Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Brenda Moore was convicted of public intoxication, a class B misdemeanor, after a public officer pulled over a car in which defendant was riding as a front seat passenger and found defendant had been drinking. A divided court of appeals reversed. On appeal, the defendant argued that her conviction (1) violated public policy because she caused no harm or annoyance and wasn't driving while drinking; and (2) violated her right to consume alcoholic beverages. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, finding (1) whether conduct proscribed by criminal law should be excused under certain circumstances on grounds of public policy is a matter for legislative evaluation and not the courts; and (2) defendant's accountability under the public intoxication statute did not violate her personal liberty rights under the Indiana Constitution.

After pleading guilty to child molesting, defendant Michael Harris was sentenced to a prison term of ten years and was required to register on the sex offender list for ten years following his release. Prior to his release, the Department of Correction (DOC) notified Harris that he was required to register as a sexually violent predator (SVP) with local law enforcement for his lifetime. Harris filed a complaint in the circuit court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the DOC, arguing that the DOC lacked the authority to make an SVP determination. The trial court granted Harris relief, thereby removing his SVP status. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the DOC was not authorized by statute to determine Harris's status as an SVP and that his status did not change by operation of law under an amendment to the Sex Offender Registration Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that Harris's status in fact changed by operation of law and that this change did not violate Indiana's prohibition on ex post facto laws or doctrine of separation of powers.

Appellant Randy Horton was convicted of nine counts of child molesting and was sentenced to an executed term of 324 years in prison. Horton appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence at trial. Horton also appealed his sentence on grounds that it constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion to sentence him to such a lengthy term and that the term was inappropriately long given his character and the nature of his offenses. The court of appeals rejected these claims and affirmed in all respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court revised Horton's sentence to an aggregate executed term of 110 years, finding that Horton's lack of any other adult criminal history, coupled with the fact that his only juvenile adjudication was for truancy, warranted credit as a mitigating circumstance. Remanded.

After being charged with two counts of child molesting, defendant Ronald Fromme asked the circuit court to require Crisis Connection, an organization that provides services to victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence, to provide him with all of its records relating to the alleged victims. Crisis Connection argued that the state victim advocate privilege gave it authority to refuse the request. The circuit court ordered Crisis Connection to deliver the records to the court for its in camera review before turning them over to Fromme. Upon review, the court of appeals concluded that he privacy interest asserted by Crisis Connection was not strong enough to bar the in camera review. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the appellate court and reversed the order of the trial court, holding the state's compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information gathered in the course of serving the needs of victims of violence and abuse was not outweighed by Fromme's right to present a complete defense. Accordingly, Fromme did not have a constitutional right to an in camera review of the records. In the absence of a violation of Fromme's constitutional rights, the Court applied the victim advocate privilege.

Appellant Lamar Crawford was convicted of murder. Prior to his trial, a television production company called Lucky Shift, Inc. filmed aspects of Crawford's murder investigation and interviewed people involved. Crawford requested an order for the trial court directing Lucky Shift to produce the footage. The trial court ordered many items requested by Crawford be disclosed for an in camera review but denied three of Crawford's requests because they were not particular enough. Appellant appealed the denial. The court of appeals affirmed the ruling that the three requests were not sufficiently particular under the three-step test used to determine the discoverability of information not otherwise protected by privilege in criminal cases set forth in State v. Cline. On transfer, the Supreme Court repeated the three-step test and found that Crawford's requests were not made with sufficient particularity. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Elmer Baker was charged with three counts of child molesting. At a retrial in 2008, Baker was convicted as charged. Baker appealed, arguing partly that the convictions were not sustained by evidence of jury unanimity. The court of appeals affirmed. On transfer, the Supreme Court held that the state may in its discretion designate a specific act on which it relies to prove a particular charge, but if the state decides not to so designate, then the juror should be instructed that in order to convict the defendant the juror must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts or that the defendant committed all of the acts described by the victim. In this case the state did not designate which specific act it would rely upon to support the charging information and the jury instruction did not correctly advise the jury what it must agree upon to convict Baker. The Court concluded, however, that because Baker did not object to the instruction the issue was waived, and because Baker did not demonstrate that the instruction error so prejudiced him that he was denied a fair trial, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

Thirteen-year old D.M. and his friend were arrested after breaking in to a residence and taking several items of personal property. According to his mother, while D.M. was being held in a police cruiser he was prevented from speaking to his mother by police officers. Later D.M. and his mother signed a juvenile waiver acknowledging they understood D.M.'s rights. D.M. then confessed to a detective. The juvenile court found D.M. to be a delinquent child for committing acts that would have been felonies if they had been committed by an adult and placed D.M. on probation. D.M. appealed, arguing that he had not been given an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his mother and that the waiver of his rights was not knowing and voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted transfer. The Court held (1) the police provided D.M. an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his custodial parent before the waiver of his rights, and (2) there is substantial evidence of probative value that D.M.'s rights were waived voluntarily and therefore the court did not err in admitting D.M.'s confession.

Plaintiffs Michael Ashby and Randy O'Brien, inmates at the state department of correction, asserted professional malpractice complaints against attorney C. Bruce Davidson to The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Company, Davidson's professional liability carrier. Bar Plan then intervened in consolidated actions for damages filed on behalf of plaintiffs against Davidson, asserting a cross-claim that it was not obligated to indemnify Davidson for the claims of plaintiffs because Davidson had failed to notify Bar Plan of any claims against him pursuant to Bar Plan's policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bar Plan. The Supreme Court held that Davidson's failure to comply with Bar Plan's policy was not dispositive because plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on grounds of waiver and estoppel. The Court then reversed summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of fact remained regarding whether Bar Plan's misrepresentation of valid coverage resulted in plaintiffs sustaining actual detriment. Remanded.

In 2008, Douglas Denzell was charged with resisting law enforcement and public intoxication. The trial court found Denzell incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction for treatment. In 2009, after psychiatric evaluation reports revealed Denzell could be restored to competency, the trial court entered a commitment order. Denzell filed a motion to dismiss the charges. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, finding the pending charges did not violate Denzell's right to due process on fundamental-fairness grounds because, under State v. Davis, there was no determination that Denzell would never be restored to competency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the appellate court was correct in rejecting Denzell's due process argument. The Court noted, however, that the standard the lower court used in evaluating Denzell's claim was too stringent. Although relevant precedent is a necessary consideration when evaluating defendants' fundamental-fairness claims, there may be factual scenarios that differ from Davis and other relevant precedent that still fall within the parameters of a due process violation.

Alva Curtis, a fifty-nine year-old man with a developmental disability, was arrested and charged with residential entry, battery, and criminal mischief. The trial court denied Curtis's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, finding the pending criminal charges violated Curtis's right to due process. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding Curtis was entitled to dismissal under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), which provides that a defendant may not be held to answer a criminal charge for greater than one year, because the days that count toward Rule 4(C) in this case exceeded 365. The Court also held (1) that Curtis waived his constitutional speedy-trial claims because he failed to raised the claims for the first time on appeal, and (2) Curtis did not have a valid due process claim on fundamental-fairness grounds where, under State v. Davis, the trial court had not involuntarily committed the defendant or made an appropriate finding that Curtis will never be restored to competency.