Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was one of three men that police officers encountered in a self-storage facility and ordered to the ground. After questioning Defendant about the contents of the black bag he was carrying, Defendant admitted it contained marijuana. A subsequent search revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The officers then searched Defendant's car, which contained marijuana and equipment for manufacturing methamphetamine. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress his confession and the evidence found in the black bag and in his car. The court subsequently convicted Defendant of several drug-related offenses. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant's confession and the evidence leading to his conviction were fruits of an unlawful detention, as the officers' initial stop of Defendant and the subsequent warrantless search of Defendant's bag did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law

Andrew McWhorter appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to a flawed voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, and remanded the case for retrial. On transfer, the Supreme Court also reversed the judgment of the post-conviction court, but concluded that on remand, there was no prohibition for retrial on either voluntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. View "McWhorter v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while suspended as a habitual traffic violator (HTV). Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging an underlying offense for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) on grounds of the trial judge's alleged impropriety and the alleged violation of his right to counsel. The post-conviction court vacated the OWI conviction based on impropriety on the part of the trial judge. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea because the OWI underlying offense had been set aside. The trial court granted the motion, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered Defendant's conviction expunged from his record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although a defendant who pleads guilty to driving while suspended as a HTV may not later challenge the plea contending that an underlying offense has been set aside on grounds of procedural error, the defendant may be entitled to relief where an underlying offense has been set aside on grounds of material error; and (2) the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the trial court clearly erred in granting Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Oney" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with felony rape and related charges. Petitioner's case was first tried to a jury in 2008. The jury deadlocked on Petitioner's charges for felony rape and felony confinement, and a retrial was scheduled. After a second bench trial, the trial court found Defendant guilty of felony rape and not guilty of criminal confinement. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner's convictions were affirmed on appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and/or move for a dismissal of the rape charge on state double jeopardy grounds. The post-conviction court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the "actual evidence" test announced in Richardson v. State is applicable to cases in which there has been an acquittal on one charge and retrial on another charge after a hung jury; and (2) the post-conviction court properly denied Petitioner's petition. View "Garrett v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony criminal deviate conduct in 1998, was released from prison in 2000, and began registering annually as a sex offender. Indiana later expanded its registration requirements. Defendant petitioned for relief from the additional SVP obligations, arguing that they were an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him. The trial court concluded in 2008 that retroactively classifying Defendant as an SVP under the expanded statutes would be unconstitutional. The State did not appeal the 2008 order, nor did the Department of Corrections (DOC) intervene to challenge it. In 2011, the State found Defendant had satisfied his registration obligations under the ten-year statute that existed at the time of his conviction. The DOC later filed a motion to correct error, arguing that Defendant's registration obligation from ten years to life was not an ex post facto violation. The trial court granted the motion and vacated the 2008 order. Defendant appealed, arguing that the 2008 order was res judicata against the DOC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the 2008 order was erroneous, it nevertheless became res judicata against the "State" - both the prosecutor and the DOC - when the State failed to appeal it. View "Becker v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor as class B felonies. The trial court sentenced Defendant to maximum consecutive terms after finding "substantial aggravating circumstances" and no mitigating circumstances. The court of appeals revised the sentence to concurrent terms of twenty years, finding that Defendant's forty-year sentence was not proportionate in comparison to Walker v. State and Harris v. State. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court, holding that the sentence in this case was not inappropriate under Ind. R. App. 7(B) and did not warrant appellate revision. View "Chambers v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, admitted to conduct that would constitute felony sexual battery if committed by an adult. The trial court subsequently ordered Appellant to register as a sex offender. Appellant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence supported the court's finding that he was likely to repeat a sex offense. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a juvenile may only be ordered to register as a sex offender if, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court expressly finds by clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile is likely to commit another sex offense; and (2) the trial court erred in placing Appellant on the registry where its order was neither issued in connection with an evidentiary hearing, nor accompanied by any findings. View "N.L. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the murder of his mother. He was subsequently found guilty but mentally ill and ultimately sentenced to fifty-five years' incarceration. Defendant filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for, inter alia, failing to object to the trial court's tendered instruction on the penal consequences of verdicts for not responsible by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill. Defendant's petition was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington and therefore could not prevail on his ineffective assistance claim. View "Passwater v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by a police officer due to his darkly-shaded tinted windows. The police officer smelled marijuana and subsequently searched Defendant's person, where he found cocaine. The State charged Defendant with felony possession of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to stop him and search his person. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that, although the tint of the windows on Defendant's car was within the statutorily defined limits, the officer's good faith subjective belief of Defendant's violation of a traffic law was enough to justify the initial stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion that the tint on Defendant's vehicle's windows was in violation of the window tint statute, and therefore, the initial stop was justified; (2) the officer had probable cause to search Defendant's person after smelling marijuana; and (3) because the search was legal, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. View "Sanders v. State" on Justia Law

After Defendant was charged with murder, he filed a motion seeking bail. At the same time, Defendant filed a motion seeking a declaration that Ind. Code 35-33-8-2(b), which assigns to a defendant charged with murder the burden of showing he is entitled to bail, is unconstitutional. The trial court denied Defendant bail. The Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional but nevertheless affirmed, holding (1) when a defendant charged with murder seeks bail, the burden must be placed on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant should be denied bail; but (2) under the circumstances presented in this case, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant bail. View "Fry v. State" on Justia Law