Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A woman standing at a window inside a building was fatally shot. Gang members intended to shoot the first rival gang member to come out. Defendant, then age 15, told police that fellow gang members, closer to the building, fired first, while he, across the street, only shot into the air. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to 28 years. No evidence other than his statement linked him to the crime. In pro se attempts to file successive post-conviction petitions, defendant claimed actual innocence. He submitted affidavits from two women who claimed to have been with defendant at the time of the shooting but had refused to come forward, and from a codefendant that defendant "had nothing to do with this shooting." The attempts were rejected by the circuit and appellate courts. The appellate court considered an Illinois Supreme Court holding that the requirement of showing cause and prejudice before being allowed leave to file a successive petition may be excused where actual innocence is alleged, but found that defendant did not assert a colorable claim of actual innocence. The supreme court affirmed. The women were known and not subpoenaed for trial. Because defendant was convicted on an accountability theory, the codefendant's claims did not exonerate him.

While defendant was in custody on another matter, he became a suspect in a fatal shooting. Another inmate told police that he thought he could get the defendant to make incriminating statements concerning that homicide. Police set up the inmate-informer to wear a wire. A judicially authorized overhear was arranged, with the inmate as the consenting party. Defendant was told that he was being taken to a lineup. He called the attorney who had been appointed to represent him in the other matter. That attorney spent about 45 minutes waiting for access to defendant while the inmate-informer was conversing with defendant in an otherwise empty room and listening to his allegedly incriminating statements. The trial court suppressed the statements. The appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed and specifically overruled an earlier appellate court decision, holding that defendant was not subjected to police custodial interrogation when he conversed with the inmate-informer. The police were not required to give Miranda warnings, and defendant had no right to counsel. Neither were police required to tell the defendant that the attorney in the other matter was seeking access to him.

In 2005, a woman was stabbed to death in the apartment she shared with defendant. At trial, he did not testify, but the jury heard the testimony of a detective to whom he had made statements and heard audio tapes of interviews in which defendant stated that the victim had yelled at him and stabbed him before he grabbed the knife, stabbed her, and left the premises. The prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior conviction of domestic battery of the same victim. The appellate court affirmed conviction for first degree murder and a sentence of 60 years. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the murder of a family or household member involving an incident of domestic violence is the functional equivalent of domestic battery or aggravated battery, referred to in section 115-20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that evidence of a prior conviction for domestic battery or aggravated battery committed against a family or household member is admissible in a later criminal prosecution for “any of these types of offenses when the victim is the same person .“

At trial for a 2004 shooting, defendant testified to self-defense, but was impeached by introduction of earlier convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and possession of a controlled substance. Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and received a 40-year sentence, but was acquitted of attempted first degree murder. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant filed a pro se petition, alleging, ineffective assistance of counsel in not challenging the judge’s refusal to rule before trial on the use of convictions to impeach. The petition was dismissed and the appellate court affirmed. The petition was filed before the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Patrick, which held that there is no justification for a blanket policy of refusing to rule on use of convictions to impeach until after a defendant testifies; the appellate court decision was released after that decision. The supreme court remanded, stating that it was clear from the record that defense counsel was aware of potential problems raised by the refusal to make a ruling, and that it was at least arguable, even pre- Patrick, that counsel’s performance was deficient and that defendant was prejudiced.

A deputy observed a woman, whose license he believed was suspended, driving, and followed her home. After confirming that her license was suspended, he attempted to effect a traffic stop, but she went inside her home. Her husband emerged and gave false information, but invited the officer to search the house. A citation for driving on a suspended license was served on wife several weeks later. Both husband and wife were convicted of obstructing a peace officer. The appellate court held that providing false information, alone, was not sufficient for a conviction. The supreme court affirmed. The offense of obstructing a peace officer does not require a physical act, but may consist of knowingly providing a false statement which interposes an obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer and is relevant to the performance of his authorized duties. In this case there was no evidence that the husband's false statements hampered or impeded the officer in any way.

In 1991, at age 16 years, defendant pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a recommendation of a 50-year sentence. He knew that the maximum was 60 years. He had previously been adjudicated delinquent and sentenced as a juvenile. The court imposed a 50-year term, without any admonition that the term would be followed by a mandatory three-year period of supervised release (MSR). Defendant's first attempt at postconviction relief was unsuccessful. Several years later, he filed another petition, claiming that his plea had not been knowing and voluntary because he was not informed of MSR. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's rejection of the petition and reduced the sentence to 47 years with three years of MSR. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendant had not been "impeded" from raising a claim about failure to advise on MSR. Lack of precedent for a position differs from "cause" for failure to raise an issue, which is a statutory prerequisite to a successive post-conviction petition. In general, a defendant must raise an issue, even when the law is against him, in order to preserve it for review.

Defendant was charged with armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping and aggravated vehicular hijacking "while armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit: a firearm," 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a); 18-4(a); 10-2-A. Although the crimes were committed in 2004, the indictment used versions of the statutes from before a 2000 amendment because sentencing enhancements in the amended versions had been declared unconstitutional. By the time of trial in 2006, enhanced sentencing provisions in the amended statutes were back in effect, but prosecution proceeded under the indictment. Defendant raised no objection. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. The appellate court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon because no weapon was recovered or introduced into evidence and because no testimony was provided as to size, weight, or metallic nature of the weapon. The court remanded with instructions that judgment be entered on lesser-included offenses of kidnapping, vehicular hijacking, and robbery. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court conviction. There was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that defendant had a firearm. Defendant was adequately apprised of the charges.

Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him when it permitted the state to introduce into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of its key and unavailable witness. The defendant also argued that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The appellate court rejected the claim of ineffective assistance, but reversed and remanded, finding that preliminary hearing testimony was improperly admitted and the error could not be considered harmless. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel was not aware of inconsistent statements the witness had given or his status as an alien or his pending deportation. Viewing cross-examination in its totality, counsel was not afforded adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

In 2007, defendant filed a petition seeking leave to file a second successive post-conviction petition challenging his 1983 convictions for rape and deviate sexual assault. He alleged that newly discovered evidence substantiated his prior claim that his confession was the product of police brutality and torture. The trial court denied the petition. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing, holding that defendant had satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test for successive post-conviction petitions. The Illinois Supreme court affirmed the appellate court, but remanded to the trial court for appointment of post-conviction counsel and second-stage post-conviction proceedings. Evidence of coercion is not rendered irrelevant simply because the defendant has denied confessing and use of a physically coerced confession as substantive evidence of guilt is never harmless error.

Defendant pled guilty in 2007 to predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and received a 20-year sentence. He challenged fines and fees imposed, including a $250 public defender fee. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a), requires notice to the defendant and a hearing on ability to pay before the public defender fee may be imposed. The procedure was not followed; the appellate court vacated and remanded for notice and a hearing concerning ability to pay. The Supreme Court held that the fee should have been vacated outright, without any remand, because no motion to impose the fee had been made by the prosecution and it had not been sought by the circuit court itself. The circuit court clerk had imposed the fee unilaterally, without any authority for doing so.