Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was living with the mother of a developmentally disabled 17-year-old. He sexually assaulted her, but she did not immediately report it. He was convicted and received a 28-year sentence. On appeal, defendant complained that venirepersons were asked about why a victim might delay making a report. The appellate court found that the prosecutor had crossed the boundary of acceptable voir dire, but refused to excuse procedural default under the plain-error rule and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The defendant also challenged failure to mention mandatory supervised release in the sentencing judgment, after which the Department of Corrections calculated the sentence to include an indeterminate MSR term of three years to natural life. The appellate court remanded under 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d), which states that for criminal sexual assault, "the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of natural life of the defendant." The Supreme Court reversed. Indeterminate sentences have generally been abolished in Illinois, but, in 2005, were resurrected for certain specified sex offenses to create lifetime supervision for high-risk offenders because of the risk of recidivism. The new provisions contemplate indeterminate terms.

After a minor accident, the drivers' friends and relatives gathered, arguments ensued, and shots were fired. One victim survived; another died. Recovered bullets came from the same gun. There was testimony about defendant's use of a gun. Although an instruction on justifiable use of force in self-defense was given, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. He appealed the refusal to give an instruction that would have found him guilty only of second degree murder for having had an unreasonable subjective belief that the use of force was necessary. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed. Evidence that supports a self-defense instruction also supports an instruction for second degree murder. It is the role of the court to determine if there is evidence to support a self-defense instruction, but it is the function of the jury to determine whether a defendant had a subjective belief that use of force was necessary and, if so, whether that belief was reasonable. The error would not automatically call for reversal, but with conflicting testimony, it was not harmless in the sense that the trial result would not have been different if the jury had been properly instructed.

Defendant was stopped for driving on a suspended license, got out of his car, and was searched. An officer testified that he found a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance in defendant's pocket. Another officer testified that the sergeant pulled the bag out of defendant's pocket and never retrieved anything from the ground. The substance tested positive for cocaine. The defendant testified that the drug was planted. The prosecutor argued to the jury that the testimony of a police officer should be believed because he would not risk "his credibility, his job, and his freedom" by lying, but no evidence was presented that such consequences would occur. Defendant was sentenced to five years in prison for possession of 0.8 grams of cocaine. The appellate court reversed, finding the prosecutorial statements improper. The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. The comments were improper because no evidence was presented that officers risked their careers by testifying falsely, but it was not plain error because the defendant's version of events was highly improbable and the jury was instructed that arguments are not evidence. The error was not so serious as to affect the fairness of the trial and challenge the integrity of the judicial process.

Forfeiture proceedings were instituted concerning three vehicles; each had multiple owners, and, in each case, one of the owners was charged with aggravated DUI. The trial court declared the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of the Criminal Code facially unconstitutional as a violation of procedural due process for lack of a provision requiring a prompt probable cause hearing after seizure of a vehicle but before trial of the forfeiture action. A new statute, effective January 1, 2012, provides for such hearings. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court looked to U.S. Supreme Court decisions and reversed. The statutory scheme does not mandate the return of a vehicle just because one of the owners demonstrates innocence. Only one of the owners need give consent to use of a vehicle in the commission of an offense for the vehicle to be subject to forfeiture, and there is no constitutional requirement for an innocent-owner defense in a forfeiture proceeding. In most cases such as this, a prompt determination of probable cause is made in connection with the underlying criminal prosecution. In the Criminal Code, the forfeiture provisions themselves comport with due process, and there is no constitutional requirement for additional procedures.

Defendant, charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)). She requested that the state produce the video recording of the stop made by the camera located in the arresting officer's vehicle. The recording had been destroyed as part of a regular purge. The circuit court granted defendant's motion for sanctions and barred the state from introducing testimony concerning what was contained on the videotape. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The state was placed on notice by defendant to produce the recording of her stop and arrest in the civil statutory summary suspension proceedings and took no action to preserve it; the sanction was reasonable.

Defendant, convicted of reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a), and failing to report an accident involving death or injury (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) after a collision resulting in one death and injuries to three people, filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel other than the county public defender and other motions, based on ineffective assistance. The trial court declined to consider the untimely motions. The appellate court reduced the failing to report conviction, held that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to serve 85% of his reckless homicide sentence, and remanded the pro se motions. The Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court erred in failing to conduct a preliminary examination into the factual basis of motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. While a motion for a new trial must be filed within 30 days of the entry of a finding or return of a verdict, an exception exists if a defendant is seeking a new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance and the claim is raised before a notice of appeal is filed.

In connection with operation of a medical transport company, defendant was convicted of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1), vendor fraud (305 ILCS 5/8A-3), and money laundering (720 ILCS 5/29B-1), sentenced to 66 months' imprisonment, and ordered to pay$1.2 million in restitution. The appellate court upheld the theft and vendor fraud convictions, but reversed the money laundering conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed with respect to the money laundering conviction. The trial court properly allowed the state establish guilt of money laundering with evidence of receipts rather than profits.

One appellate court rejected an argument that the probation officers in defendant's case lacked authority to file petitions alleging violation of probation and seeking revocation of probation. In another district, the court rejected the state's argument that 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1, which allows the chief circuit judge to adopt intermediate sanctions for probation violations and allows probation officers to impose intermediate sanctions instead of filing a violation, violates separation of powers by infringing on the executive branch, specifically, state's attorneys in prosecuting probation violations. The Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed. Probation officers possess authority to file petitions charging a violation of probation; the statute does not give a state's attorney power to "veto" a probation officer's decision to offer intermediate sanctions, so long as the sanction requirements are timely completed, and that construction does not violate separation of powers principles.

Defendant, originally charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, was found guilty of two counts of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance. He was in custody for 344 days before sentencing. He received an extended term of five years; the court also ordered indexing of defendant's DNA, and imposed monetary charges, including a $200 DNA analysis charge pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(j). The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentence, but modified his fines and fees order with regard to a $5 court system fee and a $30 children’s advocacy center charge. The court declined to modify the order with regard to the DNA analysis charge, which the court held was not subject to offset by defendant’s presentence incarceration credit. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. DNA analysis charge is not punitive. It is a one-time charge intended to cover the cost of analyzing the DNA sample submitted by the qualifying offender and is compensatory. .

Defendant pled guilty to intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1)) and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a)) and was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of 10 and 6 years, respectively, followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. Her sentences were to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case. She was also ordered to pay restitution. The appellate court vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence, reducing the sentence for that offense to three years; found that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; held that the trial court did not err in ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and vacated the restitution order because the trial court failed to admonish her about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed with respect to the restitution order and otherwise affirmed.