Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Lloyd was convicted of seven counts of criminal sexual assault under 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2). The victim was 13 years old and had known Lloyd all of her life. The appellate court affirmed six of his convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court held that all seven convictions must be reversed. The state was required to prove that Lloyd committed an act of sexual penetration with the victim and that he knew either that she was unable to understand the nature of the act or that she was unable to give knowing consent. Lloyd’s knowledge of the victim’s age, alone, was insufficient to prove that he knew the victim was unable to understand the nature of the sex acts or give knowing consent. The court criticized the state’s decision not to charge aggravated criminal sexual abuse, for which the evidence was sufficient, stating that it is “more than unfortunate that the State chose to prosecute this case in a manner that required the minor victim … to answer questions as to her motivation or willingness to engage in sexual activity … and about her sexual education.” View "People v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

In 2006, defendant was indicted for aggravated battery and mob action. Multiple continuance motions were filed by defendant and the state. When the case was called for jury trial in May 2010, the victim-witnesses had not arrived. The judge began jury selection, over defense counsel’s objection, although the defendant had not arrived. When the witnesses had not arrived, more than 90 minutes later, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and entered a written order stating that the “matter is dismissed.” The appellate court held that that the order was an appealable dismissal of charges rather than a nonappealable acquittal, then reversed and remanded for trial. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Normally jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn, but under these unique facts, the defendant was never at risk of conviction. The state indicated it would not participate prior to the jury being sworn. The court stated that it understood the court’s frustration regarding delays and its desire to control its docket, but “cannot countenance proceedings which the court labels as a ‘trial” but which simply prove to be ‘a sham [or] artifice employed by the trial judge to achieve the result of a dismissal with prejudice for want of prosecution.’” View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Fitzpatrick was stopped by a Zion police officer for walking down the middle of a street, a petty offense which violates the Illinois Vehicle Code and was also contrary to municipal ordinance. After a brief pat-down search, Fitzpatrick was placed under arrest and, at the police station, was searched for contraband. Cocaine was found in his sock. Fitzpatrick was charged with possessing fewer than 15 grams of cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence on a theory that a full custodial arrest for a petty offense violates the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution. The motion was denied and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the issue has been settled under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Fitzpatrick failed to meet his burden of establishing his claim that there is any long-standing Illinois tradition prohibiting arrests for petty offenses. The same meaning should be given to article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution as has been given to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. View "People v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law

Hunter was arrested in 2008 when Chicago police observed him standing in the doorway of a building. A codefendant, on the sidewalk, twice accepted money from a passerby and then nodded to Hunter, who retrieved an item from the vestibule and handed it to the passerby. Police recovered cannabis and handguns from the vestibule. Hunter was charged with possession of cannabis. Bail was set, he was released, and he filed a written demand for trial. Continuances were granted; 175 days after the speedy-trial demand, Hunter was indicted as an armed habitual criminal and on four counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Hunter claimed that the gun-related offenses were known when he was originally charged, were subject to the compulsory joinder statute, and should have been combined with the cannabis charge. He claimed that the speedy-trial statute was violated since he had not been brought to trial on the new charges within 160 days of his original trial demand. The trial court dismissed the new charges. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, holding that the compulsory joinder statute requires that offenses based on the same act and known of by the prosecution must be prosecuted together and are subject to the speedy-trial period of the original charge. The original drug charge remains undisturbed. View "People v. Hunter" on Justia Law

In 2003, a stampede at a Chicago nightclub killed 21 people and injured 50 others. Security guards had released pepper spray to break up a fight on the dance floor, and a rush to the exit crushed these victims. The operators of a restaurant and bar in the building were acquitted on charges of involuntary manslaughter. They were held in indirect criminal contempt for willful violation of court orders concerning building code violations, and received two-year prison sentences. Those orders prohibited occupancy of a suspended mezzanine and occupancy of the second floor of the building. The appellate court ruled that the original orders were not clear and reversed the finding of indirect criminal contempt in 2011. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for consideration of other issues, holding that the jury could have found the defendants guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt View "People v. Le Mirage, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted murder, armed robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm, and aggravated battery with a firearm. A public defender was appointed, but defendant later successfully requested a different attorney. Defendant subsequently requested to proceed pro se. In granting this request, the trial court admonished him, and defendant waived his right to counsel. He then made motions, causing the matter to be continued. On the morning of trial, defendant stated that he no longer wanted to represent himself and requested a third appointment of counsel. The trial court, noting that defendant had refused to cooperate with two public defenders, viewed the request as a delaying tactic and denied it. The trial commenced with jury selection. Defendant refused to participate without counsel and remained in his holding cell. He later participated without counsel. He did not testify or call witnesses, but made an opening statement and closing argument and cross-examined prosecution witnesses, including four victims. Following conviction, the court imposed a 95-year term. The appellate court found plain error and ordered a new trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(a)) ambiguous, but concluding that “trial in absentia” provisions were not relevant. The trial court in this case was not statutorily required to appoint a third public defender simply because defendant decided to waive his right to be present during voir dire. View "People v. Eppinger" on Justia Law

In 2005, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced to 12 years. The appellate court affirmed. In 2008, he filed, pro se, a post-conviction petition. It was dismissed; the appellate court affirmed. In 2009, again pro se, he sought leave to file a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)), alleging that he had just discovered that, after serving his sentence, he will be subject to an additional three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). MSR was not mentioned when he was sentenced, which, he claimed, denied him due process. The trial and appellate court rejected his argument. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Criminal Code states that for this offense, the three-year MSR term shall be included in the sentence “as though written therein.” The Post-Conviction Hearing Act states that a petitioner must show “cause” for failure to raise his claim earlier. This claimed defect can never be “cause” because the petitioner is presumptively charged with knowledge of mandatory supervised release as a matter of law. The court recommended that the legislature address more specifically how one seeking leave to file a successive post-conviction petition meets the statutory requirements of showing cause and prejudice. View "People v. Evans" on Justia Law

Between 2002 and 2004, the defendant assaulted his 11-year-old stepdaughter and her 13-year-old friend. While in pretrial custody, before he was charged, defendant said he wanted to talk about what happened but that he wanted guarantees of probation. The officers doing the interrogating told him that they could not give him any guarantees. The state argued at closing that these conversations were inculpatory as admissions of guilt. Defendant was convicted of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, three counts of criminal sexual assault, five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and one count of possession of child pornography; he was sentenced to 75 years. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, finding plain error in the improper admittance of plea-related statements at trial, even though defendant had not previously raised this objection. The Illinois Supreme Court held that there was no plain error. For statements to be inadmissible as plea negotiations, it must be clear that an accused actually intended to plead guilty in exchange for a concession and that such an intention is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. This defendant’s intent to engage in plea negotiations was not shown. View "People v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with five counts of burglary, pled guilty in 2009 and received a sentence of 2 years’ probation and 180 days in jail. He was ordered to pay a public defender fee of $200 after the judge questioned him about his employment. In 2010, he was sentenced to six years in prison after having been found to have violated his probation. In his appeal, defendant contended that the hearing on his ability to pay the defender fee had been inadequate, that it was too late for a remand because the statute calls for a hearing within 90 days of judgment, and that no hearing could be held at all and that the fee should be vacated. The appellate court remanded for a new hearing. The supreme court affirmed. The perfunctory hearing was inadequate and the defendant was entitled to a new hearing of the quality set forth by statute. There is no reason why the trial court’s error should be uncorrectable on appeal. View "People v. Somers" on Justia Law

In 2008, Chicago police in an unmarked car saw the defendant yelling “dro, dro” to a passing vehicle, in front of a Chicago Housing Authority building, in an area known for marijuana sales. The arresting officer testified said that “dro, dro” is slang for the sale of cannabis, and case law has recognized that this refers to a higher quality, or hydroponic, marijuana. The defendant was arrested for violation of a municipal ordinance forbidding the solicitation of unlawful business on a public way. At the scene, plastic bags containing what appeared to be cannabis were found on his person, and, at the police station, plastic bags of what later tested positive for cocaine were also found in his clothing. All took place without a warrant. The circuit court denied a motion to suppress; the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court, reversed finding that there was probable cause to arrest. The court noted that the police testimony was unrebutted; facts known to police at the time of the arrest provided reasonable grounds to believe defendant was committing a criminal offense.View "People v. Grant" on Justia Law