Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After Toby Welch was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, police officers requested a breath specimen to be used for chemical testing. Welch refused the request. After talking to his attorney, however, Welch told officers that he wanted to consent to the breath test. The officers declined the request, commenting that because Welch had already refused, it was too late to submit to the test. Based on his refusal to submit to chemical testing, the Iowa DOT revoked Welch's driver's license for one year. The DOT's administrative law judge sustained the revocation, and the reviewing officer affirmed. The district court affirmed the revocation. At issue on appeal was whether the "one refusal is determinative" rule set forth in Krueger v. Fulton should be abrogated in favor of a more flexible standard permitting a motorist's subsequent consent to cure a prior initial refusal to submit to chemical testing. The Supreme Court rejected Welch's appeal and upheld the revocation of his license, concluding that a rule treating the motorist's initial refusal as determinative was supported by Court precedents, was consistent with the general assembly's intent, and was easier for police and courts to administer.

While an inmate at a correctional facility, Kevin Walker was assaulted by another inmate and was seriously injured. Walker brought a tort claim against the State, a correctional officer, and two activity specialists, claiming they negligently failed to ensure his safety. The State sought summary judgment based upon the discretionary function and intentional tort exceptions to the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The district court denied the motion, concluding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the prison staff involved had knowledge of a history of prior trouble involving Walker. The Supreme Court granted the State's application for interlocutory appeal and affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the district court did not err in denying the State's motion for summary judgment where (1) because the decisions made by the correctional staff in the supervision of the inmates, in this instance, did not involve the evaluation of broad public policy factors, the State was not entitled to the discretionary function exception; and (2) as long as a claimant can show the State is negligent in performing a duty to protect a person from an assault, the intentional tort exception to the ITCA is not applicable.

Defendant Wendell Harrington was convicted of ongoing criminal conduct, first-degree theft, second-degree theft, and three counts of second-degree burglary, all enhanced as a habitual offender. The court of appeals reversed Harrington's conviction for ongoing criminal conduct, affirmed his remaining convictions, and preserved his ineffective-assistance claim for postconviction relief. The Surpeme Court granted review to consider whether the district court erred in admitting Harrington's prior theft and burglary convictions under Iowa R. Evid. 5.609. At issue was whether State v. Axiotis required the district court to balance the probative and prejudicial nature of Harrington's prior convictions before admitting them. The court of appeals concluded the district court had no duty to apply a balancing test as Harrington's prior convictions involved dishonesty and were therefore admissible under Iowa R. Evid. 5.609(a)(2). The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals and overruled Axiotis to the extent it suggests the balancing test articulated in Iowa R. Evid. 5.609(a)(1) applies to prior convictions that involve dishonesty or false statement under Iowa R. Evid. 5.609(a)(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals decision as to the issue and affirmed the district court's admission of Harrington's prior convictions for impeachment purposes.

Defendant Justin Derby was charged with third-degree burglary, five counts of forgery, and escape from custody. On the morning of trial, Derby presented the district court with an oral motion in limine seeking to exclude the admission of Derby's prior convictions. The district court partially sustained Derby's motion and prevented the State from using Derby's prior convictions in its case in chief. The court overruled Derby's motion to the extent that it sought to "bullet-proof...the defendant from being impeached" with his prior felony convictions. Derby elected not to testify as a result of the ruling and was later convicted as charged. Derby appealed, asserting the district court erred in overruling his motion in limine. The court of appeals held Derby failed to preserve his claim because he elected not to testify. In support of its ruling, the court cited State v. Brown, which held that the defendant must testify in order to preserve error to challenge the use of his prior convictions as impeachment. On review, the Supreme Court declined to depart from stare decisis and, accordingly, affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and the district court's judgment.

Defendant Anouhak Keutla pled guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance. The district court granted Keutla a deferred judgment and placed her on supervised probation for two years. After a report of probation violations was filed, the district court revoked defendant's deferred judgment, entered an adjudication of guilt, imposed a five-year prison sentence, suspended the sentence, ordered probation, and imposed a fine. The court further ordered defendant to serve six months in jail for contempt. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court did not have the authority both to revoke her deferred judgment and to find her in contempt. The court of appeals concluded that the district court exceeded its authority by both revoking defendant's deferred judgment and punishing her for contempt and remanded the case. The Supreme Court granted review. The Court agreed with the court of appeals, concluding that the entire sentence should be reversed and remanded to the district court for resentencing.

Appellant Randy Meyers was convicted of lascivious conduct with a minor and sex abuse in the third degree stemming from Meyer's sexual relationship with his seventeen-year-old stepdaughter, Mindy. Meyers appealed, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Meyers supported his appeal by focusing on the absence of testimony by Mindy that the sex acts with Meyers were by force or against her will. Myers also asserted that Mindy's consent could not be negated without expert evidence that she suffered from a recognized mental defect, and claimed that expert testimony presented by the state that Mindy was psychologically unable to consent was insufficient to vitiate consent under the statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding sufficient evidence that the sex acts occurred, and (2) that all the circumstances taken together support a finding that the sex acts engaged in between Meyers and Mindy were by force or against the will of Mindy.