Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant's convictions for first-degree felony murder and aggravated burglary were reversed by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Upon retrial, the jury convicted Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by assessing attorney fees against Defendant without adequately assessing his ability to pay or the burden such a payment would impose. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant's convictions; and (2) vacated the Board of Indigents' Defense Services attorney fees reimbursement order, holding that the district court erred by failing to ascertain Defendant's financial resources or the burden such reimbursement would cause him. Remanded. View "State v. Wade" on Justia Law

Appellant shot the Miguel Moya after robbing two people at gunpoint at the same house. A jury convicted Appellant of first-degree felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison, with a mandatory minimum of twenty years and lifetime postrelease supervision for the felony murder conviction. Appellant raised five issues on appeal. The Supreme Court decided all issues against Appellant except his sentencing argument, holding that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to lifetime postrelease supervision rather than to a term with the possibility of parole, and accordingly, this portion of Appellant's sentence was vacated. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4904(b), sex offenders must inform their local law enforcement agency within ten days of changing their address of residence. Defendant, a registered sex offender, left his residence on June 1. He then traveled the southwest United States for approximately three weeks before settling in Nevada and registering as an offender on July 9. Defendant was convicted of one count of failing to notify the county sheriff within ten days of changing his residence - for the period of June 1-11. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that he had not yet established a new residence and therefore had no duty to register during that ten-day period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that between June 1-11, Defendant never adopted a "place of habitation," to which, whenever he was absent, he had "the intention of returning." Accordingly, during that time period, Defendant did not "change the address of his residence" to a "new address" and therefore, Defendant was not required to register under section 22-4904(b). View "State v. LeClair" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy and two counts of aggravated liberties with a child. Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences, each with a mandatory forty-year prison term. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the jury was improperly instructed with inaccurate and misleading language used in an Allen-type instruction; (2) the prosecutor improperly appealed to the emotions of the jurors by asking them to protect child victims by supporting their version of the events; (3) the judge improperly responded to a jury question by informing the jury that the abuse had happened more than once; and (4) these cumulative errors prejudiced Defendant and denied him a fair trial. View "State v. Burns" on Justia Law

Kan. Stat. Ann. 2011 Supp. 8-1002(c) provides that where a driver's license is being suspended because an illegal blood-alcohol level has been established by a blood test, the officer shall serve notice of the suspension "by mailing the notice." This driver's license suspension case involved the question of whether the phrase "mailing the notice" requires the officer who conducted the alcohol testing to personally deliver the notice of a driver's license suspension to the custody of a mail carrier or may instead follow his or her office's standard operating procedures for outgoing mail. The Supreme Court held (1) the statute imposes the responsibility to ensure mailing on the officer but does not require the officer to personally address, stamp, and place in a mailbox an envelope containing the notice; and (2) in this case, the officer ensured mailing by following the sheriff's standard operating procedure for mailing the notice and, thus, fulfilled the statutory requirement. In so holding, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that reversed the district court, although the Court's analysis was different from that of the court of appeals. View "Byrd v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and a weapons violation when he was seventeen. The district court judge sentenced Defendant to life in prison on each of the first two counts, fifteen years to life on the third count, and five years on the fourth count, with all of the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant appealed his sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim that his sentences were the products of judicial bias, prejudice, or corrupt motive failed on appeal; and (2) the district court judge did not err by considering the results of Defendant's psychological examination during sentencing, and the judge's consideration of statements Defendant made during the examination without having been given Miranda warnings beforehand was not error, as Miranda warnings were unnecessary in this case. View "State v. Schaeffer" on Justia Law

Appellant pled nolo contendere to and was convicted of a second drug offense that required his participation in a mandatory drug treatment program. Appellant was sentenced to an underlying prison term of eleven months and placed on eighteen months' probation. Appellant failed to comply with the terms of his probation, prompting the district court to revoke his probation and order him to serve his eleven-month prison sentence. Appellant appealed, claiming that the district court should have imposed a different sanction for his probation violation. By the time the matter came before the court of appeals, Appellant had completed his prison sentence and had been released from State custody and supervision. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to refute the State's contention that the actual controversy had ceased or to establish an exception to the general rule that precludes appellate review of moot issues. View "State v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted Appellant of premeditated first-degree murder and rape for acts committed two decades earlier, in 1982. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison. In 2007, Appellant filed a pro se petition for DNA testing pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512, asserting that prior DNA test results were incompetent for a number of reasons. The district court summarily denied Appellant's petition, determining that the DNA evidence was properly offered and admitted by the court, that the DNA techniques used by the State were representative of the latest techniques available, and that Appellant's petition failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted pursuant to section 21-2512. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant's petition satisfied the criteria pursuant to section 21-2512. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing with appointed counsel. View "State v. Lackey" on Justia Law

Appellant was sentenced to serve two consecutive twelve-month probation terms for her convictions in two separate criminal cases. During the first term, the district court revoked both probations and ordered Appellant to serve her underlying prison sentences. Appellant appealed, claiming that the second probation term had not commenced when she violated the terms of the first probation term, so that the district court erred in sending her to prison on the second case. Appellant completed serving her prison terms before the case could be heard on appeal, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. Finding that the issue raised by Appellant was one capable of repetition and of importance, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals to reinstate the appeal. View "State v. Hilton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by imposing lifetime postrelease supervision instead of parole and by imposing electronic monitoring as a parole condition. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions; (2) vacated that portion of Appellant's sentence imposing postrelease supervision for the rape conviction, as the district court should have only sentenced Appellant to a life sentence with no parole for twenty-five years for the conviction, not lifetime postrelease supervision, and remanded to the district court for a nunc pro tunc order to correct a portion of the journal entry to delete reference to electronic monitoring, as the sentencing court did not have authority to impose such parole conditions; and (3) affirmed the remainder of Appellant's sentence. View "State v. Beaman" on Justia Law