Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Appellant was convicted of first-degree armed robbery. In 2011, the governor commuted Appellant's sentence. Thereafter, Appellant filed an application for postconviction relief seeking recalculation of his earned time to comply with the governor's commutation of the mandatory minimum portion of his sentence. Specifically, Appellant contended that with the mandatory minimum portion of his sentence removed he was entitled to accumulate earned time at a faster rate than had been available to him under the original sentence, which included a mandatory minimum term of incarceration. If his earned time were calculated at the accelerated rate, Appellant contended he would be entitled to an immediate release. The district court denied his application. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's determination that the governor's commutation order did not entitle Appellant to an immediate discharge; but (2) reversed the part of the district court's ruling that the commutation had no effect on the rate of Appellant's accumulation of earned time and the resulting tentative discharge, as the legal effect of the governor's commutation order changed the rate at which Appellant could accumulate earned time from the date of the commutation forward. Remanded. View "Lowery v. State" on Justia Law

The district court found Defendant guilty of fraudulent practice in the third degree for possessing 218 packs of cigarettes lacking tax stamps. At issue on appeal was whether "the amount of money or value of property or service involved" in this crime was the amount of the unpaid tax or, rather, the value of the cigarettes. Defendant contended the degree of the crime should be based on the unpaid cigarette tax, which was insufficient to convict her of third-degree fraudulent practice. The district court determined the degree of fraudulent practice was based on the value of the cigarettes, not the amount of the unpaid tax. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Iowa Code 453A.36, the possession of unstamped cigarettes was the fraudulent practice, not the unpaid tax, and therefore, the district court correctly entered judgment against Defendant for third-degree fraudulent practice. View "State v. Messer" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree in murder in 2005. In 2009, Appellant filed an application for postconviction relief alleging his trial was ineffective for (1) failing to raise the defense of temporary insanity or diminished capacity, and (2) failing to adequately support the request for bifurcation of his trial. Appellant also asserted his appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's denial of his request for bifurcation. The postconviction court denied Appellant's application. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the postconviction court did not rule on Appellant's specific claims, and Appellant failed to preserve error by filing a subsequent motion under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant's application for postconviction relief, holding (1) the postconviction court did rule on Appellant's claims, and the claims were properly preserved for appeal; but (2) Appellant's claims lacked merit. View "Lamasters v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree. Defendant provided notice he would be relying on the defense of insanity to the charge. The jury rejected the insanity defense and found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole and ordered him to pay restitution for his attorney and expert witness fees. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and restitution orders. Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the instructions given by the district court did not accurately define insanity, and (2) his own instruction should have been given. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the instructions given by the district court, when read as a whole, fairly and accurately advised the jury of the legal standard it was to apply to Defendant's insanity defense; and (2) due process under the Iowa Constitution does not require the district court to inform the jury of the consequences of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict under the facts of this case.

In 2007, two University of Iowa football players were accused of sexually assaulting another student in a campus dorm room. The incident led to criminal charges, internal actions by the University, an external criticism of the University. The incident also led to the present lawsuit, which concerned Open Records Act requests that the Iowa City Press-Citizen served on the University. Dissatisfied with the University's initial response to those requests, the Press-Citizen filed suit. The lawsuit resulted in more documents being produced and others being submitted for in camera review by the district court. The court then ordered additional documents produced, in some instances with redactions. The University appealed that order in part. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment in part, holding that the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act prohibited the disclosure of the remaining documents, including even redacted versions of "education records" where the identity of the student was known to the recipient.

Following his sentencing to consecutive prison terms totaling thirty-five years, Defendant asked the Supreme Court to review the district court's determinations that the written entry of the verdict was proper, that a fork is a dangerous weapon, and that the State did not commit a Brady violation or fail to disclose newly discovered evidence, among others. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the State did not commit a Brady violation; and (2) Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.17(2) requires a trial court to announce the verdict in a recorded proceeding in open court following a bench trial, and the district court in this case erred by not announcing the verdict in a recorded proceeding in open court. The Court found, however, that the district court cured its error and substantially complied with Rule 2.17(2) such that no remand was required.

Defendant Dontay Sanford was convicted for first-degree burglary for entering the car of a victim who later died from injuries received during the encounter. Sanford was sentenced to an indeterminate term in prison not to exceed twenty-five years. Sanford appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence that the victim's automobile was an "occupied structure," which is one of the elements of burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence that the victim's vehicle, under the facts of this case, was an occupied structure as that term is defined under the burglary statute; and (2) Sanford's pro se claims on appeal failed.

Peter Long was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse. Based on two prior convictions for lascivious acts with a child, the district court found that Long had committed a class A felony and sentenced Long to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Long appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to reopen the record after the State had rested and after the defense had made a motion for judgment of acquittal during the enhancement trial. The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to render a verdict on the enhancement based solely on the evidence introduced prior to the reopening of the record. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the record under the circumstances of this case.

Donald Clark was convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree for molesting a fifth-grade student while employed as a guidance counselor at the elementary school. Clark appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process were violated when the trial court failed to grant his request for a continuance and to allow the retaking of depositions based on the late disclosure of an e-mail written by the student. The Supreme Court affirmed Clark's conviction and sentence, holding that the district court did not violate Clark's constitutional rights or abuse its discretion when it refused to allow redepositions or grant a continuance.

Sergio Perez pled guilty to a misdemeanor drug possession charge in 2000. Perez later filed an application for postconviction relief seeking to have his conviction set aside, claiming that he did not receive advice from his attorney regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty. The district court denied the application, and the court of appeals affirmed. At the center of this appeal was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which decided a criminal defendant has a right to receive advice from counsel regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if Padilla establishes a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it does not apply retroactively, and Perez may not rely upon it to set aside an earlier conviction; and (2) if Padilla is not a new rule, Perez's application is time-barred because he could have filed it within three years of the date when his conviction became final and failed to do so.