Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and four counts of aggravated assault. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution as an adult because he was not initially charged in juvenile court and the State never obtained authorization to prosecute him as an adult. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding, inter alia, (1) Defendant did not demonstrate he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) the district court did not err in allowing into evidence statements made at the previous trial because vacating the earlier trial did not render the sworn testimony from that trial void, did not remove the constitutional protections in place at that trial, and did not change the credibility of the testimony; and (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments.

After Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor theft in municipal court for violating a city ordinance, his conviction was vacated and he was charged with and convicted of felony theft in state district court for the same offense. Defendant argued that double jeopardy attached to the municipal court proceeding. The State countered that jeopardy did not attach to the municipal court proceeding because the municipal court did not have jurisdiction over felony theft. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy did not attach, as (1) a city ordinance that conflicts with a state statute by classifying the offense as a misdemeanor when the legislature has classified the crime as a felony does not vest the municipal court with jurisdiction; and (2) the municipal court had the authority to vacate Defendant's plea, and the State could prosecute Defendant for felony theft.

On direct appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated battery, arguing that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on simple battery as a lesser included offense. The court of appeals agreed, reversed Defendant's conviction, and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals applied a complete standard of review when it declared that trial court is obligated to instruct on any lesser included offense on which a jury might reasonably return a verdict after considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant; and (2) the court of appeals properly interpreted the skip rule.

On direct appeal of his conviction for the aggravated robbery of a Target store employee, Defendant raised the issue of whether the district court committed reversible error by refusing to give the jury a lesser included offense instruction on the crime of simple theft. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the refusal to give the theft instruction was reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in refusing to give the instruction on theft as a lesser included offense, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the skip rule did not dictate an affirmance of the trial court's refusal to instruct on theft.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction under count four, reversed Defendant's conviction under count five, vacated the sentence imposed in count five, and remanded with directions to resentence Defendant on count four, holding (1) Defendant did not show reversible error in the trial court's rulings regarding the evidentiary matters, limitation of cross-examination, or amendment of the charging document; (2) Defendant's convictions for aggravated indecent liberties with a child in counts four and five were multiplicitous; and (3) the trial court's failure to provide the jury with an appropriate instruction and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury that Defendant was eighteen years or older at the time of the commission of the offense charged in count four was not harmless error.

A jury convicted Defendant of, among other crimes, capital murder and four counts of attempted capital murder. Defendant was sentenced to death on the capital offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for capital murder and attempted capital murder and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court's decision to allow the State's psychiatric expert to testify based on his court-ordered mental examination of Defendant, when Defendant had not waived his privilege under the Fifth Amendment in that examination by presenting a mental disease or defect defense at trial, violated Defendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (2) this constitutional error could not be declared harmless.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age of fourteen and lewd and lascivious behavior in the presence of a person under the age of sixteen. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, and the court imposed a term of lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, vacated the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, and otherwise affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding (1) a statute, and any instruction that incorporates it, must list distinct alternatives for a material element of the crime in order to qualify for an alternative means analysis and application of the super-sufficiency requirement; (2) accordingly, Defendant's jury was not presented with alternative means on the charges against him; (3) the trial court did not err in allowing the State to reopen its case-in-chief to present evidence of Defendant's age; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct, but the misconduct was harmless; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision.

Appellant was a personal care attendant for a Medicaid beneficiary. Appellant was later charged with Medicaid fraud for submitting a false claim for his services. After a bench trial Appellant was convicted under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3846(a)(1) for defrauding the Medicaid program. The court of appeals reversed Appellant's conviction, holding that the complaint charged that Appellant submitted statements for services he did not provide while the evidence at trial established that Appellant actually did provide the services for which he submitted statements. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that sufficient evidence supported Appellant's conviction for Medicaid fraud.

Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to reckless aggravated battery. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw plea, arguing that holding him to his plea would be manifest injustice. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district court may have relied upon State v. Ford, whose insistence on an allegation of innocence in a presentencing plea withdrawal motion had been rejected by the Supreme Court; and (2) his prior convictions were used improperly to increase his sentence because they were not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was unclear whether the district judge relied upon that part of Ford that had been disapproved; and (2) Defendant's second argument had no merit. Remanded for a new hearing to consider Defendant's motion under the appropriate legal standard.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder for the shooting death of Raymond Gutierrez. The trial court imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that Defendant's tenth grade education was obtained through special education classes rather than regular classes, as Defendant did not offer any evidence or testimony that completion of the tenth grade in special education classes as opposed to any other classes had any bearing on his behavior; and (2) any error in the admission of Defendant's statements to police officers the night of the shooting was harmless.