Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

McChriston was convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, a Class 1 felony that carried a mandatory Class X sentence. The trial judge sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. The order did not indicate that he would also be required to serve a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) under the Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d), nor did the judge mention MSR at the sentencing hearing. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentencing on direct appeal. McChriston filed a pro se post-conviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, raising issues not related to the MSR term. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. He filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that the Department of Corrections (DOC) impermissibly added a three-year MSR term to his sentence. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting arguments that imposition of the MSR term violated constitutional rights to due process and the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The MSR term attached by operation of law and was not unconstitutionally imposed by the DOC. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the trial court had no discretion with respect to MSR. View "People v. McChriston" on Justia Law

Hommerson was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to a term of natural life in prison. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petition did not contain a verification affidavit pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b). The circuit court dismissed the petition solely on that basis. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that a petition lacking a verification affidavit was frivolous and patently without merit. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the dismissal elevated form over substance. The legislative intent was that compliance with technical requirements was a matter for second stage review, after review of the merits of the claim. View "People v. Hommerson" on Justia Law

In 2006, then-policewoman Brown, entered the Chicago Patrolmen’s Federal Credit Union and presented a $1 million check made out to her and purportedly drawn by Six Flags Great America on a JP Morgan Chase bank account. She endorsed it in her own name. The check was counterfeit. Brow was charged with several offenses and testified that her mother had given her the check and had told her that it was the result of Brown’s sister’s settlement of a lawsuit. The sister already had a forgery conviction. Brown was convicted and given two years of probation and 50 hours of community service. The appellate court affirmed the convictions for attempted theft by delivering the counterfeit check and for forgery by making the check. The Illinois Supreme Court, reversed the forgery conviction, leaving the conviction for “delivery.” Brown did not “make” the check when all she did was endorse it in her own name; forgery by “making” was statutorily complete when the check was created, regardless of endorsement. There was no evidence that the defendant actually made the check. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The girl, then 15, was charged with misdemeanor battery for allegedly striking a female classmate in the face and chest. A prosecution offer to recommend a continuance under supervision in return for a guilty plea was rejected and the case proceeded to trial. The victim and a security guard who had intervened testified. The accused minor testified that she had acted in self-defense. The trial judge entered a finding of guilt. The probation officer and the prosecution recommended probation, but defense counsel asked for a continuance under supervision. The judge said that the Juvenile Court Act precludes supervision for minors without the permission of the State’s Attorney, that the “approval provision” does not apply in the adult criminal system, and that the approval provision unconstitutional. The judge placed the minor on supervision, over the state’s objection. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the supervision order as void and vacated the finding of unconstitutionality. The Juvenile Court Act has been interpreted to require that the possibility of supervision be considered before proceeding to a finding of guilt and adjudication as to delinquency. Here, supervision was not requested before the finding of guilt, so any objection by the prosecutor had become irrelevant. The minor lacked standing to raise the constitutional issue. The girl claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not know she was giving up the opportunity for supervision by rejecting the plea offer, and that neither her attorney nor the court knew that supervision had to be requested before a finding of guilt. The court found that the minor had been prejudiced and remanded to allow her to request supervision at the appropriate time. Should the state object, a challenge to the validity of the approval provision could properly be raised.View "In re: Danielle J" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers testified that a group of male teenagers was screaming, making gestures, and throwing bottles at passing vehicles, then retired to the backyard of the location, which was not the defendant’s residence. While in the street, he had been observed holding the right side of his waist area. In the backyard, defendant was heard yelling an expletive and was seen with a gun in his right hand before he dropped it to the ground. The gun was recovered; it had its serial number scratched off and was loaded with three live rounds of ammunition. The defendant testified that police searched the yard, showed him a gun and accused him of dropping it. He denied the accusation. His friend corroborated his version of events, but the defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 24 months of probation for the use conviction, but no sentence was imposed on the latter offense. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the use conviction and remanded for sentencing on the possession conviction, noting that after the conviction, the Seventh Circuit held that 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) is effectively “a flat-ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home” that violates the second amendment, which protects not only right to keep but also the right to “bear” arms. The Illinois Supreme Court said that that the federal decision did not mean that the right to self-defense outside the home is unlimited or is not subject to regulation, but only that the comprehensive ban is unconstitutional. The defendant was also convicted under a statute prohibiting possession of a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person by one who is under 18 years of age; he was 17. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

Mosley was killed in a 2006 drive-by shooting in Chicago. Trial testimony indicated that Mosley had been in a group with Robinson, a member of the Gangster Disciples street gang, and that Pikes and Donagen were in a car that approached the group and began shooting. Pikes and Donagen were members of the rival Four Corner Hustlers gang. They were tried simultaneously before separate juries. Pikes was convicted and received a 27-year prison term. The appellate court reversed, based on the introduction of evidence concerning a previous incident in which only Donagen, was involved. In that incident, a few days before Mosley was killed, Donagen had begun shooting, without success, at Robinson, who was on a scooter. A car containing Gangster Disciples was following the scooter and drove into Donagen. The Illinois Supreme Court did not agree. Because Pike was not involved in the earlier incident, the appellate court should not have applied rules concerning evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant with which he had not been charged. The question is relevance. Evidence of a continuing gang war and motivation for shooting at a group containing a rival gang member was admissible, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.View "People v. Pikes" on Justia Law

Radojcic, his daughters, his attorney Helfand, and the office manager for one of his companies, were indicted for 52 financial crimes involving fraud on mortgage lenders. It was also alleged that Radojcic, while owing the IRS more than two million dollars, fraudulently obtained rental checks exceeding $500,000 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. After discovery, the state indicated its intent to call Helfand as a witness in exchange for use immunity. Helfand and Radojcic objected, asserting attorney-client privilege, and the trial court struck Helfand’s name from the state’s witness list. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which applies when a client seeks the services of an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity. Transcripts of grand jury testimony met the standard of providing a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of a crime or fraud by Radojcic and a reasonable basis to suspect that communications with Helfand were in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. The state met its burden of overcoming the privilege; there was no need to examine Helfand in camera prior before trial testimony. The only attorney-client communications that are subject to disclosure are those related to transactions identified in the indictment.View "People v. Radojcic" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the 2004 murder of Kasavich. In pretrial motions, the trial court ruled that some evidence of domestic violence was relevant to defendant’s motive for the killing and to intent, but limited the evidence that was admissible, finding that the admission of all of it would be more prejudicial than probative. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to exclude certain testimony from defendant’s wife based on the marital privilege. The appellate court concluded the communications between his wife and defendant were protected by marital privilege because they were made during the marriage and were made privately. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Defendant’s threat to kill his wife and Kasavich was not made in reliance on the confidences of his marriage; defendant intended that his wife reveal the threat to Kasavich. It is the type of communication that the wife might have revealed to a family member or the police. Defendant’s threat, that it was not motivated by his reliance on the intimate, special trust, and affection of the marital relationship. View "People v. Trzeciak" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for participation in a 1994 Peoria home invasion and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 30 years for armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The appellate court affirmed; Coleman was unsuccessful in initial post-conviction claims. He claimed actual innocence in a 2009 successive post-conviction petition. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Coleman called eight witnesses and the state called an investigating detective. The trial court denied relief, finding that Coleman’s evidence was insufficient to probably change the result on retrial. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered a new trial. To succeed on a post-conviction claim of actual innocence, a claimant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial. Although the state’s evidence at the original trial was sufficient to convict, there was no forensic evidence linking Coleman to the attack, and the prosecution’s identifications were significantly impeached. At the post-conviction hearing, Coleman presented the testimony of five men who admitted that they were present at the crime scene and that he was not. Although their credibility could be challenged based on their voluntary intoxication and criminal records, their testimony was consistent on key details. The evidence was new, material and noncumulative. On retrial, the fact finder can determine the credibility of those witnesses and balance the conflicting accounts. View "People v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2001, a vehicle was fired at eight times by another expressway motorist on the expressway. The driver positively identified the defendant as the shooter several times, and the passenger, seriously injured, also, identified the defendant from a photo array. Convicted, the defendant was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of the passenger and to a consecutive 10-year term for shooting at the driver. He later claimed that he would have accepted a plea bargain rather than go to trial if he had known he could receive consecutive sentences, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed, but the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced. The record showed that the defendant had hoped to prove he was actually innocent and wanted to go to trial. The trial court reasonably found the defendant’s statements to the contrary incredible. The defendant had called a witness to testify that her boyfriend was the shooter, contrary to a signed statement she had given after the incident. The victim testified that he had been offered money to recant. View "People v. Hale" on Justia Law