Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Following his sentencing to consecutive prison terms totaling thirty-five years, Defendant asked the Supreme Court to review the district court's determinations that the written entry of the verdict was proper, that a fork is a dangerous weapon, and that the State did not commit a Brady violation or fail to disclose newly discovered evidence, among others. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the State did not commit a Brady violation; and (2) Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.17(2) requires a trial court to announce the verdict in a recorded proceeding in open court following a bench trial, and the district court in this case erred by not announcing the verdict in a recorded proceeding in open court. The Court found, however, that the district court cured its error and substantially complied with Rule 2.17(2) such that no remand was required.

Defendant Dontay Sanford was convicted for first-degree burglary for entering the car of a victim who later died from injuries received during the encounter. Sanford was sentenced to an indeterminate term in prison not to exceed twenty-five years. Sanford appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence that the victim's automobile was an "occupied structure," which is one of the elements of burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence that the victim's vehicle, under the facts of this case, was an occupied structure as that term is defined under the burglary statute; and (2) Sanford's pro se claims on appeal failed.

Peter Long was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse. Based on two prior convictions for lascivious acts with a child, the district court found that Long had committed a class A felony and sentenced Long to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Long appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to reopen the record after the State had rested and after the defense had made a motion for judgment of acquittal during the enhancement trial. The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to render a verdict on the enhancement based solely on the evidence introduced prior to the reopening of the record. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the record under the circumstances of this case.

Donald Clark was convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree for molesting a fifth-grade student while employed as a guidance counselor at the elementary school. Clark appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process were violated when the trial court failed to grant his request for a continuance and to allow the retaking of depositions based on the late disclosure of an e-mail written by the student. The Supreme Court affirmed Clark's conviction and sentence, holding that the district court did not violate Clark's constitutional rights or abuse its discretion when it refused to allow redepositions or grant a continuance.

Sergio Perez pled guilty to a misdemeanor drug possession charge in 2000. Perez later filed an application for postconviction relief seeking to have his conviction set aside, claiming that he did not receive advice from his attorney regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty. The district court denied the application, and the court of appeals affirmed. At the center of this appeal was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which decided a criminal defendant has a right to receive advice from counsel regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if Padilla establishes a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it does not apply retroactively, and Perez may not rely upon it to set aside an earlier conviction; and (2) if Padilla is not a new rule, Perez's application is time-barred because he could have filed it within three years of the date when his conviction became final and failed to do so.

Defendant, an alleged embezzler, entered an Alford plea to first-degree theft and entered a deferred judgment on that charge. The subrogated insurer (EMCC) of Defendant's employer brought a civil action against Defendant to recover $66,749 it paid on the theft loss. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of EMCC in that amount, concluding that Defendant's Alford plea precluded her from denying the theft or the amount. Defendant appealed, contending her deferred judgment should have no res judicata effect in the civil case. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment establishing Defendant's liability to EMCC for damages of $10,000 based on issue preclusion and reversed the summary judgment in excess of $10,000, holding (1) the victim of a crime or the victim's subrogated insurer may invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion in a civil action based on the defendant's Alford plea regardless of whether the defendant successfully complies with the conditions for the deferred judgment on the criminal charge; but (2) the preclusive effect of Defendant's Alford plea is limited to $10,000, the minimum amount required to support a charge of first-degree theft, and genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in excess of $10,000.

This case presented the question of whether an officer is justified in activating his emergency lights and blocking a driver into a parking space under the "community caretaking function" exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment based solely upon his knowledge that the vehicle has just struck an object in the roadway and suffered minor damage not affecting the drivability of the car. Here the district court denied Defendant driver's motion to suppress the evidence found after the warrantless seizure of Defendant's car, and Defendant was found guilty of OWI. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, concluding that under the circumstances of this case, the community caretaking exception was inapplicable, and the seizure was impermissible. Remanded.

At issue here was sex offenders serving prison time on a "revocation of release" from a "special sentence" under Iowa Code 903B.2 and whether the maximum time incarcerated was reduced by "earned-time credit" or "jail-time credit." Kris Kolzow began serving his ten-year special sentence released on parole. A parole violation prompted his detention for five and one-half months awaiting a parole-revocation hearing. The administrative parole judge ordered Kolzow to prison "to serve a period not greater than two years" as required by section 903B.2. The Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) refused to shorten Kolzow's prison time with earned-time credit or jail-time credit. The district court ruled that both credits applied to reduce the maximum two-year period served in prison on the revocation of release. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling awarding Kolzow jail-time credit and reversed the ruling awarding him earned-time credit, holding (1) IDOC need not apply earned-time credit to shorten the period incarcerated on a revocation of release; and (2) an offender serving a special sentence under section 903B.2 is entitled to jail-time credit against the maximum periods for revocation of release for each day he is detained awaiting his parole-revocation hearing.

Roger Ennenga was arrested for failing to stop his vehicle when police attempted to pull him over and for possession of methamphetamine. The State failed to file a trial information within forty-five days, and Ennenga's counsel did not file a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Ennenga's counsel allowed him to plead guilty. At issue before the Supreme Court on Ennenga's application for postconviction relief was whether an indictment must be filed in order to be "found" for the purposes of Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33, which requires the court to dismiss a prosecution if an indictment or trial information is not "found" within forty-five days of the defendant's arrest, and whether failing to ensure an indictment is timely filed amounts to the breach of an essential duty by an accused's counsel. The Court reversed the district court, holding that counsel breached an essential duty in failing to file a motion to dismiss the untimely trial information, and that counsel's failure resulted in prejudice to Ennenga by his plea of guilty. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Defendant Kenneth Madsen was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and one count of lascivious acts with a child. Madsen appealed, arguing (1) the district court erred in failing to suppress his confessions because his confessions were involuntary under the constitutional totality-of-the-circumstances test due to the detective's threat to make him late for work and promise that if Madsen confessed he could keep his name out of the newspaper and put the matter behind him; and (2) his counsel was ineffective for not attempting to suppress his confession under the common law evidentiary test for promises of leniency. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Madsen's trial counsel breached an essential duty by failing to move to suppress Madsen's confessions under the evidentiary test; (2) the interrogating officer made promises of leniency that required suppression of part of Madsen's confession, but Madsen's self-incriminating statements made before those promises remained admissible; and (3) Madsen was entitled to a new trial on one count of second-degree sexual abuse, but his two remaining convictions were affirmed based on lack of prejudice.