Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Johnson was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated kidnapping and concealment of a homicidal death. He was sentenced to terms of natural life plus 70 years. The appellate court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences and dismissal of his subsequent post-conviction petition,(725 ILCS 5/122-1. Johnson filed a section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment in 2008, which the circuit court erroneously dismissed. The appellate court remanded. The state filed a motion to dismiss his amended petition and requested that Johnson be assessed filing fees and court costs as an inmate filing a frivolous petition, 735 ILCS 5/22-105(a). The trial court dismissed and assessed numerous fees and costs against Johnson, including a $50 fee under the Counties Code, which provides that a State’s Attorney may collect a $50 fee for each day actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus. The prosecution argued that the habeas corpus fee applies to all collateral proceedings. The appellate court held that the reference to habeas corpus was generic and applied to all collateral proceedings, in order to deter frivolous filings. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the fee, stating that, although there are several different types of habeas corpus proceedings, the Counties Code provision applies only to those and is not generic. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old was the subject of a petition to have her adjudicated delinquent based on unlawful consumption of alcohol and other offenses. She pled guilty to the misdemeanor of unlawful consumption of alcohol in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and was sentenced to 18 months of probation. Later that year, the state filed a petition to revoke her probation, claiming that drug testing revealed that she had consumed marijuana and cocaine. She was conveyed to a Department of Juvenile Justices facility. Her sentence has been served. Addressing the issue under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute does not permit a minor to be committed to the Department after being adjudicated delinquent for unlawful consumption of alcohol, being placed on probation with conditions, and then having that probation revoked for violation of those probation conditions. Sentencing for underage drinking is limited by a Juvenile Court Act provision stating that a minor may be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice “only if a term of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent.” Underage drinking is not an offense of which an adult may be guilty. The court rejected a claim that this juvenile could be incarcerated for having “violated a court order” by noncompliance with probation terms. View "In re Shelby R." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Illinois Department of State Police denied Coram a firearm owners’ identification (FOID) card. The trial judge ordered issuance of the card. The State Police moved to vacate on the basis of Coram’s 1992 domestic battery conviction for slapping his girlfriend. He had pled guilty, but had not served any jail time. The Illinois statute provides for denial of a FOID card to anyone prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm. In 1996, after Coram’s conviction, the federal Gun Control Act was amended to impose a firearm disability on those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. A different judge confirmed the previous order and, further, held unconstitutional, as applied, language of the federal Gun Control Act which was incorporated into the Illinois statute. Although that federal statutory language provided relief in cases of pardon, expungement of conviction, or restoration of rights after conviction, Coram, who had never served jail time, claimed that these grounds were not available to him under Illinois law. The Illinois Supreme Court resolved the matter without reaching constitutional questions concerning the right to bear arms. It vacated the holding that federal statutory law was unconstitutional as applied, but affirmed the original order directing issuance of a FOID card. Coram had a remedy under the Illinois statutory scheme, which provides a process to review whether an applicant for a FOID card should be perpetually barred from obtaining one or can have his second amendment firearm rights restored because he is determined to currently be a law-abiding, responsible citizen. That is what happened here. View "Coram v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers testified that teenagers were screaming, making gestures, and throwing bottles at passing vehicles in the vicinity of 4217 West 25th Place and then retired to the backyard of that address, which was not the defendant’s residence. Defendant was heard yelling an expletive and was seen with a gun i before he dropped it to the ground. The loaded gun had its serial number scratched off. The defendant testified that police searched the yard, showed him a gun and accused him of dropping it. He denied having a gun that evening. Defendant’s friend corroborated his version of events. Convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), defendant was sentenced to 24 months of probation. He was also found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, but no sentence was imposed for that offense. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon must be reversed, but that the court should impose sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit has held that the “use” statute, which refers to “uncased, loaded and immediately accessible” is effectively “a flat-ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home” and violates the second amendment, which protects both the right to keep and the right to “bear” arms. The other statute, however, prohibits possession of a firearm of a size which may be concealed upon the person by one who is under 18 years of age. The defendant was 17. Possession of handguns by minors falls outside the scope of the second amendment’s protection. View "People v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with murder and home invasion, remained in custody after his February 8, 2009 arrest. After he was granted several continuances, trial was set for February 1, 2010. The prosecution then requested a continuance because the sole eyewitness could not travel for medical reasons. A second continuance was requested because the technician who had collected evidence was on deployment in Afghanistan. Granting this request brought the trial date to July 19, 2010. Defendant requested dismissal for expiration of his statutory speedy trial period, which he claimed ran out on June 26. The judge dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for trial, rejecting both defendant’s argument that the state may receive no more than a total of 60 days of continuance and the state’s claim that there is no limit to the number of continuances. Under the speedy-trial statute, “if a court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days.” The statute means that the 60-day period is tied to the specific evidence for which the continuance is sought. The prosecution may seek separate continuances to obtain different items of material evidence, but may obtain only one 60-day continuance for each. Awareness that two witnesses are unavailable means that the state should seek a continuance as to both simultaneously, rather than exhausting a continuance as to one and then seeking a continuance as to the other, unnecessarily prolonging proceedings. This defendant did not challenge the state’s due diligence, the materiality of the testimony, or reasonable grounds to believe that the testimony would be obtained at a later date. View "People v. Lacy" on Justia Law

A minor was questioned outside his home by a special agent of the police department, accompanied by a DCFS child protection worker, in the presence of the child’s mother and stepfather. After the interview, a petition for adjudication of wardship was filed, alleging that the minor was delinquent for having committed aggravated criminal sexual abuse concerning a young girl. The court suppressed the minor’s inculpatory statements after it was alleged that Miranda warnings had not been given. The appellate court dismissed, stating that it lacked jurisdiction. Although interlocutory appeals are allowed, in criminal cases, from the granting of suppression motions, there is no such provision in juvenile matters. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded after exercising its constitutional rulemaking authority to modify procedural Rule 660(a), which previously incorporated into minor proceedings criminal appeals rules only as to final judgments, to allow the state to take an interlocutory appeal. Since the 1998 Juvenile Justice Reform Amendments, virtually all of the protections of the criminal justice system are afforded to juveniles, and the law has moved toward protecting the public and holding minors more accountable. The state has the same interest in appealing a suppression order in a juvenile case as it does in a criminal case. The court declined to turn the matter over to the rules committee. View "In re B.C.P." on Justia Law

Chicago officers were on patrol when a man flagged them down. He did not give his name and was not asked for it, but said that there was a “possible gun” in a tan, four-door Lincoln with several persons inside. Shortly thereafter, officers saw a tan, four-door Lincoln, stopped it, and placed the driver in handcuffs. No traffic violations supported the stop. This defendant was a backseat passenger and was ordered out. He “took off running” and dropped a loaded handgun two feet from the car. Defendant was arrested after he fell. The trial court stated that a motion to suppress the gun would not have succeeded and defense counsel did not make such a motion. The defendant was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and received an eight-year prison term. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. When an ineffectiveness claim is based on counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion, the defendant must establish prejudice by demonstrating that the unargued motion was meritorious and that a reasonable probability existed that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. The initial stop effected an illegal seizure of the defendant; the tip was insufficient to justify the stop. However, the defendant could not prove that the gun itself was the fruit of that illegal seizure. The taint of illegality was removed because the chain of causation proceeding from the unlawful conduct was interrupted, by an intervening circumstance: the defendant’s flight. That flight ended the seizure, and the defendant conceded as much. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Chicago police responded to a street fight. One yelled “police, stop, stop,” but M.I., then 16, fired multiple gunshots in their direction. A petition to have M.I. adjudicated delinquent was filed, and the state successfully moved to designate the proceedings as an “extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution.” M.I. waived his right to a jury trial. After adjudicating him delinquent the circuit court sentenced him for aggravated discharge of a firearm, to an indeterminate period in the juvenile division of the Department of Corrections, to end no later than his twenty-first birthday. The court also imposed a 23-year adult sentence, stayed pending successful completion of the juvenile sentence. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. M.I. argued that the hearing on designation as an extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding was not held within the statutory time period, but the supreme court held that the statute is directory rather than mandatory. M.I. raised a constitutional vagueness challenge to the statutory provision that a stay of an adult sentence may be revoked for violation of the “conditions” of a sentence. Such a stay was part of the original sentence, and the state is seeking revocation based on a subsequent drug offense, but this was not the provision under which revocation was sought, so M.I. lacked standing for the challenge. M.I. also claimed that there was a due process violation in imposing a 23-year adult sentence, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The court found no Apprendi violation, noting that the extended jurisdiction juvenile statute is dispositional rather than adjudicatory. View "In re M.I." on Justia Law

While patrolling a motel parking area, police approached defendant’s car and saw, in plain view in the center console, a large bullet. They ordered defendant and his passengers out of the car, handcuffed hem, found several more bullets in the car and on defendant’s person, then found a .454 revolver under a floor mat on the front passenger side. The circuit court suppressed all of the evidence, concluding that the challenged police conduct subjected defendant to an unlawful search without probable cause because the bullet did not establish evidence of a crime. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The parties agree that the officers’ initial approach and their questioning of defendant was lawful. The officers were in a vulnerable situation when they observed the bullet. It was dusk and the officers were on foot in a parking lot away from their vehicle; they were outnumbered by defendant and his two passengers, who were in a running car. The officers were forced to make a quick decision based on limited information after seeing the bullet. A reasonably cautious individual in a similar situation could reasonably suspect the presence of a gun, implicating officer safety. View "People v. Colyar" on Justia Law

In 2003, Domagala, a live-in caretaker, was seen repeatedly striking and pressing the throat of his 84-year-old charge, Stanley. Approximately a week after being taken to the emergency room, Stanley was discharged to a nursing home with a feeding tube in place. While in the nursing home, Stanley pulled out the tube several times causing peritonitis, a systemic infection, which ultimately led to his death. Domagala was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 40 years. He filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to conduct a diligent investigation to discover that a superseding, intervening cause, i.e., gross negligence of treating medical staff, and not petitioner’s conduct, caused the death of the victim. The circuit court dismissed. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that Domagala is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Domagala" on Justia Law