Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jimmie Jones was charged with murder. At trial, Jones tendered instructions on reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses to the murder charge. The trial court refused Jones's instructions, finding that those lesser included offenses were not supported by the evidence. A jury later found Jones guilty of murder. On appeal, Jones disputed that his tendered instructions were not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the judgment of the trial court after adopting the opinion of the court of appeals, which concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by finding no serious evidentiary dispute.

A jury found Jesse Harris guilty of murder and two counts of attempted murder. The trial court sentenced Harris to a total of 165 years incarceration. The court of appeals affirmed. Harris appealed, contending that the State engaged in forum shopping. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thus vacating the court of appeals, to clarify that a defendant claiming a violation of a local felony case assignment rule need not establish prejudice to prevail on appeal. The Court affirmed Harris's conviction, holding (1) the trial court correctly interpreted the rule, and (2) no violation of the rule occurred in this case.

A jury found Keith Hoglund guilty of two counts of child molesting. The court of appeals affirmed. Hoglund appealed, contending the testimony of expert witnesses constituted impermissible vouching evidence. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) testimony amounting to the equivalent that a witness believes the child in a case involving child sex abuse allegations is telling the truth is inconsistent with the rules of evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony that commented on the child witness' truthfulness into evidence over Hoglund's objection; but (3) because Hoglund's conviction was supported by substantial independent evidence of his guilt, and because the improper admission of the evidence was cumulative of other evidence properly before the jury, the error in admitting the testimony was harmless.

After a jury trial, Jerrme Cartwright was convicted of attempted battery and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. A divided court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly denied Cartwright's Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of the sole African American prospective juror, as the State's proffered explanations for its peremptory strike were pretextual, resulting in purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court with respect to Cartwright's Batson claim, holding that Cartwright did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the State had pretextual reasons for striking the prospective juror.

After a two-day jury trial, the trial court found Joey Addison guilty of murder but mentally ill and imposed the minimum sentence for murder. Addison appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of an African American prospective juror. The court of appeals rejected Addison's Batson claim. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to Addison's Batson claim, holding that the State's proffered explanation for striking the venireperson was a mere pretext based on race, making a fair trial impossible. Remanded for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Antwon Abbott was convicted of possession of cocaine as a Class B felony for which he was sentenced to the maximum term of twenty years. The Supreme Court granted transfer and revised Abbott's sentence to twelve years, two years above the statutory advisory term for a Class B felony. Although Abbott's character did not necessarily justify a revision of his sentence, the Court held that the nature of Abbott's offense in this case rendered his twenty-year maximum sentence inappropriate. Remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order consistent with this opinion.

For his failure to pay child support for his two daughters, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of nonsupport of a dependent child, each a class D felony, plus two additional counts of nonsupport of a dependent child while owing over $15,000 in child support, each a class C felony. The trial court entered judgment only as to the two class C felonies. Defendant appealed, contending that the two class C felonies should have merged into one conviction under Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant's class C felony convictions but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Supreme Court granted transfer and held that applicable law permitted a separate Class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, but only one such offense could be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one or more of such children is $15,000 or more. Remanded for the entry of judgment as follows: one class C felony as to the nonsupport applicable to one of the dependent children and one class D felony as to the nonsupport of the other dependent child.

Defendant was convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant next sought post-conviction relief, asserting that his appellate counsel's failure to challenge the refusal of a tendered instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt rendered harmless any potential error in refusing the tendered instruction that "where proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence only, it must be so conclusive...as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence." The Supreme Court rejected Defendant's claim of post-conviction court error but granted transfer to provide clarification regarding the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction, as the Court disagreed with the court of appeals that the giving of a conventional reasonable doubt instruction rendered unnecessary the giving of a reasonable theory of innocence instruction.

After pulling over a vehicle for speeding, a law enforcement officer arrested the driver and passenger and, upon searching the vehicle, discovered a jar of marijuana sitting on the floorboard of the passenger seat. The trial court found the passenger (Passenger) guilty of possessing marijuana. The trial judge also suspended Passenger's driver's license and registration under Ind. Code 35-48-4-15(a), believing that the driver's license suspension statute left her no discretion in the matter even though Passenger was not driving the vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether an automotible passenger riding down the highway with a jar of marijuana between his legs can be found to have "used the vehicle" in committing the offense of possessing marijuana pursuant to section 35-48-4-15(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Passenger used the vehicle in committing the offense of possessing marijuana; and (2) the trial court properly ordered Passenger's driver's license, registration, and ability to register other vehicles suspended, as the statute left the court no discretion in the matter.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Antoine Hill pleaded guilty to one count of Class A felony attempted murder and two counts of Class C felony attempted battery. Hill did not appeal. Hill's counsel subsequently filed a Post-Convcition Rule 2 petition, seeking permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied permission, and counsel did not timely appeal this denial. Thereafter, Hill, through different counsel, filed a Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition, alleging that his Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel was ineffective for failing to timely appeal the trial court's denial of permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Hill could not satisfy the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the appropriate standard for judging the performance of Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel is the standard set forth in Baum v. State; and (2) Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel in this case did not violate Baum because she represented Hill in a procedurally fair setting that resulted in a judgment of the court.