Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to sell, deliver, or distribute methamphetamine. Before Defendant entered his plea, the legislature amended the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), raising the time Defendant was required to register as a drug offender from ten years to fifteen years. The district court imposed a fifteen-year registration period, finding that the amendments applied retroactively. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that retroactively applying the amendments to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was unable to satisfy the “clearest proof” standard because the record had not been sufficiently developed. View "State v. Hirschberg" on Justia Law

Defendant, who challenged the registration requirements of the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) as applied to violent offenders, was unable to satisfy the “clearest proof” standard because the record had not been sufficiently developed.Defendant was convicted of one count each of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, and criminal intent. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment and imposed lifetime registration pursuant to KORA. At the time he committed the crimes, Defendant would have been subject to registration only if the victim of the aggravating kidnapping charge under under age eighteen. After the State charged Defendant but prior to trial, the legislature amended KORA in such a away that Defendant was subject to lifetime registration. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court also affirmed for the aforementioned reasons. View "State v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

The registration requirements of the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) as applied to violent offenders are not punishment or subject to the limitations of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.At the time Defendant pled no contest to one count of second-degree intentional murder, KORA required those convicted of second-degree intentional murder to register as a violent offender for ten years. By the time Defendant was sentenced, however, the legislature had amended KORA, raising the registration period to fifteen years. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment and ordered her to register for fifteen years. Defendant appealed, arguing that requiring her to register for fifteen years, as opposed to ten, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that registration is not punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was unable to satisfy the “clearest proof” standard because the record was not sufficiently developed. View "State v. Wingo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of first-degree premeditated murder and kidnapping and the district court’s imposition of a hard twenty-five sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive seventy-seven-month sentence for the kidnapping conviction. The court held (1) the prosecutor erred in asking questions about Defendant’s retention of an attorney, but the error was harmless; (2) even if the prosecution’s questions regarding an alibi and the trial court’s admission of certain hearsay testimony and limitation of cross-examination of a State’s witness were in error, the errors were harmless; (3) the remaining issues Defendant raised on appeal were without merit; and (4) the cumulative effect of the error and assumed errors was not so great as to warrant reversal. View "State v. Sean" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and aggravated kidnapping. The court held (1) even if Defendant’s right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when forensic testing results came into evidence without Defendant having the opportunity to cross-examine the laboratory analyst who performed the tests, any such error was harmless; and (2) two out-of-court statements made by third parties were not testimonial and were properly admitted by the trial court as exceptions to the rule against hearsay. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Registration for sex offenders mandated by the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) does not constitute punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.When Appellant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, KORA required him to register for ten years. Before Appellant’s registration period expired, the Kansas Legislature amended KORA by adding a tolling provision tolling the registration period of an offender who was imprisoned or noncompliant with KORA. During the decade following his conviction, Appellant was noncompliant for at least four years and two months, and therefore, his registration period was extended. During the extended period, Appellant committed two additional offender registration violations and pleaded guilty to the offender registration violations. Appellant later moved to withdraw his plea because he was not required to register at the time of the alleged violations. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that registration pursuant to KORA for sex offenders is not punishment and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The Kansas Legislature intended the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) to be a civil, nonpunitive remedial scheme, and therefore, the retroactive imposition of KORA’s fifteen-year registration period on Appellant, as a drug offender, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.At the time Appellant committed his qualifying drug offense, KORA required him to register for ten years. Subsequent amendments made to KORA extended Appellant’s registration period to fifteen years. Appellant filed a motion for clarification on the status of his need to register. The district court filed a nunc pro tuna entry of judgment erroneously stating that Appellant’s registration period was for ten years rather than fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed and remanded the case to the district court to correct the length of registration error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) KORA registration for sex offenders is not punishment, and therefore, retroactive application of KORA”s tolling provision to sex offenders does not violate the Ex Post Fact Clause; and (2) Appellant was subject to the current fifteen-year registration requirement. View "State v. Meredith" on Justia Law

While Defendant was imprisoned for drug offenses, the legislature amended the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) by adding certain drug offenders, such as Defendant, to the list of those required to register. After Defendant was released from prison, he pled no contest to one count of failing to register. The district court subsequently revoked, reinstated, and extended Defendant’s probation multiple times. When the State moved to revoke Defendant’s probation a fourth time, Defendant filed a motion to correct his underlying sentence for failing to register, arguing that because he had not been required to register at the time of his drug conviction, his subsequent sentence was illegal. The court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s ex post facto claim because “the definition of an illegal sentence does not include a claim that the sentence violates a constitutional provision.” The Supreme Court affirmed the outcome below, albeit for different reasons, holding (1) according to the court’s decisions in State v. Wood, 393 P.3d 631 (2017), and State v. Reese, 393 P.3d 599 (2017), the lower courts had jurisdiction to hear and consider Defendant’s motion as a motion to correct an illegal sentence; but (2) Defendant’s claim failed on the merits. View "State v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions dismissing Appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. The lower courts dismissed Appellant’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the outcome below, albeit for different reasons, holding that, according to the court’s recent decisions in State v. Wood, 393 P.3d 631 (2017), and State v. Reese, 393 P.3d 599 (2017), the lower courts had jurisdiction to hear and consider Appellant’s motion. However, because that motion advanced no meritorious argument demonstrating that Appellant’s sentence was illegal, Appellant’s claim failed on the merits. View "State v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ reversal of the judgment of the district court rejecting Defendant’s motion to suppress a gun found on his person during a police patdown, holding that the court of appeals applied the incorrect test to evaluate the reasonable suspicion supporting the frisk of Defendant under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).Defendant was charged with criminal carrying of a firearm in the lobby of apartments on the campus of Wichita State University. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the patdown was within the scope of Terry because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was carrying a gun and thus were entitled to search him to ensure officer safety. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was no evidence the officers were actually, subjectively concerned for their safety or the safety of others. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied the incorrect test to evaluate reasonable suspicion supporting the Terry frisk of Defendant. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. View "State v. Bannon" on Justia Law