Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with felony attempted murder. After a bench trial, the trial court rejected Defendant's insanity defense, finding that Defendant's behavior was the result of his voluntary abuse of alcohol. The trial court then found Berry guilty as charged. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant suffered from "settled insanity," a mental disease or defect caused by Defendant's prolonged and chronic abuse of alcohol, which rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) there was credible expert testimony that Defendant's behavior was caused by the voluntary abuse of alcohol and not a mental disease or defect as defined in Indiana's insanity statute; and (2) accordingly, under the applicable standard of review, the trial court properly rejected Defendant's insanity defense.

Defendant Tina Whiting was charged with murder and robbery. During voir dire, a prospective juror stated that he could not be fair because she knew Defendant, Defendant's grandmother, the victim's family, and the attorneys. The trial judge denied a joint challenge for cause. Defendant did not strike the juror with any of her available peremptory challenges, and the juror served on the jury. Defendant was subsequently convicted of felony murder and felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. Defendant appealed, claiming, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause because Defendant had not exhausted her peremptory challenges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed Defendant's conviction for felony murder, holding (1) Defendant's claim of error regarding the denial of the challenge for cause was procedurally defaulted, and thus unavailable for review, because Defendant failed to exhaust her peremptory challenges; and (2) Defendant's claim was not reviewable for fundamental error.

The State charged Defendant Michael Baker with burglary of a structure used for religious worship with the intent to commit theft, a class B felony in connection with an apparent breaking and entering of a church from which nothing had been removed. Defendant was subsequently convicted of class B burglary. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, concluding that there was insufficient evidence of Defendant's intent to commit theft within the church. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed breaking and entering of the church with the intent to commit theft.

In this case, the State filed charges against Defendant, and after a brief period of incarceration, Defendant was released. Shortly after his release, Defendant was again incarcerated but on a probation-revocation case. While he was incarcerated on the probation-revocation case, Defendant filed a Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(B) motion requesting a speedy trial on the pending charges. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 4(B) is available to a defendant only when the defendant is held on the pending charges for which he requests a speedy trial; and (2) accordingly, Rule 4(B) was not available to Defendant on the pending charges for which he sought a speedy trial because he was not incarcerated on those charges.

Brice Webb was charged with murder in the shooting death of his girlfriend. Webb requested a jury instruction on the lesser offense of reckless homicide. The trial court denied the request and Webb was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court reversed Webb's conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide was reversible error, as the evidence in this case produced a serious evidentiary dispute concerning Webb's state of mind, and whether Webb acted knowingly or recklessly, that would justify giving the requested instruction.

The trial court revoked the probation of Troy Smith for failure to pay weekly child support as a condition of his probation. On appeal, Smith argued that the State failed to carry its burden of proof that his failure to pay was reckless, knowing, or intentional. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) it is the defendant probationer's burden to show facts related to an inability to pay and indicating sufficient bona fide efforts to pay so as to persuade the trial court that further imprisonment should not be ordered; and (2) here, Smith failed to carry his burden, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Smith's probation.

A jury found Rodney Nicholson guilty of stalking and harassment, and Nicholson admitted to being a habitual offender. A majority of the court of appeals held that a span of twenty-two months between contacts would not fit the definition of repeated or continuing harassment and therefore would not support a conviction for stalking. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the lag in time between the harassing calls in 2006 and subsequent single call in 2008 did not foreclose the conviction for stalking, as there was no statutorily determine timeframe required for a stalking conviction and there was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to determine Nicholson engaged in stalking.

Defendant was charged with felony robbery, felony theft, and felony receiving stolen property. Before trial, the trial court permitted a late filing of a habitual-offender charge. The jury found Defendant was guilty of theft and receiving stolen property and determined that White was a habitual offender. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the decision of the court of appeals but summarily affirming the court of appeals' decision that the two convictions violated double jeopardy principles (resulting in vacation of Defendant's conviction for receiving stolen property). The Court then held (1) under the circumstances of this case, Defendant did not preserve the issue of whether the trial court properly allowed the habitual-offender filing; and (2) the authenticated and certified evidence was sufficient to uphold the jury's determination that Defendant was a habitual offender.

Defendant Harold Klinker managed and owned Trucks Unlimited (Trucks), a used-car dealership. Plaintiff First Merchants Bank (FMB) financed Trucks' vehicle inventory. After it was discovered that thirty-one vehicles for which FMB had loaned purchase money were not in Trucks' possession, FMB filed an eight-count complaint against Klinker, Trucks, and others (only Klinker appealed), alleging fraud, among other claims. FMB moved for summary judgment on seven counts, but by then only twenty-two vehicles were missing. The trial court nevertheless granted summary judgment to FMB on all seven counts and awarded treble damages and attorney's fees on the fraud claims under the Indiana Crime Victims' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the fraud claims and treble-damages claims because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant acted with the requisite criminal intent.

Rebecca Kays was convicted of misdemeanor battery and sentenced to 180 days in jail, suspended to twelve months probation. The trial court ordered as a term of probation that Kays pay restitution in the amount of $1,496. Kays appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly ordered restitution as a term of probation because her only source of income was social security disability benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that restitution may not be based on social security income, and therefore, the trial court could not take into account Kays' social security income in determining her ability to pay. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and reversed the trial court. The Court held that social security benefits may be considered by a trial court in determining a defendant's ability to pay restitution, but the trial court erred in failing to determine Kays' ability to pay restitution and to determine her manner of payment.