Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A deputy sheriff stopped Myron Coleman for speeding. While detaining Coleman, the deputy sheriff learned Coleman was on parole. Coleman's parole officer asked the deputy sheriff to detain Coleman for a search. Thirty-five minutes to an hour after the initial stop, the parole officer arrived. Coleman and his car were then searched. The search produced evidence leading to Coleman's charge for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine without tax stamps, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to package a controlled substance for sale. Coleman was convicted of all charges. On appeal, Coleman challenged the detention and search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputy sheriff had a reasonable suspicion that Coleman was engaging in criminal activity, justifying a temporary detention and allowing further investigation; (2) the deputy sheriff had no reasonable and legal basis for detaining Coleman while waiting for the parole officer to arrive at the scene; and (3) because the detention was of an unlawful duration, the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest must be suppressed.

After being convicted of kidnapping, burglary, rape, and criminal sodomy, defendant Jack Goldsmith filed a request for postconviction DNA testing. The district court ordered the testing pursuant to an agreement of the parties to test thirty-five items. The state conducted testing on only one of the items, a pair of blue sweatpants. The result of the testing was unfavorable to Goldsmith. Without granting a hearing, on unilateral request of the state, the district court dismissed the motion. Goldsmith appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and reversed the decision of the district court, holding that when a district court has issued an order for postconviction forensic DNA testing of multiple items of evidence, the state may not unilaterally discontinue testing after obtaining a single result unfavorable to the defense, nor may the district court automatically dismiss the petition. Remanded.

While defendant Carlos Montes-Mata was held in county jail on drug-related charges, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the pending charges because defendant had been held approximately 111 days when his motion was heard, exceeding the 90-day statutory speedy trial limit. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed. At issue was whether an I-247 form the county sheriff received from the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that informed the sheriff about the possibility of ICE formal proceedings against defendant tolled the 90-day requirement in Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3402(1). The Supreme Court concluded that the district judge properly discharged defendant from further liability for trial on the crimes charges, holding that the I-247 form did not constitute a present custodial claim on defendant and therefore did not affect the speedy trial question under the statute.

Appellant Raymore Levy was convicted for rape of a child under fourteen years of age, aggravated criminal sodomy of a child under fourteen years of age, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Levy received three life imprisonment sentences, the third sentence running concurrent with the first two. On appeal, Levy argued (1) his sentence was disproportionate in violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, (2) his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated after a video interview was shown at his preliminary hearing when the child victim was not there to be cross-examined, and (3) both his trial counsel were ineffective, depriving him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding appellant's first two arguments were not properly preserved for appeal and declining to decide the third issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Defendant Kevin Gatlin was convicted by a jury of intentional aggravated battery causing disfigurement after biting off the tip of another man's thumb in a bar fight. On appeal to the court of appeals, the panel ruled that Gatlin failed to preserve the issue of failure to instruct on recklessness-based lesser included offenses. Gatlin appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to give two specific lesser included offense instructions, one for reckless aggravated battery that did cause disfigurement or great bodily harm and one for reckless aggravated battery that could have caused disfigurement or great bodily harm. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, reversed Gatlin's conviction, and remanded, holding (1) that the issue was properly preserved for appeal, and therefore, the appellate court applied an incorrect standard of review, and (2) that the district court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct on the definition of recklessness and the recklessness-based lesser included offenses sought by Gatlin and his counsel.

Louie Martin, a convicted felon, was released on postrelease supervision after incarceration. Shortly after his release, the legislature passed an amendment that impacted Martin's previously imposed postrelease expiration date by extending it nearly eleven years. Martin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus against the parole board, claiming that the change in his postincarceration supervision discharge date is an unlawful ex post facto law. The district court dissolved Martin's writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) because the period of parole or postrelease supervision is part of the sentence imposed, a change to that period is a change in punishment for ex post facto considerations; (2) because the amendment is retrospective and changes the term of postrelease supervision, the law violates ex post facto protections if it acts to Martin's detriment; and (3) Martin was clearly disadvantaged by the amendment. Therefore, the amendment is an impermissible ex post facto law as applied to Martin.

In 1999, Melvin Holmes was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded because of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. In 2002, a second jury convicted Holmes of the same offenses, and in 2004 the Court affirmed the convictions. In 2007, Holmes filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel during his 2004 appeal. Specifically, Holmes contended appellate counsel failed to (1) raise the issue of ineffective trial counsel, (2) include a videotape and accompanying transcript used by the jury in the appellate record, and (3) file a reply brief or motion for reconsideration. The district court's denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Holmes appealed. After dismissing Holmes' first and third arguments, The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the videotape and transcript issue. The Court directed the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to inquire about appellate counsel's strategy in not providing the items in the record on appeal, and if the court found appellate counsel's performance was deficient, to inquire whether Holmes was prejudiced to the extent that, but for counsel's failure, Holmes' appeal would have been successful.

After pleading no contest to his criminal charges, appellant Rafael Flores was convicted of one count of first-degree felony murder and one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Flores moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because felony murder with an underlying felony of attempted voluntary manslaughter is not a crime. The district court denied the motion, and the supreme court affirmed. The court held that (1) although attempted voluntary manslaughter is not specifically mentioned in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3436(a) as an inherently dangerous felony capable of supporting a felony-murder charge, voluntary manslaughter is listed as a felony that may be inherently dangerous in certain circumstances, and because Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3401(b) anticipates that an attempt to commit an inherently dangerous felony may support a felony-murder charge, an attempted voluntary manslaughter may support a felony-murder charge; and (2) a defendant can be charged with felony murder with the underlying charge of attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter if the latter charge was so distinct from the homicide that was the subject of the felony murder charge as not to be an ingredient of the homicide.

Appellant Corinthian Bricker pleaded no contest to one count each of aggravated battery, driving under the influence, and failure to present proof of insurance. Contrary to the plea bargain agreement that recommended sentencing to Labette Bootcamp Probation, the district court sentenced Bricker to prison. Bricker then filed a motion to withdraw plea, alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to learn Bricker was ineligible for Labette. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court affirmed, holding (1) defense counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the admission criteria of Labette was not sufficient to meet one prong of Strickland v. Washington test, which states that defendant must show counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's failure to advise Bricker that he could file a pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea was insufficient grounds to warrant post-sentence withdrawal of the plea.

Appellant William Albright missed the deadline to file an appeal of his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeals. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for a waiver of the deadline in his case because he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellantâs counsel missed the deadline, and the district court dismissed his appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court should not have dismissed Appellantâs case because his appointed counselâs performance was indeed ineffective. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of Appellantâs appeal.