The SDPA concerns individuals who have been charged with any type of criminal offense and suffer from a mental disorder predisposing them to commit sex crimes. The SVPA is limited to persons with mental disorders who have been convicted of serious and violent sex offenses, and are facing potential release or discharge from state custody but continue to pose a risk to commit additional sex crimes.

The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based on findings of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12â13(a)(1)) and attempted robbery (720 ILCS 5/8â4(a), 18â1). The trial court ordered him committed for an indeterminate term, to automatically terminate in 15 years or at age 21. The appellate and state supreme courts affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, despite some inconsistencies in testimony. The court presumed that the trial court did not allow the juvenile to be shackled without a hearing on whether restraint was required, absent any indication in the record that the court was aware that he was in shackles before he was called to testify. Delinquency adjudications are not the equivalent of felony convictions,so it is not unconstitutional that juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial. Imposition of collateral consequences on juveniles adjudicated delinquent for committing felony sex offenses, such as reduced confidentiality, unavailability of expungement, and possibility of involuntary commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Act,do not negate the rehabilitative purposes of the Act so that a jury trial would be required.

The Illinois Department of Corrections sought to recover the costs of defendantâs incarceration under 730 ILCS 5/1. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the Department for $455,203.14, but precluded the Department from satisfying any of the judgment out of money defendant had earned while working for prison industry. Those wages had already been applied to offset the cost of incarceration. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, but it reversed with respect to prison earnings. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that once an inmate's wages have been properly subjected to the offset provision of section 3â12â5 of the Code, the remaining wages are not subject to collection.

In defendant's trial for criminal sexual assault, the circuit court admitted evidence that defendant had also been involved in criminal sexual assault of another woman. The court cited the Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/115â7.3, permitting the evidence to show a defendantâs propensity to commit sex crimes. When defendant sought to admission of evidence of his acquittal in the prior case, the court rejected his request. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The statutory language permits admission of both evidence of defendantâs commission of another enumerated offense and evidence to rebut that proof or an inference from that proof. Exclusion of the acquittal evidence limited the juryâs ability to assess testimony from the victim in the earlier case and was very prejudicial to the defendant.

The defendant, charged with the attempted robbery death of a cab driver, agreed to plead guilty and receive a 28-year sentence on the charge of first degree murder and a 4-year sentence on the charge of possession of contraband while in a penal institution, to be served consecutively. Before accepting defendantâs plea, the trial court admonished him that the sentencing range was 20 to 60 yearsâ imprisonment. The state presented a factual basis for both pleas that included use of a gun. After sentencing the court denied a motion to vacate the plea. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that defendant was subject to a mandatory 15-year enhancement for being armed with a gun, so that the mandatory minimum sentence was 35 years. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for trial, stating that the trial court could not impose a sentence that did not include the enhancement.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to a murder charge. The trial court imposed a sentence of 33 years and ordered him to pay $200 for DNA testing. The appellate court rejected an argument that the court lacked authority to impose the order because the defendant's DNA was already on file. The supreme court affirmed in all other respects, but reversed the DNA order, holding that 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 authorizes a court to order the taking, analysis, and indexing of a qualifying defendant's DNA only if that DNA is not already in the database.

While the defendant was on probation following conviction for retail theft, police and probation officers searched his residence and found marijuana and cocaine. The trial court denied a motion to suppress, convicted the defendant of unauthorized possession, and sentenced him to two years imprisonment. The appellate court reversed. The supreme court reversed, affirming the conviction. By agreeing, in his probation order, to suspicionless searches and consenting to the use of anything found during such a search as evidence, the defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights.