Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Johnson, the defendant in this criminal case, wrote the trial court judge a few months prior to trial complaining that his public defender, who had a history of neglecting clients, had been neglecting his case. The judge forwarded the complaint to the public defender's office and took no further action. Johnson appealed, arguing that the judge's failure to inquire further into his complaint violated his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals found that the trial court handled Johnson's complaint reasonably. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, but held that the trial court had a duty to receive assurances from the public defender's office that Johnson's complaint had been addressed. The trial court judge's failure, however, (1) did not violate Johnson's right to the effective assistance of counsel, and (2) did not prejudice the defendant because Johnson failed to renew his objection at trial and because defense counsel appeared at trial and subjected the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing.

In district court, appellant was convicted of one count of Class A felony child molestation based on penetration and one count of Class C felony child molestation based on fondling. The Court of Appeals reversed appellantâs Class C felony conviction because the charge was filed well after the applicable five-year statute of limitations. At issue was whether, under Ind. Code 35-41-4-2, the statute of limitations was tolled when appellantâs coercive authority over the victim ceased in 1991 or when the victim disclosed the abuse to the authorities in 2008. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that once concealment of evidence by the defendant has been established, statutes of limitations for criminal offenses are tolled under the statute until a prosecuting authority becomes aware or should have become aware of sufficient evidence to charge a defendant. The Court also held that there was no double jeopardy violation because each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts.

In September 1997, the State charged Defendant Charles Boyle with felony and misdemeanor motor vehicle violations. Defendant pled guilty to the felony "operation of a motor vehicle while a habitual traffic offender" charge against him. The trial court accepted the plea, and entered its judgment of conviction. Several years after the case had concluded, Defendant petitioned for post-conviction relief, and the trial court modified his conviction. The Court of Appeals overturned the trial court on grounds that the lower court lacked statutory authority to modify the conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court lacked statutory authority to modify Defendant's conviction. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to reinstate Defendant's original conviction.

In August 2000, Defendant Jeffrey Brunner entered a guilty plea to "operating while intoxicated" (OWI). At the time of his plea, Defendant had an OWI within the previous five years that made the August, 2000 offense a felony. When going over Defendant's constitutional rights at trial, the court said "it [was] theoretically possible that a person found guilty of a . . . felony can have judgment of conviction entered and be sentenced as if it were a. . . misdemeanor." Defendant moved the court to modify its order of conviction to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor. The court granted the motion to modify, and the State appealed. The Court of Appeals overturned the trial court on grounds that the lower court lacked statutory authority to modify the conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that trial court indeed lacked statutory authority to modify Defendant's conviction. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to reinstate Defendant's original conviction.

Defendant Tyrus Coleman shot Anthony Dye and Jermaine Jackson during a confrontation on Defendantâs property. The State charged Defendant with murder and attempted murder. At trial, Defendant testified and admitted to the shootings, but maintained that he shot in self-defense. Defendant was acquitted on the murder charge, but a mistrial was entered on the attempted murder charge. Before he could be retried, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the attempted murder charge arguing that the State was âcollaterally estoppedâ from bringing the same case against him, and that if allowed to proceed, the second trial would constitute double jeopardy. The trial court denied that motion, and a retrial was held. The second jury found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty-five yearsâ imprisonment. A divided appellate court reversed Defendantâs conviction on collateral estoppel grounds. The Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel and double jeopardy did not preclude the State from retrying Defendant after a mistrial had been declared. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision, and affirmed the trial courtâs judgment.

A jury convicted Appellant Richard Barnes of misdemeanor charges involving battery, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. Appellant contested his conviction by raising technical errors at trial, specifically that the trial court did not advise the jury of his right to reasonably resist what he considered the officersâ unlawful entry to his apartment on the day he was arrested. The Supreme Court reviewed the trial record, and found that there is no right to âreasonably resistâ an entry by police officers. Furthermore, the Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendantâs conviction, and affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Facing felony drugs and firearms charges, Appellant Damion Wilkins sought to suppress evidence obtained when police executed a search warrant of a home. The trial court denied his motion, and Appellant appealed. The appellate court reversed the lower court. On interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued that police were not justified in their âno knockâ execution of the warrant. Appellant maintained that the record did not reflect sufficient âexigent circumstancesâ to justify the police bypassing the âknock and announceâ rule. The Supreme Court found that Appellant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence relating to the no-knock search. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs denial of his motion to suppress.

Facing felony drugs and firearms charges, Appellant Cornelius Lacey, Sr. sought to suppress evidence obtained when police executed a search warrant of a home he was in. The trial court denied his motion, and Appellant appealed. The appellate court reversed the lower court. On interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued that police were not justified in their âno knockâ execution of the warrant. Appellant maintained that the record did not reflect sufficient âexigent circumstancesâ to justify the police bypassing the âknock and announceâ rule. The Supreme Court found that Appellant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence relating to the no-knock search. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs denial of his motion to suppress.

In June, 2008, Appellant Joshua Konopasek attended a house party in Rochester. At some point, he got into an altercation with another party-goer. The evening ended with Appellant shoving the other party-goer to the ground and stomping on his head. Appellant would later be charged with battery causing serious injury. Appellant claimed self-defense. On direct examination, Appellantâs attorney elicited testimony from him regarding his probationary status. On cross-examination, the State inquired further about appellantâs probation. Defense counsel objected that the stateâs inquiry was irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objection. Petitioner was found guilty as charged, and sentenced to eight yearsâ imprisonment, with six suspended and credit for time served. On appeal, Petitioner argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of battery, and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence elicited by the State on his probation. The appellate court affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court agreed too, holding that the Stateâs elicited testimony on the length of Petitionerâs suspended sentence was relevant and admissible. Furthermore, the Court found the evidence sufficient to support his conviction. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions.