Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Upon responding to a call about an unsupervised toddler wandering near an apartment-complex retention pond, Defendant informed the police that he was the child’s father. Defendant consented to police entry into his apartment, and the child’s mother, the leaseholder, consented to a full search. The police officers subsequently discovered contraband in the apartment and charged Defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, neglect of a dependent, dealing marijuana, possessing marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. Defendant pleaded guilty to the neglect and marijuana-possession counts, and the case proceeded to a trial on the remaining counts. During trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found during law enforcement’s pat-down search and subsequent search. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was acquitted of dealing marijuana but found guilty on the remaining charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, as Defendant consented to police entering the apartment, Defendant’s movements justified a pat-down, and the mother gave her consent to search the rest of the apartment. View "McIlquham v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting six crime-scene photographs into evidence, and expert witness’s reliance on the photographs was admissible; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial as a sanction for undisclosed testimony; (3) the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury; and (4) the LWOP sentence was supported by sufficient evidence, the jury was not invited to recommend LWOP based on non-stautory aggravators, and the sentence was proportionate and appropriate. View "Knapp v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-native English speaker, pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school. Ten years later, Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily because the court-appointed interpreted failed to accurately translate Defendant’s Boykin rights. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that the advisement was defective but, nonetheless, Defendant knew at the time of the plea hearing that he was waiving his Boykin rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was not properly advised of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and did not understand his constitutional rights when he purportedly waived them. View "Ponce v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of felony sexual misconduct with a minor. Defendant appealed, arguing that several statements made by the State during closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Because Defendant did not raise any objection to the prosecutor’s remarks during trial, Defendant contended that the remarks cumulatively resulted in fundamental error. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant and reversed his convictions. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the prosecutor engaged in one instance of misconduct; but (2) because of the absence of any timely objection by Defendant, reversal was not warranted. View "Ryan v. State" on Justia Law

In 2010, three teenagers, including sixteen-year-old Martez Brown and fifteen-year-old Defendant, robbed two victims in their home. The victims were killed during the robbery. Defendant was found guilty of two counts of murder and one count of robbery. The trial court ultimately sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of 150 years, the same sentence imposed on Brown. The Supreme Court revised the 150-year sentence received by Brown and similarly exercised its constitutional authority to revise Defendant’s sentence, holding that Defendant’s sentence “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal” and concluding that Defendant should total aggregate sentence of eight-five years imprisonment. View "Fuller v. State" on Justia Law

In 2010, three teenagers, including sixteen-year-old Martez Brown, robbed two victims in their home. The victims were killed during the robbery. Brown was found guilty of two counts of murder and one count of robbery. The trial court ultimately sentenced Brown to an aggregate sentence of 150 years, the same sentence imposed on Brown’s cohorts. The Supreme Court revised the 150-year sentence received by Brown, holding that Brown’s sentence “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal,” and concluded that Brown should be sentenced to an enhanced sentence to a total aggregate sentence of eighty years imprisonment. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

On September 19, 2011, the trial court sentenced Defendant. On December 5, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to modify her sentence. On March 5, 2013, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for modification. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to modify Defendant’s sentence because more than 365 days had passed since Defendant was sentenced and the prosecutor did not affirmatively approve of the modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting Defendant’s motion for sentence modification, where, in the context of the interactions and communications between the trial court and the prosecutor in this case, the prosecutor’s conduct adequately conveyed the “approval of the prosecuting attorney” required in Ind. Code 35-38-1-17(b). View "State v. Harper" on Justia Law

After a detective received a tip that Defendant, who was African American, was responsible for a 2007 murder, the detective brought Defendant into an interrogation room to question him about the murder. In order to convince Defendant to admit his guilt, the detective implied during the interrogation that Defendant’s race precluded him from receiving a fair trial and an impartial jury. Defendant confessed to the murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement, claiming that it was involuntarily given. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in order to induce a confession, a police officer’s tactic of intentionally misleading a suspect as to his constitutionally guaranteed rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury, because of the suspect’s race, renders that confession involuntary. Remanded. View "Bond v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on several charges relating to his divorce case. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one felony count of intimidating the trial judge, two misdemeanor counts of intimidation involving the judge’s wife and a psychologist who was an expert witness in the divorce, and one felony count of attempted obstruction of justice relating to the psychologist. Defendant appealed on free speech grounds. The court of appeals reversed the misdemeanor-level intimidation convictions and affirmed the felony convictions. The Supreme Court granted transfer, affirmed Defendant’s convictions for intimidation of a judge and attempted obstruction of justice, and summarily affirmed the court of appeals on all other counts, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its free speech analysis by failing to distinguish between Defendant’s attacks on his victims’ reputations, which are protected by the stringent actual malice standard, and Defendant’s true threats to the victims’ safety, which receive no such protection; but (2) there was ample evidence of true threats to support Defendant’s convictions for intimidating the judge and Defendant’s attempted obstruction of justice regarding the psychologist. View "Brewington v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and criminal gang activity. During trial, the trial court excused a juror from the jury after she disclosed that she had a frightening experience at her apartment and that she could not render an impartial verdict. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for a mistrial, concluding that the juror’s incident was unrelated to Defendant’s case and that the jury could remain impartial. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of murder and criminal gang activity. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a mistrial, holding (1) defendants are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice when they can show by a preponderance of the evidence that an unauthorized, extra-judicial contact or communication with jurors occurred and that the contact or communication pertained to the matter before the jury; and (2) Defendant in this case was not entitled to the presumption of prejudice because he failed to prove that the juror’s extraneous contact and communications related to his case. View "Ramirez v. State" on Justia Law