Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Anderson challenged a district court order placing him in a transitional release program at the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) as a violation of his due process rights.After a jury determined that Anderson was a sexually violent predator, Anderson was civilly committed to CCUSO under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. Anderson was later granted release with supervision but violated the terms of his release-with-supervision plan. The district court revoked Anderson’s release-with-supervision status and ordered him placed at a transitional release program housed at CCUSO. It was this order that Anderson challenged on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the order revoking Anderson’s release-with-supervision status and placing him at the transitional release program at CCUSO did not violate his substantive or procedural due process rights under either the Iowa Constitution or the United States Constitution. View "In re Detention of Jeffrey Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Iowa’s theft-by-taking prohibition in Iowa Code 714.1(1) is limited to situations where a person obtains property without the consent or authority of another, and therefore, a defendant does not violate the statute when he or she obtains property or services by delivering a counterfeit check or money order. Defendant was convicted of “theft by taking” after she removed money from her bank account after depositing several counterfeit checks and money orders and later endorsed a counterfeit money order to a veterinary clinic to pay for boarding services. The Court reversed Defendant’s theft-by-taking convictions, holding that Defendant’s conduct did not constitute theft by taking. View "State v. Nall" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his first-degree murder conviction entered after a retrial. The State prosecuted Defendant on the theory that Defendant aided and abetted Louis Woolheater in the murder of Lance Morningstar and was motivated to do so because Morningstar had an affair with Defendant’s wife. During Defendant’s second trial, Defendant was precluded from presenting out-of-court statements that he argued were admissible as statements against interest. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Defendant should have been allowed to present to the jury the challenged statements because they would have given Defendant a powerful argument that Woolheater acted to “save his own skin” rather than at the direction or encouragement of Defendant. View "State v. Huser" on Justia Law

Deputy Dan Furlong prepared a warrant application to search a residence. The detective brought the application before a judicial officer and, without signing the application, orally swore to the trust of the application in the presence of the judicial officer. The judicial officer approved and signed the warrant. After the warrant was executed Defendants were charged with several drug charges. Defendants moved to suppress the results of the search based on the detective’s failure to sign the warrant application. The district court granted the motions to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Iowa Code 808.3 permits the warrant applicant to swear to the truth of the warrant application in the presence of the judicial officer even if, inadvertently, the applicant fails to sign it; and (2) in this case, the issuance of the warrant complied with section 808.3. View "State v. Angel" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of making a false statement on an application to acquire a weapon permit, in violation of Iowa Code 724.17. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the district court correctly interpreted the statute and that substantial evidence supported the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court misinterpreted the statute; and (2) under the correct interpretation of the statute, section 724.17 does not criminalize Defendant’s act of falsely answering an unauthorized question on the application to acquire a weapon permit. View "State v. Downey" on Justia Law

Kent Tyler, Yarvon Russell, James Shorter, and Leprese Williams were charged with first-degree murder in connection with the death of Richard Daughenbaugh. Tyler was tried separately from the other three defendants. At the trial of the three codefendants, Russell and Shorter were convicted of second-degree murder. Williams was acquitted. The court of appeals reversed Russell’s conviction, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support a joint criminal conduct instruction. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, and any erroneous submission of the joint criminal conduct instruction did not undermine the jury’s verdict; and (2) Russell’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be addressed in an action for postconviction relief. View "State v. Russell" on Justia Law

Four defendants, including Kent Tyler and James Shorter, were charged with murder in connection with the death of Richard Daughenbaugh. Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder. In State v. Tyler, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the evidence in Tyler’s case did not support the trial court’s instruction on joint criminal conduct. In this case, as in Tyler, a jury convicted Shorter of second-degree murder. Relying on Tyler, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that although there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction on the ground that Shorter was a principal in the murder or aided and abetted the murder, there was insufficient evidence to support the joint criminal conduct instruction. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed Shorter’s conviction, holding that even if the joint criminal conduct instruction was erroneously given, reversal was not required under the facts of this case. View "State v. Shorter" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with robbery in the second degree. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty. The State sought a habitual offender sentencing enhancement, but the district court did not inform Defendant of certain constitutional and statutory rights associated with accepting guilty pleas before accepting his admission to the prior convictions to support the habitual offender status. The district court subsequently sentenced Defendant for the crime of robbery in the second degree as a habitual offender. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Defendant failed to preserve error concerning deficiencies in the habitual offender colloquy by filing a motion in arrest of judgment and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the admission to be withdrawn. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court and remanded the case for a trial on Defendant’s habitual offender status, holding that Defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily admit his prior convictions because he was not informed of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his admission. View "State v. Harrington" on Justia Law

A special restitution law provides that the court may order restitution paid to any public agency for the costs of the “emergency response” resulting from the actions constituting a violation of the operating while intoxicated (OWI) statute. In the instant case, Defendant pled guilty to OWI, first offense. The Sate submitted a request for “emergency response restitution” on behalf of the Davenport Police Department pursuant to Iowa Code 321J.2(13)(b). The district court denied the State’s claim for restitution, concluding that this case only involved “services provided by a police department in investigating and effecting the routine arrest and processing of a person” for OWI. The Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons set forth in today’s State v. District Court decision, holding that section 321J.2(13)(b) does not authorize recovery of the costs of the routine law enforcement activities involved in this case. View "State v. Iowa District Court for Scott County" on Justia Law

A special restitution law provides that the court may order restitution paid to any public agency for the costs of the “emergency response” resulting from the actions constituting a violation of the operating while intoxicated (OWI) statute. In this case, Defendant pled guilty to OWI, first offense. The State requested that Defendant pay “victim restitution” to the City of Davenport and requested “emergency response restitution” on behalf of the Davenport Police Department. The district court denied the State’s claim for restitution, concluding that this case involved only police department services provided to investigate and effect the routine arrest and processing of a person for OWI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, for the reasons set forth in today’s decision in State v. District Court, Iowa Code 321J.2(13)(b) did not authorize recovery of the costs of the routine law enforcement activities involved in this case. View "State v. Iowa District Court for Scott County" on Justia Law