Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment and sentence of conviction of the crime of theft in the second degree, holding that the district court imposed an illegal sentence by requiring Defendant to pay the total court costs in this case.The State charged Defendant by an eight-count trial information with multiple crimes. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft in the second degree, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence and ordered that Defendant pay the court costs of the action, including the court costs associated with the dismissed counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should have apportioned the court costs to limit his responsibility to pay only those costs associated with the single count that resulted in the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for a determination how the service fees should be apportioned so that no service fees were attributed to the counts dismissed. View "State v. Ruth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment and sentence of the district court and remanded for resentencing on restitution for court-appointed attorney fees, holding that the amount of court-appointed attorney fees assessed against the defendant must be determined before the sentencing court determines the reasonable amount the defendant is able to pay.Defendant was charged by a trial information of several crimes. Defendant entered into an Alford plea of guilty to the charge of false report of an incendiary explosive device, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The district court sentenced Defendant, suspended the terms of incarceration, and placed Defendant on probation. The court ordered Defendant to pay restitution, including court costs and court-appointed attorney fees. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the district court (1) imposed an illegal sentence by ordering him to pay costs associated with counts of the trial information later dismissed by the State, and (2) erred in assessing court-appointed attorney fees before the amount of the fees was known. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in ordering Defendant to pay court costs, but (2) erred in finding that Defendant had the ability to pay attorney fees before the amount had been determined. View "State v. McMurry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of Defendant’s sentence regarding restitution but affirmed the district court’s decisions revoking Defendant’s deferred judgment and probation and sentencing him to serve a maximum of twenty-five years in prison, holding that the court erred in finding Defendant reasonably able to pay restitution when it did not have the total amount of restitution owed.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s deferred judgment and probation; (2) the district court did not err in ordering Defendant to serve the twenty-five-year sentence he would have served had the court not granted a deferred judgment; but (3) the court erred in ordering Defendant to pay restitution without knowing the total amount of restitution owed. View "State v. Covel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated certain portions of Defendant’s sentences, holding that the imposition of a surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions and that the district court erroneously ordered restitution without determining Defendant’s reasonable ability to pay.Defendant pled guilty to lascivious acts with a child and sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court failed to comply with Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b) in accepting his guilty pleas, did not adequately inquire into an alleged communication breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses by imposing a surcharge, and erred in ordering restitution without first determining his reasonable ability to pay. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not preserve error on his guilty pleas challenge; (2) the record on appeal was insufficient to conduct an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis and to determine whether the district court adequately inquired into the alleged communication breakdown; and (3) the surcharge and restitution were erroneously imposed. View "State v. Petty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for willful injury causing bodily injury and kidnapping in the first degree but vacated the restitution portion of the sentencing order and remanded the case to the district court to order restitution in a manner consistent with this opinion, holding that the restitution order did not comply with restitution law.Specifically, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported Defendant’s conviction for first-degree kidnapping; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced when the court instructed the jury on a lesser included charge of kidnapping in the second degree; (3) this Court cannot reach Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (4) the lower court’s finding that Defendant had the reasonable ability to pay and ordering restitution for certain items without having the amount of each item of restitution before it was contrary to the statutory scheme as outlined in this opinion. View "State v. Albright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of second-degree burglary and reversed the habitual offender judgment and Defendant’s sentence, holding that Defendant’s stipulation to being a habitual offender was not knowingly and voluntarily made.A jury found Defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree. While the jury was in deliberations, Defendant’s counsel informed the court that Defendant would stipulate to predicate priors for the habitual offender charge. The district court sentenced Defendant as a habitual offender to incarceration not to exceed fifteen years and ordered restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court failed to comply with the requirements set forth in State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 2017), in accepting his habitual offender stipulation. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the stipulation was not knowingly and voluntarily made because the stipulation proceedings did not comply with the Harrington requirements. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with Harrington. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of operating while intoxicated (OWI) in violation of Iowa Code 321J.2, holding that an initial laboratory test that was positive for controlled substances was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the presence of a controlled substance in his system because the initial screen test found only the “possible presence” of drugs, not their actual presence. Without a confirmatory test, Defendant contended, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) without other evidence, a test that identifies only the “possible presence” of a controlled substance falls short of satisfying the reasonable doubt standard; and (2) the plain meaning of section 321J.2(1)(c) could not be satisfied in this case by relying on the circumstantial evidence of impairment. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court on the question on whether the crimes of involuntary manslaughter by a public offense and delivery of a controlled substance merge, holding that the district court did not err in failing to merge the convictions.Defendant was convicted and sentenced for delivery of a controlled substance and involuntary manslaughter by a public offense other than a forcible felony or escape. On appeal, the court of appeals held, among other things, that the crimes did not merge. The Supreme Court granted further review to consider the merger question and then affirmed the judgments of the courts below, holding that Defendant’s crimes should not have merged. View "State v. West" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court affirming the determination of the Department of Public Safety (DPS) that Appellant was required to register as a sex offender for life, holding that the DPS must accept an earlier court of appeals decision regarding the length of Appellant’s sex offender registration.In 2008, Appellant pled guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. At his sentencing hearing, the district court informed Appellant that he was only required to register as a sex offender for ten years, when, in fact, Appellant was subject to lifetime registration. When Appellant was informed he was required to register for life, Appellant sought postconviction relief. In 2015, the court of appeals determined that Appellant was only required to register as a sex offender for ten years. The DPS declined to accept the court of appeals’ decision. On judicial review, the district court and court of appeals affirmed the DPS’s determination, concluding that they lacked the authority to determine the length of Appellant’s sex offender registration requirements. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the DPS, holding that the 2015 court of appeals’ decision had preclusive effect over the DPS’s determination. View "Barker v. Iowa Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of operating while intoxicated (OUI), second offense, holding that Defendant’s rights under Iowa Code 804.20 were not violated when a law enforcement officer denied Defendant’s request to call his wife until after sobriety testing occurred.Defendant was driving a motor vehicle when he was involved in an accident in the midst of a snowstorm. Because of the weather conditions, the law enforcement officer that responded to the scene transported Defendant to a protected location - the sally port of the nearby law enforcement center - for the completion of field sobriety testing. Before leaving the scene, Defendant asked to talk to his wife, but the request was denied. Defendant subsequently failed field sobriety tests. Defendant was later convicted of OUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that his rights were violated because he had been “restrained of his liberty” within the meaning of section 804.20 at the sally port. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s rights under section 804.20 were not violated when the officer refused to allow Defendant the opportunity to speak with his wife until after field sobriety testing had been completed at the sally port because the sally port was a location for testing, not a “place of detention” within the meaning of section 804.20. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law