Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of the 2004 shooting death of a man whose body was found in a garbage can. He gave a statement, but would not sign it and did not testify at trial. There was testimony that defendant had stated that he had a homosexual relationship with the victim, that they had argued, and that defendant had shot the victim before dragging the body outside. Police searched defendant’s residence with his consent. It had been cleaned; no inculpatory evidence or usable fingerprints were found. The defense offered testimony as to defendant’s mild retardation. There was testimony that the condition of the body was consistent with having been dropped on the sidewalk and dragged. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, based on purportedly inadequate jury questioning, but, following a supervisory order, affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court then affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to ask prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted the principle that failure to testify should not be held against defendant, and in failing to ask whether they understood three other principles, but the objections were defaulted for failure to raise them during voir dire or by post-trial motion. The evidence was not close. View "People v. Wilmington" on Justia Law

Lake Holiday, a private community, is governed by the Association, which enacted restrictive covenants, rules, and regulations, including rules that concern speed limits, impose fines, provide for enforcement of rules by private security officers, and require residents to provide security officers with identification when requested to do so. Plaintiff owns property in the development and was driving within the development, when a private security officer measured plaintiff’s speed, pulled plaintiff over, took plaintiff’s license, detained plaintiff for a few minutes, and issued a citation. In his third amended complaint plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the practices of the security department were unlawful and that the rules and regulations were void and alleged breach of fiduciary duty and willful and wanton conduct and false imprisonment. The trial court granted defendants summary judgments. The appellate court held that the practice of recording drivers was not a violation of the eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), nor was the security department prohibited from using radar, but that the Association was not authorized by the Vehicle Code to use amber lights on its vehicles and that stopping and detaining drivers for Association rule violations was unlawful. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, in favor of the Association. View "Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

English, was charged with knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)), felony murder predicated on aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)), and aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a)), based on the death of his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter. Convicted of felony murder and aggravated battery of a child, he was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. The appellate court held that the court did not err by not instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter, but that the sentencing statute violated Illinois’ single-subject rule. On remand, he was sentenced to 50 years. While direct appeal was pending, English filed a post-conviction petition, which he voluntarily dismissed in 2003. In 2004, he filed another post-conviction petition, which the court treated as successive and dismissed. The appellate court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider dismissal of the 2004 petition, but that the court erred in declining to reinstate the 1999 petition. On remand, English argued that his felony-murder conviction was improper because the acts constituting the aggravated battery of a child arose from, and were inherent in, the killing. The circuit court denied the petition as barred by res judicata because it was related to the claim raised on direct appeal regarding jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. View "People v. English" on Justia Law

Stanbridge served time for aggravated criminal sex abuse concerning a 1999 Adams County; Lieberman was convicted of multiple Cook County counts of rape in 1980. Both were committed to the Department of Human Services under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1), which establishes a framework under which persons who have been convicted of certain sex offenses may be subjected to further civil detention after service of their criminal sentences. Their petitions for release were dismissed by the circuit courts. In Stanbridge’s case, the appellate court reversed, but as to Lieberman, dismissal was affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed (reinstated) dismissal of the petitions, clarifying the evidence required at post-commitment hearings for discharge or release. There must be a plausible account on each of the required elements of the petition, demonstrating a change in the circumstances that led to the initial commitment. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to bring forward sufficient evidence. In both of the proceedings at issue, the evidence did not, essentially, present anything new; there was no “plausible account” showing that the individual should no longer be civilly committed as sexually violent. View "In re the Detention of Stanbridge" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of committing multiple sex offenses concerning his 14-year-old daughter in 2007 and 2008. The convictions were for two counts of criminal sexual assault, one count of criminal transmission of HIV, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant had HIV, knew it, and took medication for it. He did not always wear a condom, but the victim did not contract the disease. The appellate court reduced the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault to criminal sexual assault; the supreme court affirmed. Section 12-14(a)(3) of the Criminal Code provides for aggravation of a criminal sexual assault if the offender “during the commission of the offense … acted in such a manner as to threaten or endanger the life of the victim.” Mere exposure of the victim to HIV during the commission of the offense did not threaten or endanger her life. The court noted that the sentence for criminal transmission of HIV should be consecutive to the others. View "People v. Giraud" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty in 2006 to aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a minor and received a 14-year term. He had originally been indicted for offenses involving several minor victims between 1995 and 1998. Some charges were nol-prossed in 1999 and the state attempted to have defendant involuntarily committed as sexually dangerous (725 ILCS 205/0.01). After a 2004 remand, the state did not seek commitment a second time, but proceeded with criminal prosecution and agreed to dismiss remaining counts except one. Considering time already spent in custody, it was anticipated that defendant would soon be sent home. However, two weeks after the plea, the Attorney General (not the State’s Attorney) sought commitment under a different statute, the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1). A motion to withdraw the guilty plea was denied; the appellate and supreme courts affirmed. Where an accused pleads guilty to an offense which could trigger the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, defense counsel has a minimal duty to advise him that, after completing his prison term, he will be evaluated and may risk involuntary commitment, but defendant failed to showing that he was denied effective assistance or prejudiced: that he could establish actual innocence or a plausible defense. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a police station and reported that he had strangled his wife to death. Although there had been an argument and a struggle, he claimed that the death was an accident. At trial, defense counsel argued that the evidence showed, at most, recklessness and involuntary manslaughter. Leach was convicted of first degree murder, based on knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The court properly admitted testimony of a qualified expert that it would take three to six minutes for a person to die from strangulation. Leach raised constitutional confrontation issues because the autopsy report, concluding that the death was a homicide, was made by a pathologist who had retired before trial and could not be cross-examined. A different expert testified, based on the report. The routine autopsy report is not testimonial and not subject to the “Crawford” rule even if the examiner is aware that police suspect homicide and a specific individual. It was not prepared for the primary purpose of criminal prosecution. Any error was harmless given that Leach did not dispute the manner and cause of death or that he was guilty of some form of homicide. View "People v. Leach" on Justia Law

A sex offender pled guilty to criminal sexual assault, to failing to register as a sex offender, and to subsequently failing to register a change of address. A 12-year sentence was imposed for the assault; different judges later imposed concurrent sentences of two and three years for his registration convictions. The State’s Attorney sought a writ of mandamus, claiming that consecutive sentences were required by law. The supreme court agreed with the State’s Attorney, construing the section 5-8-4(d)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(2)) and finding that criminal sexual assault is a “triggering” event for purposes of consecutive sentencing. Although the two registration offenses may themselves be the subject of concurrent sentences, the term for criminal sexual assault must be served first. View "People v. Meersman" on Justia Law

Tate was convicted for a 2001 fatal shooting. Four eyewitnesses identified him. The appellate court affirmed. Tate retained counsel and filed a post-conviction petition, attaching affidavits of alibi witnesses and of occurrence witnesses. Tate alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to call these witnesses. Although this issue had not been raised by post-trial motion, the supreme court found that there was no forfeiture. The circuit court nonetheless summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed. Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, a petition may be dismissed, initially, if it is “frivolous or patently without merit.” If this does not occur, the court determines whether there is a substantial showing of a constitutional violation meriting an evidentiary hearing. Most petitions are filed pro se. The state argued that Tate should be held to the higher standard of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, because he had counsel. The court rejected the argument. Tate’s petition could survive the first stage if it was arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and if it was arguable that he was prejudiced.View "People v. Tate" on Justia Law

Murdock, then 16, was convicted in 2001 of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The conviction was affirmed. Defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements made to police. Defendant, a juvenile, alleged his statements were the product of police coercion that rendered them involuntary. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a suppression hearing. The trial court denied the motion on remand. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on the absence of a concerned adult during defendant's police detention. Defendant was able to clearly communicate and understand the questions posed to him. He was able to understand and give assent to a waiver of his Miranda rights. On tape defendant appeared mostly calm and collected. He did not appear frightened or under any intense coercion. Defendant was never threatened physically or mentally and there were no promises or assurances to defendant to contribute to a coercive atmosphere. Defendant was allowed access to food, drink, and restroom; his statements were the result of his own decisions. View "People v. Murdock" on Justia Law