Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved a fatal shooting at a house in Junction City, Kansas, in May 2020. The defendant, an 18-year-old, was initially a guest at a barbeque where a 13-year-old girl and two men, Aaron Villarreal and Dylan Spencer, were present. After being told by Villarreal and Spencer to stop touching the girl, the defendant left but soon returned with an armed accomplice. Both men were armed when they re-entered the house. The confrontation escalated, and both the defendant and his accomplice fired multiple shots, resulting in the deaths of Spencer inside the house and Villarreal outside. Forensic evidence, eyewitness testimony, and physical evidence linked the defendant and his accomplice to the shootings.The District Court of Geary County charged the defendant with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for Villarreal’s death and the lesser included offense of second-degree intentional murder for Spencer’s death. The court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without parole for 50 years, plus a consecutive term for the second conviction. The defendant directly appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, raising multiple claims, including erroneous jury instructions, improper response to a jury question, prosecutorial error, insufficient evidence, and cumulative error.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that: foreseeability cannot establish accomplice liability for a specific intent crime like premeditated murder—the State must prove the defendant’s specific intent; the erroneous inclusion of foreseeability language in the aiding and abetting instruction was harmless and not clearly erroneous; the district court properly declined to give certain involuntary manslaughter instructions; the court’s response to the jury’s question was legally correct; the prosecutor’s statements were within permissible bounds; and sufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no cumulative error. View "State v. Wright " on Justia Law

A woman was observed by a store asset protection manager removing multiple tools from a retail store, concealing them in her purse, removing security tags, and attempting to leave the store after paying for only one item. She was intercepted and signed a statement admitting to shoplifting. The State charged her with theft of property valued at least $50 but less than $1,500, alleging she had two or more prior theft convictions within the preceding five years. At trial, a jury found her guilty of theft. The presentence investigation report documented three prior theft convictions within five years, and the court sentenced her to a felony term based on those prior convictions.The Sedgwick District Court denied her motion for a directed verdict, which argued the State failed to prove her prior theft convictions to the jury. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction, concluding that proof of prior convictions was not an element of the crime but a sentencing factor, consistent with prior Kansas precedent such as State v. Hanks and State v. Loudermilk.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. The court held that K.S.A. 21-5801(b)(6) does not require the State to prove prior theft convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the offense. Rather, sentencing judges may rely on court records to determine both the dates and statutes of prior convictions if this is a mechanical or mathematical determination not subject to reasonable dispute. The court affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the district court, finding no violation of the appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey or Erlinger v. United States, because the fact of prior convictions and their dates are not the type of facts that must be determined by a jury. View "State v. Calvert " on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with the first-degree premeditated murder of his former romantic partner, with whom he shared a child. The victim was found dead in their shared residence from a gunshot wound. Surveillance footage and testimony indicated the defendant had access to the residence and was present in the vicinity during the relevant time. He was interviewed by police on the day of the crime, during which he denied leaving his girlfriend’s hotel room the night before and denied owning any guns. The initial trial ended with a hung jury. Before a second trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements made during the police interview, arguing violations of his Fifth Amendment rights.In the Wyandotte District Court, the defendant’s motion to suppress was denied after a hearing. The court found that the pre-Miranda portion of the interview was not custodial and that the defendant’s post-Miranda statement did not constitute an unequivocal invocation of the right to silence. The second trial proceeded, and the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison, prompting this direct appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to receiving Miranda warnings, making admission of his pre-Miranda statements erroneous. However, the court determined that the error was harmless because the same statements were properly admitted post-Miranda and supported by other evidence. The court further held that the defendant’s statement after receiving Miranda warnings (“No, ’cause I don’t know where this is going”) was ambiguous and did not clearly invoke his right to remain silent. Therefore, the admission of his post-Miranda statements was not error. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. McCullough " on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 1993 of multiple violent sex offenses. Many years later, he filed a pro se motion in 2023, arguing that the district court had ordered a psychological evaluation three months before trial but failed to include the evaluation in the record or consider it at sentencing, as he alleged was required by statute. He claimed this omission meant the sentencing phase was never properly concluded, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to impose his sentence. His appointed attorney expanded these arguments, suggesting the evaluation implied a finding of incompetence to stand trial and that this raised constitutional concerns about his conviction’s validity.The Sedgwick District Court summarily denied the motion. The judge found that the evaluation occurred before trial and was not required to be part of the sentencing record. The court also determined that the evaluation was not related to the defendant’s competence to stand trial, but rather to the potential for a mental disease or defect defense. The court took judicial notice of a prior, similar claim by the defendant and noted that his allegations were unsupported.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas first determined the nature of the defendant’s postconviction motion, construing it as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504, rather than a habeas corpus motion. The court rejected constitutional arguments as improper for this procedural vehicle. On the merits, the court held that procedural errors alleged by the defendant, such as failing to consider the psychological evaluation, did not divest the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over sentencing. The court further held that failure to consider certain statutory factors does not render a sentence illegal under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the district court’s denial of the illegal-sentence motion. View "State v. Denney " on Justia Law

A Kansas Highway Patrol trooper stopped the defendant for speeding and observed signs of alcohol impairment, prompting a preliminary breath test. The test provided probable cause for arrest, and a subsequent certified breath alcohol test showed the defendant’s blood-alcohol content exceeded the legal limit. The defendant was charged with driving under the influence and speeding. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress evidence from the preliminary breath test, arguing various grounds including that any consent to the test was involuntary due to coercion. The parties stipulated to certain facts for the suppression motion, intending to frame legal issues for appellate review, and the defendant waived his right to a jury trial.The Ellsworth District Court denied the suppression motion based on the stipulated facts, without explicitly addressing the voluntariness argument, and found the defendant guilty. On appeal, the defendant limited his challenge to the voluntariness of his consent to the preliminary breath test, raising new sub-issues about statutory amendments and the effect of an officer retaining a driver’s license. The State argued that there was no evidence of duress, but the Court of Appeals panel majority dismissed the appeal, finding the voluntariness issue was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant’s motion lacked specific factual allegations required by statute. The dissent argued the issue was preserved and warranted remand for clarification.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal. The court held that under K.S.A. 22-3216(2), a suppression motion must state specific facts showing why a search or seizure was unlawful, not merely conclusory statements. Because the defendant failed to allege sufficient facts in his motion to support his claim of involuntary consent, the statutory obligations of the prosecution and the district court were not triggered, and the issue was not preserved for appellate review. View "State v. Anderson " on Justia Law

Thomas Gatewood pleaded no contest to several felony charges, including first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, aggravated endangering a child, and aggravated intimidation of a witness. Prior to sentencing, the presentence investigation report classified Gatewood’s 2010 Oklahoma child-abuse conviction as a person felony, which elevated his criminal-history score to B and subjected him to a longer sentence. Gatewood objected to this classification, arguing that the Oklahoma statute was broader than Kansas’ person-felony criteria. The State responded that Gatewood was convicted under the injuring-torturing-or-maiming version of the Oklahoma statute, which required proof of bodily injury and the presence of another person—the child victim.The case was reviewed in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas. At sentencing, the State produced the Oklahoma journal entry showing Gatewood pled guilty to “Child Abuse by Injury.” The district court determined the conviction was properly classified as a person felony and found Gatewood’s criminal-history score was B. Gatewood was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 615 months for felony murder, with a consecutive 228-month term for kidnapping, and concurrent sentences for the remaining offenses. The court also imposed several fees, including forensic services, a Children’s Advocacy Center assessment, and a sexual assault evidence collection kit fee. Gatewood did not object to these fees during proceedings.On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Gatewood challenged the person felony classification and the imposed fees. The court held that the State met its burden of proof and that substantial competent evidence supported the district court’s classification of the Oklahoma conviction as a person felony. The Supreme Court affirmed both the sentence and the imposition of fees, declining to reach the merits of the fee challenges due to lack of preservation at the district court level. View "State v. Gatewood " on Justia Law

Christopher J. Allison was charged with multiple offenses, including theft, burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and terroristic threat. He pled guilty to the theft, burglary, and firearm charges. A jury convicted him of the remaining counts and found a statutory aggravating factor for first-degree murder, specifically that Allison committed the crime to avoid or prevent lawful arrest or prosecution. The jury determined this aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating circumstances, and the district court imposed a hard 40 life sentence, meaning Allison would not be eligible for parole for 40 years.After his conviction and sentencing, Allison appealed, raising various claims, but the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed both his conviction and sentence. In 2014, Allison filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the sentence did not comply with certain statutory requirements. The Cowley District Court summarily denied the motion, stating the claims were not correctable under a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. Allison later filed another motion to correct an illegal sentence in 2020, which was again summarily denied by the Cowley District Court.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that Allison’s hard 40 sentence was not illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 because the procedural requirements of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4624(5), (6), and K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4628 were met. The court also found that the district court’s consideration of statutory sentencing factors, including future dangerousness and threat to society, did not render the sentence illegal or constitute an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Allison " on Justia Law

Kyle Hardwick was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of theft, and solicitation of perjury for the killings of Phil Anstine and Marion "Ed" Bates at a rural property in Reno County, Kansas. The evidence included forensic findings, eyewitness testimony, and Hardwick’s own admissions. Hardwick testified that he acted in self-defense after allegedly being sexually assaulted and threatened with firearms by Anstine and then encountering Bates, whom he said fired at him. Physical evidence at the scene, however, conflicted with Hardwick’s account, including the location and condition of the victims' bodies and the absence of supporting ballistic evidence.The case was tried in the Reno District Court, where Hardwick requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. The district court denied this request, reasoning that Hardwick was either justified in acting in self-defense or guilty of murder, depending on the jury’s view of premeditation. The jury was instructed on first- and second-degree murder and self-defense but not on imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter. Hardwick was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to two consecutive life terms plus additional concurrent sentences.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the conviction. The court held that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense, as Hardwick’s testimony provided some evidence—however weak—for such an instruction. Nonetheless, the error was deemed harmless because the strong circumstantial evidence of premeditation supported the jury’s verdict, and the jury rejected lesser homicide charges. The court also held that Hardwick’s preserved challenge to the admission of his post-Miranda silence failed; he had “opened the door” to impeachment, and the State’s use of that evidence was limited and constitutionally permissible. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Hardwick " on Justia Law

On July 3, 2021, a group of young women in Topeka, Kansas, were involved in escalating physical and verbal altercations. The confrontation ended with Daisha Butler firing a gun, resulting in the death of 17-year-old N.M., who was shot in the head while running away. Butler had previously purchased the firearm legally, and ballistic evidence linked the shell casing at the scene to her weapon. Witnesses described various fights between two groups and Butler’s eventual admission to firing the gun, allegedly for self-defense and to protect her daughter, though she denied intentionally shooting anyone.The District Court of Shawnee County presided over Butler’s trial. The jury convicted Butler of first-degree felony murder, based on the inherently dangerous felony of aggravated endangering a child, and of aggravated endangering a child itself. The court merged the murder convictions and sentenced Butler to life in prison without parole for 25 years, plus a consecutive prison term. Butler appealed directly to the Kansas Supreme Court, arguing insufficient evidence, errors regarding the admission of prior crimes evidence, improper jury instructions (including self-defense and lesser-included offenses), and cumulative error.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the convictions. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to convict Butler of aggravated endangering a child and felony murder, clarifying that the State is not required to prove the defendant knew the victim was a minor; only the fact of the victim’s age must be shown. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial after a fleeting reference to marijuana possession. Instructional errors regarding lesser-included offenses and self-defense were deemed harmless, and the cumulative error doctrine did not apply, as there was only a single, non-prejudicial error. View "State v. Butler " on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant committed crimes in Kansas in February 2016 and later pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At sentencing, the presentence investigation report counted a prior Illinois conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm as a person felony, which affected the defendant’s criminal history score and sentence. The defendant objected, arguing that the Illinois law on third-party liability was broader than Kansas law and that this should preclude the Illinois conviction from being counted as a person felony under Kansas law.The Saline District Court rejected the defendant’s argument and classified the Illinois conviction as a person felony, holding that the proper inquiry was whether the elements of the Illinois offense were comparable to a Kansas person felony, not whether the theory of liability in Illinois was broader. The defendant was sentenced accordingly and appealed. The Kansas Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court, reasoning that neither state treats third-party liability as a separate crime and that the conviction itself, not the underlying theory of liability, should be compared. The panel found the Illinois aggravated discharge statute was at least as narrow as, if not narrower than, the comparable Kansas statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals and the district court. The court held that, for crimes committed before May 23, 2019, the proper method is to compare the elements of the out-of-state offense with the Kansas offense. The court concluded that the Illinois crime of aggravated discharge of a firearm is comparable to Kansas’ criminal discharge of a firearm and should be classified as a person offense. The court further held that sentencing courts are not required to consider theories of liability, such as aiding and abetting, when conducting this comparability analysis. View "State v. McCray " on Justia Law