Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Subsequent to the sentencing hearing at which Appellant Justin Jones was sentenced for committing the crime of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, the Supreme Court filed several decisions that explained the steps to be taken if a sentencing court departed from the sentence provided for in Jessica's Law. The sentencing court did not explicitly take these steps or make the corresponding findings. As a result, under these recent decisions, Appellant's sentence would be considered illegal. The State argued that Appellant could not complain about his sentence because he had agreed to the sentence as part of a plea agreement. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's sentence, noting that a defendant cannot agree to an illegal sentence. Remanded for resentencing.

Shannon Bogguess requested a bench trial on stipulated facts after his motion to suppress his confession was denied. Bogguess was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding, inter alia, that (1) Bogguess reserved his right to appeal while proceeding to a bench trial on stipulated facts even through he did not do so expressly; (2) at the Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine whether Bogguess' confession was voluntary, the district court erred in ruling that Bogguess must answer questions about events that were the bases for the crimes charged, and the court erred in striking all of Bogguess' testimony after he refused to testify further because Bogguess had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Bogguess' motion to suppress.

Anthony Kidd was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and aggravated battery. Kidd appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, (1) the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication; and (2) the prosecutor violated his duty to inform the State that an order in limine prohibited reference to Kidd's prior crimes, but this error and one witness's subsequent violation of that order did not affect the outcome of the trial, and therefore, the error was harmless. The Court rejected Kidd's remaining claims.

Ricky Hyche pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child, a Jessica's Law offense, and received a hard twenty-five sentence with lifetime electronic monitoring. Hyche appealed, arguing (1) he should be eligible for parole after twenty years, not twenty-five, pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(b)(2); (2) lifetime electronic monitoring was an invalid component of his sentence under State v. Jolly; and (3) his motion for a downward departure from the hard twenty-five sentence should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the balance of Hyche's sentence but vacated the component of his sentence imposing lifetime electronic monitoring, holding that under Jolly, this part of Hyche's sentence was inappropriate.

Joshua Cash pled guilty to sex crimes covered by Jessica's Law, Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4643, after confessing to having had sexual contact with his eight-year-old stepdaughter. The district court (1) imposed three concurrent life sentences with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not less than twenty-five years, and (2) included lifetime postrelease supervision in Cash's sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the hard-twenty-five life sentence but vacated that portion of the sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision instead of lifetime parole because Cash received an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence.

A jury convicted Christopher Tahah of felony murder and the underlying felony of discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling resulting in great bodily harm. During trial, Tahah argued for a lesser-included offense instruction of second-degree unintentional murder and involuntary manslaughter. The felony-murder rule then in effect provided that, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3414(3), requiring instructions on lesser-included offenses where there is evidence that would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser-included crime did not apply when murder was committed during the commission of a felony. The district court applied the felony-murder rule and denied Tahah's request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in refusing to give the lesser-included offense instruction in light of the Court's recent decision in State v. Berry, which held that section 22-3414(3) no longer makes an exception for felony murder.

Defendant Brandon Hulett was charged with first-degree murder. Before trial, Hulett filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion, finding no conflict of interest, no irreconcilable conflict, and no complete breakdown between Hulett and counsel. Hulett then pleaded guilty to felony murder. Before sentencing, Hulett filed a motion to set aside his plea that made no mention of any conflict between Hulett and his counsel. The district judge denied the motion. Hulett then appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was deprived of conflict-free counsel at the hearing on his motion and seeking a reversal and remand for appointment of substitute counsel to represent him at a new hearing on his motion to withdraw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no error in the district court's failure to address a nonexistent, possible conflict of interest between Hulett and counsel at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.

Anthony Stapleton committed suicide while he was incarcerated in the Shawnee County Adult Detention Center. Plaintiffs, including the administratrix of Stapleton's estate, filed suit against Defendants, Shawnee County, a detention center guard, and an assistant shift supervisor at the detention center, alleging negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants breached a duty of care, and (2) even if Defendants breached their duty of care, they were immune from suit under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the guard and shift supervisor were not entitled to summary judgment, and (2) Defendants were not entitled to KTCA immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment as (i) the guard and supervisor owed a duty of reasonable care to Stapleton and breached that duty, and (ii) the County was alleged to be vicariously liable for the guard's and supervisor's negligence; and (2) the discretionary function under KTCA was not applicable to immunize Defendants from liability for negligence in this lawsuit.

A jury convicted Michael Tully of one count of rape. The court of appeals affirmed Tully's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and district court, holding (1) Tully's rights as protected by Miranda v. Arizona and Doyle v. Ohio were violated by the State's improper comments on Tully's postarrest silence; (2) the district court gave an improper jury instruction on the element of force; (3) the district court abused its discretion in allowing a State's expert witness to offer an opinion beyond her qualifications, which also invaded the province of the jury; and (4) the cumulative errors denied Tully a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant Anthony Barnes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. Barnes was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole with a consecutive fourteen months for the aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes' convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse her discretion when she accepted Barnes' jury trial waiver and continued with the trial to the bench despite Barnes' difficulty in choosing between jury and bench trial; (2) the district judge did not err in accepting Barnes' knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial right; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Barnes possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crimes.