Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of Class A felony neglect of a dependent and found him to be a habitual offender, which resulted in a thirty-year sentencing enhancement. The court of appeals affirmed. On transfer to the Supreme Court, the State presented an unsigned judgment of conviction to prove that Defendant in fact had been convicted of one of the predicate felonies. The Court vacated the court of appeals in regard to Dexter's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he was a habitual offender and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) an unsigned judgment was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a prior conviction, and therefore, Defendant's habitual-offender sentencing enhancement must be reversed; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the State from retrying Defendant on the habitual-offender enhancement.

After a 911 call was made by a motorist complaining that the driver of a blue Volkswagen, who had just pulled into a gas station, was driving erratically, a police officer arrived at the gas station and observed the blue Volkswagen. The officer then made an investigatory stop of the driver of the vehicle, Amanda Renzulli. Renzulli was later charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court granted Renzulli's motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police officer in this instance had reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts to briefly detain Renzulli for investigatory purposes.

Appellant was charged with tattooing a minor for taking his former Stepdaughter to get a tattoo. While the charge was pending, a detective arranged for Stepdaughter to make recorded phone calls to Appellant to obtain evidence concerning a sexual relationship Appellant allegedly forced upon Stepdaughter. The State subsequently charged Appellant with several sex-related crimes. Appellant moved to suppress the incriminating statements from the conversations, claiming they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion and convicted Appellant as charged. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an "inextricably intertwined" exception to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel existed under the state Constitution. The Court affirmed, holding (1) under the Indiana Constitution, the right to counsel is violated only where the different offense is inextricably intertwined with the charge on which counsel is already representing the defendant; and (2) because there was no evidence that it would have been objectively foreseeable for the detective, at the time he conducted the phone calls, to believe the pending tattooing offense was inextricably intertwined with the alleged sexual misconduct, the recorded conversations did not violate Appellant's right to counsel.

Appellant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated after proceeding pro se in plea negotiations with the State. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his waiver of counsel was invalid. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted transfer and announced that future defendants expressing a desire to proceed without counsel must be informed that an attorney is more experienced in plea negotiations and better able to identify and evaluate potential defenses and problems in the prosecution's case (Hopper warning). The Court subsequently granted the State's petition for rehearing and affirmed the post-conviction court, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment does not require the same warnings and analysis for a valid waiver of counsel during plea negotiations as it requires for the entry of a guilty plea; (2) the post-conviction court properly found that Hopper's waiver of counsel during his guilty plea hearing was voluntary and intelligent; and (3) the absence of the Hopper warning is not a per se violation of a defendant's right to counsel, but rather, courts should consider the absence of the instruction as an additional factor in a totality of the circumstances approach.

Mother's parental rights to her Child were terminated by the juvenile court after Mother's incarceration. The court of appeals affirmed. Mother appealed, alleging several due process violations on the part of the Department of Child Services (DCS). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if any error existed in DCS's failure to locate Mother, which resulted in Mother's absence from the termination hearing, it did not substantially increase the risk of error in her termination proceeding; (2) a misrepresentation by DCS on an affidavit, in this limited instance, did not violate Mother's due process rights; (3) a delay from DCS in serving Mother with a Child in Need of Services petition upon locating Mother was inappropriate, but a reversal was not warranted in this case because the dilatory action did not result in fundamental error or deprive Mother of due process; (4) whether an incarcerated parent is permitted to attend a termination hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court judge, and therefore, Mother's due process rights were not violated by her absence from the trial; and (5) the evidence in this case supported the trial court's findings that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests.

While driving on a county road, Pamela Price encountered ice across the roadway and lost control of her vehicle, sustaining personal injury and property damage. Earlier that morning, after a different driver lost control of his vehicle at the same location, a deputy of the county sheriff department arrived at the scene and advised the county highway department of the icy condition. Price filed a complaint against, among others, the sheriff department and highway department, alleging negligence. The sheriff department and highway department filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which the trial court denied. The sheriff department sought interlocutory review. The court of appeals granted review and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that because the sheriff department neither owned, maintained, nor controlled the county road, it did not owe a common law duty to warn the public of known hazardous conditions upon the roadway.

Desmond Turner was found guilty of murder, felony murder, criminal confinement, robbery, and burglary. Turner appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in admitting four types of evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting firearms tool mark identification testimony; (2) testimony related to the firearms identification did not deny Turner the right of confrontation and did not violate Indiana's rule against hearsay; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Turner's alleged other crimes, wrongs or acts; (4) testimony of a witness was hearsay and the trial court erred in admitting it; but (5) the admission of the hearsay testimony did not require reversal because Turner's conviction was supported by substantial evidence of guilt apart from the challenged testimony.

A jury found Richard Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes's conviction. Subsequently, Barnes petitioned for rehearing, which the Supreme Court granted. At issue in the appeal was whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that Barnes, a suspected spouse abuser, had the right to get physical with the police officers if he believed their attempt to enter his residence was legally unjustified. The Court continued to affirm Barnes's conviction, holding that the Castle Doctrine, which authorizes a person to use reasonable force against another person to prevent the unlawful entry of his dwelling, is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a police officer.

Defendant Arturo Garcia-Torres was convicted of rape, attempted rape, and two counts of burglary and was sentenced to thirty-six years in prison. Defendant challenged the use of DNA evidence gathered when police obtained a cheek swab while Defendant was in custody after the attempted rape, arguing it was an invalid search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding (1) the cheek swab was a search requiring its own separate probable cause proceedings; (2) the cheek swab was taken under a valid consent; and (3) a Pirtle warning requiring the presence and advice of counsel prior to consenting to a search was not required.

After a jury trial, Donald Pierce was convicted of four counts of child molesting and adjudicated as a repeat sex offender. The trial court sentenced Pierce to four consecutive sentences for a total term of 124 years and enhanced the sentences by ten years for the repeat sex offender adjudication. Pierce appealed, raising several claims including the appropriateness of his sentence. The state cross-appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause with instructions to attach an additional fixed ten-year term to one of Pierce's felony sentences to an aggregate term of 134 years. The Supreme Court granted transfer to address Pierce's appropriateness claim. Based on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, the Court revised the sentence to a total term of 80 years. Remanded.