Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court revisited and realigned the Kansas approach to charging document sufficiency. Defendant was convicted of one count each of forgery and stalking. For the first time on appeal, Defendant argued that the charging document failed to allege all of the elements of the crime of forgery, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. In so arguing, Defendant urged the Supreme Court to reject State v. Hall in the respect that Hall made it more difficult for defendants to mount a jurisdictional challenge based on charging document error raised for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, holding (1) there is no reason for Hall’s differentiation between treatment of charging document error and other types of types of errors; (2) charging documents need not allege every element of a crime in order to invoke a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction or sustain an appellate court’s jurisdiction; (3) omission of certain information from a charging document may give a defendant a successful claim for relief that will take various forms at various stages of a prosecution before the trial court and on appeal; and (4) under the revised analysis described in this opinion, Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. View "State v. Dunn" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Kansas’ speedy trial statute, which provides that a criminal case in which a defendant has been “held to answer on an appearance bond” shall be dismissed if a trial does not occur within 180 days after arraignment. In City of Elkhart v. Bollacker, the Supreme Court held that the legislature intended the statute to apply even when a defendant had not been held on an appearance bond. In the instant case, Defendant, who was not on bond, relied on the speedy trial statute in seeking dismissal of the criminal charges. The district court dismissed the charges because a trial did not take place within 180 days after Defendant’s arraignment. The Court of Appeals affirmed based on Bollacker. The Supreme Court overruled Bollacker, holding (1) the Bollacker court violated the rules of statutory interpretation, and (2) a defendant not held to answer on an appearance bond has no statutory speedy trial right under the statute. The Court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the charges against Defendant because its right to dismissal for a statutory speedy trial violation had vested under the prior binding law. View "State v. Spencer Gifts, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1987, Appellant pled no contest to felony murder and one count of aggravated robbery and pled guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery. The district court imposed a controlling prison term of life without the possibility of parole for thirty years. In 2014, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that State v. Murdock required that his sentence be converted to a guidelines sentence under the 1993 version of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA). The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s sentence was ineligible for retroactive application of the KSGA today, and therefore, his 1987 sentence was not illegal. View "State v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, criminal threat, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant’s first trial ended in a postconviction mistrial. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed and filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that his aggravated kidnapping sentence was illegal based on State v. Murdock. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Defendant’s motion, holding (1) juror misconduct occurred but the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) any errors that occurred during trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) Defendant’s argument that his sentence was illegal was resolved by State v. Keel, which overruled Murdock. View "State v. Corey" on Justia Law

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, and refusing a preliminary breath test. Defendant appealed, arguing that the stipulated facts were insufficient to prove that she operated or attempted to operate a vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the applicable statute, as taking actual physical control of a vehicle does not satisfy the operate or attempt to operate element of DUI; and (2) the stipulated facts presented by the parties were sufficient to prove that Defendant attempted to move the vehicle. View "State v. Darrow" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and burglary. The district court sentenced Defendant to life without the possibility of parole for twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the lifetime postrelease supervision term, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and criminal discharge of a firearm; (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s vehicular burglary conviction; (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) the district court’s jury instruction on aiding and abetting was not in error; (5) the district court did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by authorizing the state to prosecute Defendant as an adult; and (6) the district court erred by noting within the journal entry of judgment that Defendant was subjected to lifetime postrelease supervision for all of his convictions. Remanded. View "State v. Potts" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered a plea of no contest to charges of second-degree intentional murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Later, Petitioner was placed in administrative segregation in response to threats of gang violence and possible involvement in contraband trafficking. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his continued administrative custody, lasting over 1,000 days, violated his due process rights. The district court dismissed the petition. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that, without at least a prima facie showing of unusually harsh conditions, continued incarceration in segregated custody does not infringe on a protected liberty interest. The Supreme Court granted in part Petitioner’s petition for review. Noting that Petitioner was no longer placed in administrative segregation, the Court denied relief, as Petitioner’s request for relief was moot, but the Court nevertheless issued this opinion to provide guidance to courts as they countered liberty interest claims in the future. The Court then concluded that duration of segregated placement is a factor that courts must consider in determining whether an inmate has met the standards for demonstrating a liberty interest infraction. View "Jamerson v. Heimgartner" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, was disciplined for violating K.A.R. 44-12-301, the regulatory prohibition on fighting. Petitioner filed a Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1501 petition against the warden of the correctional facility where Petitioner was incarcerated, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the finding by the hearing officer that Petitioner violated K.A.R. 44-12-301 was unsupported by the evidence. The district court reversed the disciplinary hearing panel’s findings, ruling that the hearing officer could not have reasonably found Petitioner guilty. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Petitioner was not accorded due process when he was found to have violated K.A.R. 44-12-301, as there was a complete failure of proof of one of the elements of the offense. View "May v. Cline" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 2008 of one count of DUI. Defendant’s 2008 conviction was classified as a fourth DUI. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a mandatory fine. The court of appeals vacated the sentence and “remanded for resentencing,” concluding that the district court erred by failing to consider community service in lieu of a direct payment of the fine. Before the district court held the remand hearing, the legislature in 2011 amended the DUI lookback provisions so that, at the time of the remand hearing, Defendant would have been resentenced for a first DUI rather than a fourth DUI. In 2012, the district court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to resentence Defendant and allowed him to perform community service in lieu of a direct payment of the fine. Defendant appealed, arguing for a retroactive application of the 2011 amendment to his 2008 conviction. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Reese. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s sentence for a fourth DUI conviction, concluding that Defendant was neither sentenced nor resentenced in 2012. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was never resentenced, and therefore, his claim to the benefit of the 2011 lookback period failed. View "State v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

In 2011, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant for a methamphetamine laboratory in Gregory Rosa's home in Leavenworth County. The house had four long-term residents. Rosa and Maureen Evans were in a relationship at the time and lived together in the upstairs master bedroom where they were found during the raid. Randall Smith lived in a bedroom on the main floor. Smith was found hiding behind a water heater in the basement. Joshua Sigler also lived in the house but was not present during the raid. Brian Brice and O'rian Heckman were also in the house in a separate bedroom during the raid. Neither lived at the house, but both would sometimes "crash there." Rosa owned the home and paid the utilities. Smith, Sigler, and Evans did not lease their rooms or otherwise pay rent. The State prosecuted Rosa on the theory that he possessed the methamphetamine found in his house. The State intended to prove its case by demonstrating that Rosa owned and exercised general control over all areas in the house and that he knew methamphetamine was in the house. Rosa did not deny he owned the premises or that the drugs were found there. Rosa challenged his conviction for possession of methamphetamine on three grounds: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) evidence of his prior drug use was improperly admitted; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct. The Kansas Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Rosa's conviction. View "Kansas v. Rosa" on Justia Law