Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State charged Defendant in two separate cases for conduct occurring in April 2010. In the first case, Defendant was found guilty of three of four charged offenses after a bench trial on stipulated facts, which included a police report filed after Defendant was arrested. In the second case, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3108(2)(a), the compulsory joinder rule, because of the admission of the police report into evidence in the trial of the first case. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of felony theft by deception. The court of appeals affirmed the district judge’s refusal to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to claim the protection of the compulsory joinder rule in section 21-3108(2)(a). View "State v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to four counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years to life on each charge of rape, to run consecutively, and to five to twenty years on the charge of attempted rape, to run concurrently. Twenty-six years after sentencing, Appellant filed a motion to correct journal entry. The district court treated the motion as one to correct illegal sentence and summarily denied it, concluding that Appellant’s sentence was legal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court followed the proper procedure in denying Appellant’s motion to correct illegal sentence; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that Appellant’s sentence was legal. View "State v. Gray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The sentencing judge imposed a hard fifty life sentence upon finding that two aggravating factors existed. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Alleyne v. United States, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504(1), arguing that the procedures used to impose her hard fifty life sentence were unconstitutional. The district judge denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant employed the wrong procedural vehicle to advance her constitutional challenge. View "State v. Warrior" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two alternative counts of first-degree felony murder, attempt to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and other criminal offenses. The district judge imposed a hard twenty life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction, a consecutive sixty-month sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, and concurrent sentences for the remaining three convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and felony murder and that the district court judge imposed an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and felony murder; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was not illegal. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

More than a dozen years after Appellant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony of manufacture of methamphetamine, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the court failed to provide lesser included offense instructions for felony murder and because the charging document was fatally defective. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of Appellant’s claims was properly raised through a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and even if the Court were to construe Appellant’s motion as a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507, it was untimely. View "State v. LaMae" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested under suspicion of driving while under the influence and taken to a law enforcement center. Defendant refused to provide a breath sample for testing, so a law enforcement officer applied for and received a warrant to search Defendant’s blood. Defendant was subsequently charged with refusing to submit to testing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, among other offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of section 8-1025. The district court dismissed the charge against Defendant that alleged a violation of section 8-1025, finding that the statute violated Defendant’s due process rights and violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the holdings in State v. Ryce, which stated that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional, are equally applicable to Defendant and resolve his case. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence and transported to the county jail, where he refused to submit to a death test. The State charged Defendant with refusing to submit to testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025(a). The district court dismissed the section 8-1025 charge, concluding that it is unconstitutional to criminalize a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test for alcohol. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 does not withstand strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interests and therefore violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. View "State v. Ryce" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. He was taken to the county jail, where he read an implied consent advisory advising him of the consequences if he refused to consent to a breath-alcohol test. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his breath test results, contending that his consent to the test was not voluntary, and therefore, the test violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. The district court concluded that Defendant’s consent to the breath test was not freely and voluntarily given. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s consent was involuntary because it was obtained by means of an inaccurate and coercive advisement and, therefore, the district court correctly suppressed Defendant’s breath-alcohol test results. View "State v. Nece" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, refusing to submit to an evidentiary test under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, and related offenses. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or suppress evidence, arguing that section 8-1025, which criminalized his refusal to submit to a breath test, was unconstitutional. The district court concluded that section 8-1025 was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and also imposed an unconstitutional condition on the privilege to drive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional. View "State v. Wycoff" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder. Before sentencing, the district judge ruled that Defendant qualified for Stand-Your-Ground immunity from prosecution on the attempted second-degree murder charge. The judge vacated the second-degree murder conviction and dismissed that charge. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s immunity order and reinstated Defendant’s attempted second-degree murder conviction, holding that the district judge had no legal basis for his unilateral decision. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Defendant’s attempted second-degree murder conviction because the district judge had entered a judgment of acquittal on the charge; and (2) a district judge may sua sponte grant Stand-Your-Ground immunity to a criminal defendant after a jury has returned a guilty verdict but before sentence on the conviction has been pronounced. View "State v. Barlow" on Justia Law