Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Dana Deal was convicted for unintentional but reckless second-degree murder in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3402(b) for the death of Donald Irvin. Deal appealed, arguing (1) the evidence established that he intentionally hit Irvin with a metal tire iron and Irvin died as a result of these intentionally inflicted blows, and (2) because he acted intentionally in inflicting those blows, he could not be guilty of unintentional but reckless second-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed Deal's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 21-3402 focuses culpability on whether a killing is intentional, not on whether a deliberate and voluntary act leads to death; and (2) in this case, there was evidence that Deal did not intend to kill Irvin, and this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that Deal committed an unintentional but reckless second-degree murder.

A state trooper arrested Lindsay May for driving under the influence. May agreed to submit to a breath test, but her initial efforts failed to provide an adequate breath sample. After the trooper informed her that the insufficient breath sample constituted a test refusal under Kansas law, May requested an opportunity to retake the breath test. The trooper denied the request. At trial, the district court found that May had validly rescinded her her test refusal and suppressed any evidence of a test refusal or of the test result on the insufficient sample. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that May effected a valid rescission of her constructive test refusal, and therefore, the district court was correct in suppressing the evidence.

A jury convicted Theodore Burnett of capital murder and aggravated kidnapping for his role in the kidnapping and murder of a pregnant fourteen-year-old. After the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict in the penalty phase of the trial regarding imposition of the death penalty, the sentencing court imposed a life sentence with no possibility of parole on the capital murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Burnett's argument that the verdict forms used in the penalty phase of the trial insufficiently protected his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy in any future prosecution was not ripe for appellate review; (2) the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct by making certain comments during closing argument; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting autopsy photographs and in instructing that another trial would be a burden on both sides; and (4) the Court had no jurisdiction to address Burnett's challenge to his presumptive sentence for his kidnapping conviction.

Jamaal Summers was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years and lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed Summers' convictions, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) admitting statements Summers made to police during an interview at his father's house; (2) allowing the victim's wife and neighbor to testify that the victim told them his friend, Homie, was coming over that evening; and (3) handling the prosecutor's inappropriate question during cross-examination of a defense witness by sustaining defense counsel's objection to the question, thus curing any possible prejudice. The Court then vacated the portion of Summers' sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the trial court did not have the authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence.

Defendant Mauricio Macias-Medina pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child pursuant to a plea agreement. After entering his plea but before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, contending that his attorney and his interpreter had coerced him into accepting the plea agreement. The district court denied Defendant's motion, determining that Defendant's pleas were knowingly and intelligently made and that they were not caused by dishonest interpretation of information or by coercion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding an absence of good cause to permit Defendant to withdraw his pleas.

Katreal Harris was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by (1) failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-defense; (2) denying Harris' motion to suppress statements made to police where the statements were voluntary; (3) denying Harris' motion for mistrial during jury selection where there was no showing of substantial prejudice; (5) imposing a hard fifty sentence without first submitting the aggravating factors to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) including Harris' prior juvenile adjudication in his criminal history without a jury determination.

Katrina Allen pleaded guilty to attempted possession of methamphetamine pursuant to a plea agreement but did not appear for her scheduled sentencing hearing as ordered pursuant to the plea agreement. Allen eventually appeared in court, but the district court released the State from its plea obligation to recommend probation at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed. Allen appealed, arguing that the district court erred in releasing the State from its obligations because she substantially complied with her obligations under the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the merits of Allen's argument, as Allen failed to address a dispositive procedural holding of the court of appeals in her petition.

Oscar Torres pleaded guilty to felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, and aggravated assault. After the Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing on a separate issue but before resentencing, Torres sought to withdraw his plea. Torres argued that the State violated the plea agreement at his original, since-vacated sentencing by reading a letter from the victim's mother asking the court to impose the maximum prison time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Torres ultimately received a new sentencing hearing at which the victim's mother personally testified and the court imposed the sentence recommended by the plea agreement, Torres' argument on appeal was moot.

Appellant Roland Guder pleaded guilty to unlawfully manufacturing a controlled substance, cultivating marijuana, criminally possessing a weapon, and possessing drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals vacated reversed the original sentence for manufacturing a controlled substance and remanded with directions to resentence Appellant. The district court modified the manufacturing sentence as it was directed to do by the court of appeals but also modified the paraphernalia sentence. At issue on appeal was whether a district court could modify a previously imposed sentence on one conviction following a remand from an appellate court for resentencing based on a different conviction. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence the modification of Appellant's paraphernalia sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that a district court is not allowed to modify any of the sentences that were not vacated on appeal.

Montrez Washington was convicted of first-degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. Washington appealed, arguing that (1) insufficient evidence was presented at his preliminary hearing, and (2) the Allen-type jury instruction given at his trial was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at Washington's preliminary hearing was sufficient to bind him over for trial, and (2) the Allen-type instruction was not clearly erroneous under the facts of this case where the instruction was included in the jury instructions given before jury deliberations and there was no indication the instruction changed the outcome of the trial.