Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and aggravated kidnapping. The court held (1) even if Defendant’s right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when forensic testing results came into evidence without Defendant having the opportunity to cross-examine the laboratory analyst who performed the tests, any such error was harmless; and (2) two out-of-court statements made by third parties were not testimonial and were properly admitted by the trial court as exceptions to the rule against hearsay. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Registration for sex offenders mandated by the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) does not constitute punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.When Appellant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, KORA required him to register for ten years. Before Appellant’s registration period expired, the Kansas Legislature amended KORA by adding a tolling provision tolling the registration period of an offender who was imprisoned or noncompliant with KORA. During the decade following his conviction, Appellant was noncompliant for at least four years and two months, and therefore, his registration period was extended. During the extended period, Appellant committed two additional offender registration violations and pleaded guilty to the offender registration violations. Appellant later moved to withdraw his plea because he was not required to register at the time of the alleged violations. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that registration pursuant to KORA for sex offenders is not punishment and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The Kansas Legislature intended the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) to be a civil, nonpunitive remedial scheme, and therefore, the retroactive imposition of KORA’s fifteen-year registration period on Appellant, as a drug offender, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.At the time Appellant committed his qualifying drug offense, KORA required him to register for ten years. Subsequent amendments made to KORA extended Appellant’s registration period to fifteen years. Appellant filed a motion for clarification on the status of his need to register. The district court filed a nunc pro tuna entry of judgment erroneously stating that Appellant’s registration period was for ten years rather than fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed and remanded the case to the district court to correct the length of registration error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) KORA registration for sex offenders is not punishment, and therefore, retroactive application of KORA”s tolling provision to sex offenders does not violate the Ex Post Fact Clause; and (2) Appellant was subject to the current fifteen-year registration requirement. View "State v. Meredith" on Justia Law

While Defendant was imprisoned for drug offenses, the legislature amended the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) by adding certain drug offenders, such as Defendant, to the list of those required to register. After Defendant was released from prison, he pled no contest to one count of failing to register. The district court subsequently revoked, reinstated, and extended Defendant’s probation multiple times. When the State moved to revoke Defendant’s probation a fourth time, Defendant filed a motion to correct his underlying sentence for failing to register, arguing that because he had not been required to register at the time of his drug conviction, his subsequent sentence was illegal. The court of appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s ex post facto claim because “the definition of an illegal sentence does not include a claim that the sentence violates a constitutional provision.” The Supreme Court affirmed the outcome below, albeit for different reasons, holding (1) according to the court’s decisions in State v. Wood, 393 P.3d 631 (2017), and State v. Reese, 393 P.3d 599 (2017), the lower courts had jurisdiction to hear and consider Defendant’s motion as a motion to correct an illegal sentence; but (2) Defendant’s claim failed on the merits. View "State v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions dismissing Appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. The lower courts dismissed Appellant’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the outcome below, albeit for different reasons, holding that, according to the court’s recent decisions in State v. Wood, 393 P.3d 631 (2017), and State v. Reese, 393 P.3d 599 (2017), the lower courts had jurisdiction to hear and consider Appellant’s motion. However, because that motion advanced no meritorious argument demonstrating that Appellant’s sentence was illegal, Appellant’s claim failed on the merits. View "State v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ reversal of the judgment of the district court rejecting Defendant’s motion to suppress a gun found on his person during a police patdown, holding that the court of appeals applied the incorrect test to evaluate the reasonable suspicion supporting the frisk of Defendant under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).Defendant was charged with criminal carrying of a firearm in the lobby of apartments on the campus of Wichita State University. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the patdown was within the scope of Terry because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was carrying a gun and thus were entitled to search him to ensure officer safety. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was no evidence the officers were actually, subjectively concerned for their safety or the safety of others. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals applied the incorrect test to evaluate reasonable suspicion supporting the Terry frisk of Defendant. The court remanded the case for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. View "State v. Bannon" on Justia Law

The plain language of Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4508 permits privately retained counsel to pursue funding for certain services through the State Board of Indigents’ Defense Services (BIDS) so long as the defendant is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense.Petitioner, who was charged with first-degree murder, moved to be declared, through his retained counsel, partially indigent. The district court judge declared Petitioner partially indigent. When Petitioner presented the new presiding criminal judge of the district court with a request for a transcript, the judge denied the request, concluding that an indigent defendant may only access BIDS for payment of expenses associated with his defense through appointed counsel. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandamus in part and directed the district court to hold an ex parte hearing on Petitioner’s requests for investigative, expert, or other services under section 22-4508 and determine whether those services were necessary to an adequate defense, holding that the judge had a duty, despite Petitioner’s representation by retained counsel, to hold such a hearing. View "Landrum v. Goering" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The court held (1) the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant committed premeditated first-degree murder; (2) the prosecutor did not commit reversible error during closing argument; and (3) the district court did not violate Defendant’s right to present a defense by excluding photographs. View "State v. Banks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for first-degree felony murder and aggravated battery rendered after a jury trial. The court held (1) the prosecutor did not err by introducing gang affiliation evidence and the State did not mislead the district judge about its basis for the admission; and (2) Defendant’s challenge to the procedure employed by the court clerk’s office in Sedgwick County for handling pro se motions in criminal cases, as it was employed in Defendant’s case and as it is generally employed for other defendants, cannot be brought in his direct appeal. View "State v. Pollard" on Justia Law

The coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, as derived from the vicarious liability exception set forth in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-460(i)(2), can apply when the hearsay is offered at trial by a coconspirator rather than a third party.Defendant was convicted and sentenced for attempted first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder of her husband, Dennis Davey (Dennis). Defendant was prosecuted, in part, on the theory that she conspired with her daughter and two others to kill Dennis. During trial, the trial court admitted several hearsay statements that were made among the conspirators. The court of appeals concluded that the hearsay evidence was admissible under the coconspirator exception. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence because the hearsay fit within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. View "State v. Davey" on Justia Law