Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and other crimes, holding that the prosecutor did not err during closing arguments by saying, "The defense has speculated about other peoples [sic] motives, but the State has actually presented evidence."On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the State to the defense and infringed on his constitutional protections against compulsory self-incrimination. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the prosecutor's comments did not offend Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and did not fall outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's case. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for aggravated battery but affirmed his convictions for abuse of a child and aggravated endangering of a child, holding that the cumulative effect of certain errors required reversal of the aggravated battery conviction.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred by giving jury instructions that allowed the jury to convict Defendant of aggravated battery if it found that Defendant intended the conduct but not the harm; (2) during closing arguments, the prosecutor erred by telling jurors to acquit only if the jurors thought it was acceptable to inflict injuries on their children; and (3) the two errors when considered together were not harmless as to the aggravated battery conviction. Further, the Supreme Court held the district court erred by scoring a previous out-of-state conviction from Virginia for domestic assault and battery as a person crime. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, holding that Defendant met his burden of showing that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's deficient performance, the result of his trial would have been different.Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant later moved to have his conviction set aside, arguing that his appointed trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to admit into evidence a recording of a 911 call in which the caller identified someone other than Defendant as the person who killed the victim. The district court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) counsel's failure to introduce the 911 call fell below an objective standard for reasonably effective representation; and (2) Defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. View "Balbirnie v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court judge denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the basis of DNA testing results, holding that the district judge did not abuse her discretion by concluding that there was no "reasonable probability" the DNA results would have changed the original trial's outcome.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to possess with intent to sell hallucinogenic drugs, and aggravated robbery. Approximately a dozen years later, Defendant filed a request for DNA testing on some items found at the crime scene. The district judge granted the request. Defendant filed a motion to set aside his conviction or grant him a new trial in light of the DNA test results. The district judge denied the motion, concluding that the new DNA evidence was "not reasonably probable to lead to a jury reaching a different result." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying relief. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Defendant's pro se motion styled as a "Motion to Set Aside a Void Judgment under Due Process of Law and K.S.A. 22-3210," holding that the trial court correctly analyzed the motion as a motion to withdraw plea under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3210 and did not err in denying the motion as untimely.In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to premeditated first-degree murder and other crimes. In 2017, Defendant filed the motion that was the subject of this appeal. The trial court construed Defendant's motion as one to withdraw his plea under section 22-3210 and denied it as untimely. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in analyzing his motion as one to withdraw his plea instead of analyzing it as a motion to void his convictions and sentences and that he was denied due process during the plea process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly analyzed the motion as one to withdraw plea; and (2) where Defendant neither asserted nor demonstrated any grounds of excusable neglect, the motion was procedurally barred. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of possession of marijuana and cocaine, holding that the district court did not err in allowing Defendant to exercise her constitutional right of self-representation where the record did not establish that Defendant suffered from a severe mental illness.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court judge used the incorrect standard to determine whether she was competent to represent herself. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, without an indication that Defendant suffered from a severe mental illness, there was no basis to conclude that the district court judge abused his discretion when he allowed Defendant to waive her right to counsel and represent herself at trial. View "State v. Burden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as right for the wrong reason the judgment of the court of appeals holding that harmless constitutional error occurred when the district court responded to a jury question by having court staff deliver a written note to the jury room rather than convening in open court and answering the question in Defendant's presence, holding that no constitutional error occurred.Specifically, the court of appeals held that the district court violated Defendant's constitutional right to be present at a critical stage in the proceedings by responding in writing to the jury rather than giving the answer with Defendant present in the open court but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3420(d) gave the district court discretion to deliver a written response to the jury room without having Defendant present; and (2) no constitutional error occurred in this case. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the uncertainty in the residual phrase in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6304 defining a knife as "a dagger, dirk, switchblade, stiletto, straight-edged razor or any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of life character" is so great that the law is impermissibly and unconstitutionally vague.Defendant, a convicted felon, was found guilty of criminal possession of a weapon stemming from his act of pulling out a pocketknife when he got into an altercation with another man. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by rejecting his vagueness challenge to section 21-6304, which makes it a crime for a convicted felon to possess a knife. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that section 21-6304 invites "varying and unpredictable" enforcement decisions on an "ad hoc and subjective basis" and, therefore, the residual clause in section 21-6304 is unconstitutionally vague. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for first-degree felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm, aggravated battery, and criminal threat, holding that any error during the proceedings below was harmless.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by (1) declining to give his proffered instruction clarifying the definition of aiding and abetting, and (2) erred in granting the State's motion to consolidate his charges for trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any possible error in failing to give Defendant's requested jury instruction on aiding and abetting was harmless; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating Defendant's charges for trial. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for, among other things, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of oxycodone, holding that the trial court's admission of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 was evidence was not error and that sufficient evidence supported Defendant's possession of oxycodone conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the trial court erred in admitting section 60-455 evidence related to two prior methamphetamine sales to undercover detectives approximately one week before his arrest, (2) the trial court clearly erred in instructing the jury on possession of oxycodone, and (3) his conviction for possession of oxycodone was supported by insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting the prior crimes evidence; (2) invited error precluded Defendant's jury instruction claim; and (3) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's conviction for possession of oxycodone. View "State v. Brazzle" on Justia Law